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Abstract 
One of the main challenges facing contemporary political theory is how humans 
should respond to their complicity in systemic injustice and political oppression, so 
as to facilitate positive social transformation. The problem of judging responsibility 
for complicity lies at the heart of public and scholarly debates about global poverty, 
transitional justice, racism, (neo-)colonialism, and climate change. This thesis builds 
on the works of Hannah Arendt and Margaret Archer to explore the relationship 
between complicity, judgement, and a person’s stance towards reality – what I term 
an ‘ethos of reality’. I argue that the suitability of judgements on complicity depends 
not only on our receptivity to suffering and our ability to identify marginal 
contributions to injustice. Instead, judgements need to be informed by an ethos that 
affirms a multi-layered, shared reality and seeks to engender a more hospitable 
world-in-common, as the prism through which to evaluate complicity and 
responsibility. The thesis highlights the kind of focus on structure, agency, and 
plurality that is needed to develop this less reductive ethos of reality. 
The thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 1 introduces key themes in Hannah 
Arendt’s thought. I relate Arendt’s theory of reflective judgement to the problem she 
faced – totalitarianism and a break in tradition – and discuss her response through 
pluralist politics as the locus of a new ethic of reality. Chapter 2 analyses the debate 
around Hannah Arendt’s account of judgement. This secondary literature enriches 
our understanding of judgement and points to a neglected dimension of judgement: 
its embeddedness in the interplay of structures and agency. Chapter 3 picks up 
where this literature leaves off. I discuss Margaret Archer’s case for theorising 
causally distinct, but temporally interlinked, powers of agency and structure. Chapter 
4 articulates the hybridisation of Arendt’s and Archer’s work and engages critically 
with existing conceptualisations of complicity. I argue that the dominant moral and 
legal framework and its critical alternatives tend to undertheorize structure-agency 
and risk side-stepping the challenges of judging responsibility. Finally, Chapter 5 
illustrates what a judgement that is informed by a less reductive ethos of reality 
could look like instead. I engage with Nobel laureate Herta Müller’s autofiction, 
written in response to life under the Romanian communist dictatorship. Müller shows 
how attentiveness to structure, agency, and plurality can help us judge responsibility 
for complicity and engender resistance to injustice and oppression. 
 
Lay Summary 
One of the main challenges facing contemporary political theory is how humans 
should respond to their complicity in injustice and oppression, in order to help 
change society for the better. The problem of judging responsibility and complicity 
lies at the heart of debates about (neo-)colonialism, global poverty, transitional 
justice, racism, and climate change. In this thesis I argue that the suitability of a 
person’s judgement for tackling complicity depends on its focus on the world 
humans have in common, which allows them to enlarge their sense of reality and 
identify and address issues of general interest. In other words, the project departs 
from an immediate concern with suffering and injustice and highlights the need to 
respond to the underlying challenge of how we engage with reality together. This 
orientation towards a shared reality is in turn dependent on a consideration of the 
interplay of three key components to social reality: structure, agency, and plurality. 
The thesis proposes that judgements attentive to the common world in its multi-
layered and shared character can be described as fulfilling a less reductive ‘ethos of 
reality’ – a normative project dedicated towards creating a hospitable common 
world. To make these points I bring together Arendt’s influential work on judgement 
and her reflection on how humans are dependent on others for making sense of 
reality, with Margaret Archer’s contribution to debates about the interrelationship 
between structures and human agency. I engage critically with theoretical debates 
about complicity and turn to the work of Nobel laureate Herta Müller to illustrate 
what a different engagement with complicity could look like. 
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Recent public debates instigated by social movements have put a spotlight on 
patriarchal society (#me too/ Time’s Up), institutional racism (Black Lives Matter), 
environmental challenges (350.org/ Extinction Rebellion), and capitalist exploitation 
(Occupy Wall Street), amongst many other contemporary political problems. The 
discussions highlight that taking responsibility for complicity in systemic injustice1 
has become an important part of everyday life, especially in affluent Western 
societies. Amidst the global condemnation of unjust practices, those profiting from 
injustice seem increasingly less able to maintain their innocence and proclaim their 
ignorance of any wrongdoing that they contributed to. 
Yet, late modern2 societies continue to be characterised by a general failure to act 
upon the omnipresent demands for facing up to one’s involvement in complex 
oppression. The unwillingness or inability to tackle complicity in racism, sexism, or 
the destruction of the environment, has been further exacerbated by the recent re-
emergence of reactionary populist forces and parties in the US and large parts of 
Europe. The enduring failures by unresponsive, complicit actors are cause for much 
despair and frustration. However, they could also serve as catalysts for a sustained 
public and theoretical deliberation about the complexities of responsibility and 
complicity. It is my intention in this thesis to contribute to this interrogation. I seek to 
refine the theoretical toolkit available for thinking through the problem of complicity 
and the potential and limitations of political actors taking responsibility for injustice. 
Scholars tackling what I will call the problem of ‘responsibility-for-complicity’ have 
formulated a wide variety of interpretations of what philosophers, scientists, and 
                                                          
1
 I follow Iris Young’s (2011: 45) use of the concept ‘structural injustice’, which she defines 
as someone being in a position that they should not be in, as a result of specific social 
processes. I avoid the term structural in order to capture the contribution of both structures 
(the system of relationships between social positions or of social wholes, e.g. MPs and 
constituents, the state structure, the structure of capitalism) and human agency (the capacity 
of humans to act and respond to their context) to injustice. At times, I also refer to political 
oppression, problem and violence to capture wrongs that go beyond merely being unjust, for 
example apartheid or climate change, which is not to claim that these concepts can be easily 
separated. Overall, I wish to capture a wide range of unjust, violent, and oppressive 
practices that are facilitated by entrenched forms of complicity, in full awareness that there 
are significant differences between for example racism, capitalist exploitation, or political 
violence and indeed between racism in different countries, e.g. in South Africa or Japan. 
2
 I take late modernity to refer to the period from the 1980s onwards that began with the 
launch of the World Wide Web, the rise of multi-national corporations and the deregulation of 





legal practitioners mean by complicity. Their formulations range from accounts that 
focus on individual acts of participation in complex, pervasive injustice (Kutz, 2000), 
to theories that identify in complicity an inescapable part of being human (Sanders, 
2002). The differences in their interpretations of what constitutes complicity are 
important, because they translate into different demands of responsibility (Young, 
2011). Broadly speaking, debates on complicity and responsibility can be divided 
into a dominant moral and legal philosophical framework and several critical 
alternatives. 
The dominant position focuses especially on (relatively) easily identifiable acts of 
contributing to wrongdoing that are morally problematic and that sometimes ground 
legal culpability (Kadish, 1985; Lepora and Goodin, 2013). Typical examples include 
a lookout during a heist or a police officer who turns a blind eye to a crime. This 
literature provides sophisticated means to capture contributions far removed from 
the principal act of wrongdoing. Critics of this legal-moral framework nonetheless 
reject the individualism underpinning its conception of complicity and responsibility. 
Alternatives informed by critical theory and post-structuralist thought instead focus 
on contexts where a concern with identifiable wrongdoers is no longer adequate, 
because of the systemic nature of wrongdoing (Afxentiou et al., 2016). Such 
approaches zoom in on the structural dimensions of capitalism and colonialism and 
their role in thinking through responsibility and complicity. Recent literature has 
therefore turned to the problem of how to cultivate responsiveness to systemic 
injustice when there are no clearly identifiable, unencumbered agents (Beausoleil, 
2014, 2017; Coles, 2016; Hayward, 2017; Loacker and Muhr, 2009; Oliver, 2010; 
Schiff, 2014). 
Neither the dominant paradigm nor its alternatives, I argue, capture fully what is at 
stake in understanding complicity and responsibility for such systematic wrongs. 
Engaging with existing accounts critically, this thesis proposes a turn to the 
underlying problem of political judgement. We need to ask ourselves how each of us 
can judge our complicity in unjust practices in order to facilitate positive social 
transformation. As academics, we also need to think about how we can theorise 
appropriate ways of judging responsibility-for-complicity. The existing debate on 
complicity and responsibility centres around human’s capacity for judgement in at 
least three important ways: it asks whether a person could have judged and 





and responded to by, for example, a court; and how these judgements are related to 
judgements about how society is formed, how wrongdoing occurs, and how positive 
social change is possible. I add to these investigations by turning to the debate on 
political judgement for further insights. 
Whatever the context of complicity, I maintain that judgement is a capacity essential 
to making sense of, and giving meaning to, the reality we3 have in common. 
Judgement is not merely a tool to choose between different options and to judge the 
degree of our complicity, but a process embedded in what I will call an ‘ethos of 
reality’.4 This ethos describes a normative project that all humans pursue throughout 
their life, more or less well, and that is distinctive for each person. It consists in 
establishing a stance towards reality that mediates our context so that we may come 
to terms with our situation and meet our concerns, needs, and desires. Because of 
the close connection between judgement and human’s sense of reality, I identify a 
distinct ethico-political challenge in how we can suitably engage with the world that 
precedes the problem of judging responsibility-for-complicity. In particular, this thesis 
highlights that the starting point for tackling complicity in the varied ways suggested 
by the literature on complicity, must be the cultivation of an ethos attentive to the 
interplay of three components of reality, structure, agency, and plurality. 
Admittedly, what ‘attentiveness’ and ‘structure’, ‘agency’, and ‘plurality’ mean, can 
vary extensively. I nonetheless challenge reductive positions that put unwarranted 
weight on only one of these three components in their account of social change – for 
example on the cultivation of responsive individuals (over-emphasising receptive 
agency), or on the role of structural crisis (displaying an overarching focus on 
structure), or on the dissolution of conflict through consensus among a plurality of 
views (over-estimating the potential of collective responses to injustice). As 
representative of this type of reductive theorising, the thesis criticizes the dominant 
                                                          
3
 Throughout this thesis I rely on the first-person plural we, us, our, alongside ‘humans’ to 
address the subject of this investigation. I am aware of the dangers that come with these 
descriptors: they obscure differences between people and potentially hide the hierarchies of 
domination that are central to debates on complicity and responsibility. I follow Arendt in 
interpreting ‘we’ as not a pre-defined category, e.g. political theorists or citizens of Western 
society, but as an imagined community that in the process of reading and writing comes into 
being and is open to contestation. Insofar as I address key characteristics of the human 
condition, the person judging responsibility-for-complicity that I have in mind can include a 
wide range of people around the world. I accept that the thesis is biased towards my own 
perspective as a privileged citizen of one of the richest countries in the world. 
4
 My description of an ethos of reality builds on and extends Patricia Owens’s interpretation 





legal-moral framework on complicity, as well as post-structuralist and critical theory 
alternatives. I will argue that, because they lose sight of the contribution that all 
these three elements – structure, agency, plurality – continuously and 
simultaneously make to social transformation, such positions fail to address 
adequately how we should judge responsibility-for-complicity. 
To find the right balance between making concrete judgements on complicity and 
the need to attend to the complex interplay of structure, agency, and plurality is 
difficult. More often than not, we are likely to end up reducing reality to our preferred 
vision of the world. The challenge of establishing a suitable engagement with reality 
can also be at odds with our (immediate) reactions to the problem of responsibility-
for-complicity. The desire to alleviate the suffering of oneself or others, for example, 
may prevent us from caring for a world that is shared by the privileged and suffering 
alike. The difference – often formulated in terms of Arendtian worldliness and a post-
structuralist self-other binary – will become clearer throughout the thesis. As I will 
show, any hope we might have of humans actively5 participating in the 
transformation of unjust practices depends on avoiding, and indeed combating, the 
reductionisms of reality that plague (late) modernity. To advance this argument, I 
build on the work of Hannah Arendt and Margaret Archer with a view to outlining a 
more complex, more accurate and thus hopefully more inspiring – account of 
judgment. 
Political Judgement – Hannah Arendt and Margaret Archer 
To get to the core of the problem of judging responsibility-for-complicity, I propose to 
delve deeply into the conceptualisation of judgement. My interpretation of judgement 
as being both the source of, and informed by, our ethos of reality, emerges out of a 
turn to a central scholar of political judgement, Hannah Arendt. Throughout much of 
her life, Arendt faced the destructive forces of totalitarianism and mass society on 
humans and their engagement with reality. In response, she sought to find new 
ways for human beings to grapple with the (violent) past and create a flourishing, 
hospitable6 world that could be shared in common (Arendt, 1973). She considered 
                                                          
5
 I do not wish to suggest what exactly an active participation entails, for example to what 
extent it requires intentionality, but the role of human agency should be more than 
coincidental and be recognisably human. 
6
 With the term ‘hospitable’, I respond to Arendt’s negative observation on ‘the irritating 
incompatibility between the actual power of modern man [….] and the impotence of modern 





the negative and positive implications that arise out of the fact that humans inhabit 
the world together – each with a distinctive and partial perspective on the world. In 
particular, Arendt highlighted the potential of politics as a space for producing 
meaning, which helps people refine their partial perspectives on the world by 
exchanging opinions with others (Arendt, 1998). Judgement plays an important role 
in this politically sustained sense of reality, because it gives meaning to what 
appears in the public sphere, provides the standards through which to evaluate 
action, and articulates what seems worthy of (future) political judgement. 
My Arendtian interpretation of judgment and its relationship to an ethos of reality 
emerges in contraposition to debates about heightened pluralism in late modernity. 
The dominant position in political theory, commonly associated with the works of 
Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls, interprets the pluralism of values and beliefs 
characterising contemporary societies as ‘burdens of judgement’ (Rawls, 1996: 
54ff.). Seen through this lens, pluralism and the inevitable conflict that arises 
between views and judgements in society, pose a threat to decision-making 
processes that needs to be ‘managed’. In response, democratic theorists turn to a 
model of deliberative democracy that adheres to rational standards. In contrast, 
Arendt and her followers, commit to seeing human plurality primarily as a source of 
– rather than an obstacle to – good judgement.7 They are concerned with the loss of 
a world in which human plurality can find its expression and objects of shared 
interest are made tangible for judgement and action. 
The scholarship on Arendt’s reflective judgement acknowledges that, in moving 
away from the narrow concern with consensus and validity claims, the 
conceptualisation of judgement still faces the following challenge: how to maintain 
the critical potential of judgement to gain purchase on reality and give it meaning, 
without introducing transcendental standards for judgement. This is also sometimes 
formulated as the problem of how to judge new appearances in the public sphere in 
ways that do not reduce them to what has been. For a suitable answer scholars turn 
to the potential in formulating a refined approach to the relationship between the 
person judging and their context. Judgements are neither the outcome of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
established’ (Arendt, 1973: viii). A hospitable world accordingly reconciles the powers of 
humans to create a common world in their own fashion and a human need to come to 
understand that world together. 
7
 Albena Azmanova (2012) and Linda Zerilli (2016a) provide projects that seek to replace the 
scepticism towards pluralism found in deliberative democratic theories through an embrace 





deliberations by a dis-embedded, unencumbered person, nor merely the direct 
expression of underlying social structures such as gender, race, or class. 
Understanding this complex relationship between judging person and context is key 
to any project that affirms the potential in plurality to improve8 judgement without 
seeking unwarranted claims to objectivity.9 This thesis therefore proposes to 
formulate an account of social conditioning that is compatible with the pluralism that 
emerges out of Arendt’s thought. 
Arendt scholars have fruitfully turned to social theoretical insights to cross-pollinate 
Arendt’s commitment to pluralism with an account of social conditioning that 
foregrounds the role of structure in practices of judgment. Some invoke Bourdieu’s 
contribution to the debate on the relationship between structure and human agency 
to counterbalance the intellectualist tendencies in the Arendt-inspired judgement 
scholarship (Azmanova, 2012; Kornprobst, 2014; Mihai, 2016b; Weidenfeld, 2013). 
Indebted to their insights on the imbrication of judgement with issues of power and 
injustice, my turn to British social theorist Margaret Archer serves a related, but 
different purpose: to complement Arendt’s theorising on judgement and plurality by 
shedding light on the interplay between structure and agency that frames pluralism. 
In her own words, Archer continues Arendt’s project ‘to put forward a model [of 
society] that is recognisably human’ (Archer, 2016: 138).10 She helps clarify Arendt’s 
                                                          
8
 Improvement is here not understood in terms of providing better arguments but in the 
sense of refining our sense of reality which always entails understanding how the world is 
objectively, subjectively, and intersubjectively constituted. 
9
 I understand objectivity as the desire to depart from all that is partial, dependent on 
individual opinions and perspectives, towards a position of impartiality that claims to be 
neutral and context-independent. This move towards objectivity is particularly familiar from 
logical positivism and is implicit in debates about the validity of political judgement, i.e. how 
can we presuppose that some judgements are necessarily better than others? Throughout 
the thesis I will recuperate the term objectivity to refer to an acceptance that there are 
objects that are intersubjectively shaped and accessed, but irreducible to our perspectives 
on it. Unlike the former sense of objectivity, this form of object-ivity is always both situated 
and impartial. 
10
 The full quote reads: ‘to put forward a model that is recognisably human; one that retains 
Arendt’s notion of the “Human Condition” as entailing a reflexive “Life of the mind”’ (Archer, 
2016: 138). This quote provides a rare example of Archer explicitly acknowledging the 
affinities and overlap between her and Arendt’s projects. The secondary literature on their 
thoughts seldom makes the connection between Arendt’s and Archer’s work, with the 
exception of Philip Walsh (2015) and Daniel Chernilo (2017). Walsh is primarily concerned 
with what sociology can learn from Arendt and Chernilo addresses the humanist projects of 
both Arendt and Archer without seeking their hybridisation. Together with recent scholarship 
that links Arendt’s thought with political theory and IR realisms (Klusmeyer, 2011; Owens, 
2008; Vogler and Tillyris, 2019), these authors provide a novel opportunity for a fruitful 





commitment to plurality by addressing the dependence of this notion of plurality on 
an appropriate account of structures and agency that remains obscured in Arendt’s 
thought. 
Archer (1995) responded to tendencies in the social sciences to explain social 
phenomena by emphasising either structural or agential capacities, or by 
highlighting their inseparability. According to Archer, these forms of conflation 
cannot explain the contribution of both structures (networks of relationships between 
social positions) and agency (distinct capacities of each human being). In response, 
she proposes a model of social transformation in which structures pre-date agency 
which, in turn, transforms structure. The analytical distinction allows a closer look at 
their interrelated but distinct properties and causal powers. She calls this model 
analytical dualism, as opposed to an emphasis on the inseparability of structure and 
agency, which she terms ‘duality’ and criticises for its inability to theorise the 
experience of feeling both free and constrained and for oscillating between receptive 
agency and recursive social processes. The distinction gains in importance, and will 
be further sharpened, as my argument develops. Following investigations into the 
role of structure, Archer spent the last two decades working on a systematic account 
of human agency freed from a reduction of agency to social explanations. She has 
shed light on the development of a sense of self and personal identity, and more 
recently, on modes of reflexivity through internal conversations and their 
transformation in late modernity (Archer, 2000, 2003, 2007, 2012). 
In this thesis, I seek to hybridise Arendt’s theory of reflective judgement with 
Archer’s realist social theory in order to critically evaluate current responses to the 
problem of responsibility-for-complicity outlined above. Through their hybridisation, I 
propose an account of judgment guided by a less reductive ethos of reality – which, 
I believe, illuminates what is at stake when we grapple with our own implication in 
widespread injustices. 
Main Objectives 
The thesis aims to bring together three debates – on complicity and responsibility, 
on political judgement, and on structure-agency. At different stages of my argument, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
by their different language games. While my argument does not depend on articulating to 
what extent realisms share a family resemblance, the thesis draws its strength from a 
commitment to an attentive facing up to and caring for a world not of our choosing common 
to political and social forms of realism including Arendt’s ethic of reality and Archer’s critical 





the thesis provides an overview of the current state of the three debates. I start with 
political judgement literature and highlight that, in recent years, the debate has 
focused on complementing Arendt’s emphasis on human plurality with a suitable 
description of social conditioning (chapter 2). I then show how debates on the 
relationship between structure and agency have turned to disagreements about the 
role played by habitual and reflective action, and the changes that come with late 
modernity, with a particular focus on Archer’s contribution to these discussions 
(chapter 3). Finally, I observe that the debate on complicity has increasingly turned 
to the challenge of receptivity towards suffering, as indicated above (chapter 4). 
Attentive to these developments and their combined potential, my argument 
proceeds along the following steps that I take to be essential for arriving at an 
adequate theory of judging responsibility-for-complicity. First, I turn to the underlying 
problem of how to judge complicity and responsibility. Secondly, I highlight that the 
question of how we judge responsibility-for-complicity is preceded by the problem of 
how we can make sense of reality. Without an answer to that question, responses to 
complicity and responsibility are unlikely to achieve their overall goal, i.e. positive 
social transformation. Thirdly, building on Arendt scholarship I argue that this 
ethically distinct problem, i.e. giving meaning to reality, cannot be addressed by 
turning to radical forms of subjectivism or objectivism.11 Instead, Arendt offers a 
commitment to the potential in intersubjectivity, which helps find the right balance 
between objectivity and subjectivity. In engaging with the plurality of perspectives in 
a community, judgements on complicity can become critical without losing sight of 
the ‘it-seems-to-me’12. Fourthly, this means that debates on, and practices of, 
responsibility-for-complicity must be orientated towards the common world that 
sustains our intersubjective sense of reality. The concept ‘common world’ refers 
both to the objects, structures, ideas, and interactions, that a group of people have 
in common insofar as their judgements and actions refer to shared objects, and that 
becomes common by interchanging opinions and views and through the ability to 
                                                          
11
 With radical or impossible subjectivism, I refer to a position that reduces reality to human 
perceptions of it, drawing closely on Zerilli (2016a). In its place, I delineate a subjectivism 
that highlights the causal efficacy of human’s sense of self, which is connected to each 
human being’s unique perspective on the world. Radical objectivism entails a desire for 
transcendence of the merely ‘subjective’ or ‘partial’ understanding of social formations. In its 
place, I highlight an objectivism that demands of us attention to a reality that is irreducible to 
our perspectives on it. 
12
 The ‘it-seems-to-me’, dokei moi, is ‘the mode […] in which an appearing world is 





see it from each other’s perspective. This common world can be impoverished, 
meaning that humans no longer make references to the same object and/or are no 
longer able to see the object from the other’s perspective. Fifthly, and this is where 
the thesis extends recent discussions on judgement and debates on complicity, a 
commitment to intersubjectivity fails unless it is combined with an adequate account 
of subjectivity and objectivity. The common world is equally intersubjectively, 
objectively, and subjectively constituted, i.e. it emerges out of the interplay of 
structure, agency, and plurality. To articulate the right balance between these three 
components to the common world, I turn to Margaret Archer’s contribution to 
debates on structure-agency. Together, Arendt and Archer provide a theoretical 
framework that reveals how structure, agency, and plurality must be understood so 
that a focus on any one of them does not come at the cost of, or fall back on, the 
other two. In simple terms, my hybridisation of their work reveals how we can 
account for the role that structures such as gender or class play in shaping our 
world, without denying the contribution that humans, individually and collectively, 
make to our context. I conclude that a response to the problem of responsibility-for-
complicity entails an orientation towards a common world that draws its strength 
from our affirmation of the multi-layered, shared character of reality. 
From these steps taken in developing a refined theoretical toolkit arise the following 
contributions to the debates on complicity and responsibility, structure-agency, and 
political judgement. With regards to political judgement literature, I take up the 
challenge of complementing Arendt’s emphasis on human plurality with an 
appropriate subject- and object focus, or theory of social conditioning. The thesis 
turns to Archer’s realist social theory to add a subjectivism and objectivism that 
avoid tendencies towards reducing plurality to a plethora of perspectives that can be 
managed through certain ‘immanent’ or ‘transcendent’ principles. Through the 
hybridisation of Arendt’s and Archer’s work, I maintain an emphasis on the 
importance of the ‘it-seems-to-me’, the intersubjective constitution of the common 
world, and the fact that the objects of judgements are irreducible to the perspectives 
on that object. In relation to debates on structure-agency, I bring into focus Arendt’s 
unique concern with plurality. The discussion on structure-agency has traditionally 
centred around individuals. More recently, social theory has experienced various 
turns to relationality, including in the form of relational sociology (Dépelteau, 2018; 
Donati, 2011). Arendt’s pluralism can continue to offer key insights that complement 





concern with the political implications of the fact that humans live in the world 
together. Finally, with regards to debates on complicity and responsibility, I highlight 
the problematic formulation of structure-agency that befalls the ethics of 
responsiveness, which can be amended by articulating a less reductive ethos of 
reality. Whatever else we might wish judgement to achieve, without acknowledging 
its dualism and pluralism any project relying on the human capacity for judgement is 
prone to failure. This is because these two dimensions draw on key features of the 
human condition. They account for the distinct causal contributions of structure, 
agency, and plurality, without which no social transformation could be explained.  
Thesis Structure 
The thesis consists of five main chapters. Each chapter addresses a different aspect 
of my response to how humans can judge their responsibility-for-complicity in 
systemic injustice and political oppression. 
Chapter 1 focuses on Arendt’s thought, which provides important insights into the 
pluralist dimension to judgement. Arendt argued that plurality has three components: 
the fact that humans share certain conditions in the world, that they remain unique in 
their perspectives on reality, and the fact that a world exists in-between people that 
enables them to maintain this sameness and distinction. Only an approach to 
plurality attentive to all three components can respond appropriately to the fact that 
humans have a world in common that they can only make hospitable together. To 
unpack this pluralist dimension to judgement, I focus on the following key concepts 
in Arendt’s thought: reality, politics, and judgement. I begin by introducing the 
potential of politics to help create a hospitable common world. My discussion 
secondly turns to reality: Arendt highlights that her pluralist politics can help humans 
find new ways of refining and confirming their sense of reality together as the source 
for adequate judgements. The final section of the chapter turns to reflective 
judgement. Arendt teaches us that non-determinate forms of judgement, which 
simultaneously draw on a political community and constitute that community, can 
help maintain a public sphere in which a plurality of views can be expressed and 
objects become of common interest. 
Chapter 2 analyses the scholarly debate on Arendt’s concept of reflective 
judgement. I identify two phases to the debate and my discussion centres on four 
recent projects that seek to valorise and expand on Arendt’s theory. The projects 





imagination, the affective and unconscious domains, storytelling, and common 
sense. These insights help in providing a more sophisticated conception of political 
judgement. They also highlight in different ways that the issue of social conditioning 
is key to understanding how we can say that some judgements are better than 
others, without following narrow concerns with validity and rationality. An emphasis 
on the first dimension to judgement, i.e. its capacity to engage a plurality of 
perspectives, is no longer seen as enough to gain critical purchase on political 
issues. Instead, scholars seek to say more about the situated agency preceding 
judgement. 
Chapter 3 continues the Arendtian project on judgement outlined in chapter 2 and 
delves more deeply into the issue of social conditioning. I argue that Archer’s critical 
realism offers insights into the relationship between structure and agency that 
enhance Arendt’s project of political judgement. In drawing on Archer, I suggest that 
the dualist dimension of judgement entails two key elements. Firstly, it involves a 
suitable objectivism, by which I mean an orientation towards a multi-layered reality 
that is independent from our epistemic access to it, yet always socially mediated. 
Secondly, dualism requires attention to subjectivity, by which I mean a sense of self 
that is embodied, relational, emotional, but also irreducible to the social or discursive 
dimensions to reality, and that draws on reflexivity in the form of an internal 
conversation to mediate between the internal and external context of its agency. 
Archer thus adds to the conceptualisation of political judgement a focus on both 
structure and agency alongside plurality. 
Chapter 4 hybridises Arendt’s and Archer’s theories to engage critically with the 
conceptualisation of responsibility and complicity. Following a brief discussion of the 
dominant legal and moral philosophical conception of complicity and responsibility, 
inadequate in its focus on de-contextualized individuals and their intentional 
contributions to wrongdoing, I evaluate several recent critical alternatives. Chapter 4 
contributes to this literature by showing how even these critical alternatives fail to 
account appropriately for the dualism of structure and agency: their arguments fall 
back on cultivating an improved moral self independently from the world, which, in 
turn, affects their ability to orientate judgement adequately towards a common world. 
I argue that they, too, have a diminished capacity to conceptualise responsibility and 
complicity because they do not capture the dualism of structure and agency 





features of judging responsibility-for-complicity informed by a less reductive ethos of 
reality. 
Finally, chapter 5 renders my theoretical analysis more tangible, by engaging with 
Nobel laureate Herta Müller’s autofiction. Written in response to the reality of life 
under the Romanian communist dictatorship (especially in the 1980s), her essays, 
novels, interviews, and collages entail and reflect on a resistant practice of ‘living in 
the detail’. Müller hoped that accounting for concrete action, objects, and moments – 
to live in the detail – could give her life some meaning and stability beyond the 
uncertainty produced by state terror. The practice is also part of a normative project, 
which I interpret as exemplary of my proposed ethos of reality: she extends this 
focus on the concrete through attentiveness to the distinct qualities and interplay of 
structure, agency, and plurality. Müller’s writing seeks to create, build, maintain, and 
protect a common world, one that remains open to innovation and transformation. 
To a regime that through its repressive apparatus sought to systematically 
undermine individuality and the creation of a flourishing common world, she 
opposes a fictionalised acknowledgement of the complexity of reality. Her example 
will hopefully materialise the main objective of this dissertation: to think about 





Chapter 1 – Hannah Arendt & the Pluralist Dimension to Judgement 
‘What is at stake here is this common and 
factual reality itself, and this is indeed a political 
problem of the first order’ 
(Arendt, 2006a: 232) 
This thesis responds to debates on how humans should judge their complicity in 
injustice in order to take responsibility and facilitate positive social transformation. 
The problem of ‘responsibility-for-complicity’, as I label it in this thesis, raises difficult 
questions about the nature of complicity and the potential and limitations of 
acknowledging responsibility. I contribute to these hotly debated issues in and 
beyond academia, by thinking through the force of political judgement as a faculty 
and practice that is central to assuming responsibility. To this end, the present 
chapter turns to a prominent scholar in the debates on political judgement, Hannah 
Arendt. Unfortunately, Arendt’s theorising on judgement was left unfinished at the 
time of her death in 1975. Nonetheless, the remarks on judging scattered throughout 
Arendt’s work provide ample evidence of her views, views that I will later bring to 
bear on the problem of judging complicity in systemic injustice and political 
oppression. 
Arendt described judgement as ‘the ability to say “this is wrong,” “this is beautiful,”’ 
(Arendt, 1981a: 193). She understood it as the process that helps individuals 
position themselves in relation to particular events, issues, and people. Through 
judgement, humans disclose something of themselves and of the world as they see 
it, they reveal differences and communalities between themselves and others 
(Arendt, 2006a: 220). In so doing, judgement helps make sense of reality and give it 
meaning.1 In facing up to and coming to terms with events that are never fully under 
our control, judgement enables us to affirm our freedom to respond to whatever 
happens in a way that is neither pre-determined, nor fully idiosyncratic. Any 
contribution that judgement can provide to responding to the problem of 
‘responsibility-for-complicity’ is thus related to its capacity for making sense of 
reality, to produce meaning, and to situate humans in relation to events, issues, and 
other people. This is the first point I wish to emphasise in this chapter, the 
connection between judgement and our sense of reality. 
                                                          
1
 Arendt argued that humans, ‘in so far as they live and move and act in this world, can 
experience meaningfulness only because they can talk with and make sense to each other 





Arendt rarely referred to political judgements. Political judgement for her does not 
describe a distinct type of judgement that could be differentiated from other judging 
practices by its content. Instead, according to Arendt judgement becomes political 
wherever a person formulates it through engagement with a plurality of 
perspectives. The contribution that judgement provides in addressing political 
problems such as ‘responsibility-for-complicity’ is, for her, dependent on this 
orientation. I therefore draw on Arendt’s thought to outline the first of two dimensions 
to judging politically that I seek to articulate in this thesis: the pluralist dimension to 
judgement.2 
In talking of ‘pluralism’, I seek to capture what it means for judgement to be attentive 
to plurality as a key feature of being human. By plurality, I refer to the fact that 
humans have a world in common that they can only make hospitable together. 
Arendt stands out as a scholar who spent most of her career dedicated to 
emphasising that a response to a variety of political and philosophical problems 
must acknowledge the fundamental plurality of human existence. To map out the 
implications of plurality for judgement, I engage with three key concepts in Arendt’s 
thought: politics, reality, and judgement. 
Section 1.1 considers the close connection between plurality and politics. Arendt 
raised the question, what is politics? and concluded that plurality is central to its 
constitution (Arendt, 2002: 15). Their interrelationship means that plurality can only 
be suitably addressed through the creation of a public sphere in which a diversity of 
views on a shared reality can be expressed and lead to collective action. Through 
this emphasis, Arendt cleared the political sphere of its conventional association 
with instrumental, interest-driven thinking. This instrumentalism is primarily 
orientated towards how politics benefits a particular individual or pressure group. We 
                                                          
2
 In my engagement with Arendt, the focus lies more on excavating the importance of 
pluralism for judgement and less on providing a new reading of her work. Chapter 1 
continues a (loose) tradition of interpretations started by Margaret Canovan (1992) and Lisa 
Disch (1994), who turned towards the ‘political realist’ themes in Arendt’s thought, especially 
her preference for political practices over ethical deliberations. They emphasised how the 
negative impact of totalitarianism on the ontological human fact of plurality proved definitive 
of her thought. I build on recent proponents of this realist view, Waltraud Meints (2014) and 
Linda Zerilli (2016a), who put political judgement at the centre of their interpretation of 
Arendt’s work. Lastly, I follow into Patricia Owens’ (2008) footsteps who identifies in Arendt a 
different understanding of ethics as orientated towards reality. I discuss the uptake of 
Arendt’s theory of judgement in more detail in chapter 2 to capture how debates have 
substantiated the pluralist dimension to judgement and increasingly turned to a second 





might call the orientation a thin3 conception of plurality, as it reduces plurality and 
politics to the competing individual interests within a community.4 In contrast, Arendt 
formulated a thick conception of plurality that takes the wellbeing of the relationships 
between the members of a community into account. I highlight three elements to her 
understanding of politics embedded in a thick notion of plurality: the individuals who 
appear and reveal their unique, partial perspectives on the world by acting together, 
the spectators who confirm and judge these appearances and give them meaning in 
relation to their own perspectives on the world, and the common world that exists 
between all members of the political community. 
In section 1.2, I tackle Arendt’s political realism. The purpose of a re-orientation of 
politics towards plurality is to protect people’s capacity to come to understand and 
give meaning to events and issues. Understanding entails the ‘unpremeditated 
attentive facing up to, and resisting of, reality’ (Arendt, 1973: viii) and describes a 
‘specifically human way of being alive; for every single person needs to be 
reconciled to a world into which he5 was born a stranger and in which […] he always 
remains a stranger’ (Arendt, 2011: 308). For Arendt, this capacity to understand was 
increasingly undermined in modernity by a break in tradition, as an expression of the 
loss of unity between tradition, religion, and authority. The break inhibits ways of 
engaging with reality that have relied on tradition as standards for judging the past, 
present, and future. In their place, Arendt proposed a political sphere in which 
diverging views on shared objects can be articulated as the source of a stronger 
sense of reality. 
Section 1.3 introduces Arendt’s discovery of reflective judgement as a uniquely 
political capacity. Its exercise depends on incorporating a plurality of perspectives 
and is not primarily guided by tradition and universal standards. My discussion 
highlights how reflective judgement is uniquely capable of connecting the immediacy 
                                                          
3
 The terms thin and thick have been used by scholars in various ways, for example by 
Michael Walzer (1994) to distinguish two types of moral arguments, but any similarity 
between my use and theirs are coincidental and do not bear on my argument. 
4
 Arendt rejected any attempt to deduce ideas about humanity by analysing an individual 
human being in isolation. Such a reductive approach would fail to grasp the togetherness 
and with-each-otherness, as an irreducible experience to human life that follows from living 
in a world with different people (Arendt, 2002: 17). 
5
 Throughout the thesis, I reproduce quotes in their original version and refrain from rewriting 
problematic gendered language, as it is visible in this quote. In the rest of the text, I use 
variations of the pronoun ‘they’ instead of he or she, to promote an inclusive use of the 





of political action with the critical distance of judgements. I show how for Arendt 
political judgement draws on common sense, on our capacity to tell stories, and on 
exemplarity to create and protect a shared world in which a plethora of perspectives 
can be evaluated. 
Put together, I draw on Arendt to conclude that the pluralist dimension refers to 
judgement’s ability to help create and maintain a world that is home to a diversity of 
views on shared objects, which, in their difference, make lives more meaningful. I 
will later combine this pluralist dimension with a second dimension, the dualism of 
the interplay between structure/objectivity and agency/subjectivity from within which 
judgement emerges. Arendt’s pluralism is uniquely attentive to how both the 
subjective ‘it-seems-to-me’ and the objective world are intersubjectively constituted 
through political action. I seek to complement this focus with an appropriate account 
of structure and agency. I argue that their hybridisation can be usefully formulated 
as the foundation for a less reductive ethos6 of reality. The practice of such an 
ethos, attentive to the dualism and pluralism of judgement, provides my suggestion 
for how we might fruitfully take responsibility-for-complicity in ways that help reduce 
systemic injustices. 
 
                                                          
6
 The experience of life under totalitarianism taught Arendt that moral frameworks are easily 
revealed in moments of crisis as nothing more than customs and habits. She (2003: 75) 
argued that morality and ethics, far from providing absolute frameworks of right and wrong 
that are or should be universally accepted, are closer in meaning to their original names 
mores and ethos that tie morality and ethics to customs, habits and manners. I therefore 
adopt the term ethos to indicate a stance towards the world that potentially encourages 





1.1 The Human Condition and the Meaning of Politics 
In her book The Human Condition (1998), Arendt put forward an analysis of the way 
society transitioned in modernity. She tracked the costs and benefits that come with 
the changing relationships between different activities and spheres of human 
existence. This approach enabled Arendt to provide a crystallised conception of 
what politics is uniquely about – in her reading. I introduce central features of The 
Human Condition insofar as they bear directly on Arendt’s pluralism. The analysis of 
her specific conception of plurality and its connection to a different practice of 
politics, helps capture a key insight into the pluralist dimension to judgement: the 
need for a public sphere in which to express, judge, and act on a diversity of views 
on a shared reality. 
Arendt described plurality as part of her characterisation of different human 
conditions, that is, constraints on being human that are the product of certain 
characteristics of the world in and around us.7 The conditions of biological life, 
worldliness, plurality, natality, and mortality arise from a person’s earthly existence. 
Human activities and relations further condition human existence as anything that 
‘enters the human world of its own accord or is drawn into it by human effort 
becomes part of the human condition’ (Arendt, 1998: 9). Plurality offers according to 
Arendt ‘the condition – not only the conditio sine qua non, but the conditio per quam 
– of all political life’ (1998: 7). 
The term plurality in Arendt refers to the fact that ‘men, not Man, live on the earth 
and inhabit the world’ (Arendt, 1998: 7). It also captures the conviction that human 
existence develops ‘only in the shared life of human beings inhabiting a given world 
common to them all’ (Arendt, 2011: 186). Plurality is thus both an ontological fact to 
be acknowledged and something that is made manifest in human interaction. There 
are three elements to this conception of plurality. Firstly, humans, in plural, are 
characterised by sameness, for they share the same basic constraints on their lives 
and have a world in common. Sameness enables them to communicate 
meaningfully with each other and to treat the other members of society as political 
                                                          
7
 References to human conditions are not to be confused with remarks on a human ‘nature’. 
Arendt was sceptical of the idea of a human ‘nature’, because its existence would mean that 
we could talk ‘about a “who” as though it were a “what”’ (1998: 10). Instead, the constraints 
do not condition humans absolutely. They may also vary extensively over time, especially 
when the circumstances of human life change dramatically. Arendt illustrated this point with 





equals (1998: 175). Secondly, humans are characterised by distinctiveness. Plurality 
refers to the fact that everybody is human ‘in such a way that nobody is ever the 
same as anyone else who ever lived, lives or will live’ (1998: 8). Distinctiveness for 
Arendt is unlike the kind of otherness that all things share by virtue of their unique 
location in time and space. Distinctiveness emerges as part of human’s capacity for 
speech through which to express one’s perspective on the world as irreducible to 
any shared characteristics (1998: 176). Thirdly, plurality means that ‘a world of 
things is between those who have it in common, as a table is located between those 
who sit around it; the world, like every in-between, relates and separates men at the 
same time’ (1998: 52). A thick description of plurality accounts for the common world 
as an irreducible feature of human plurality alongside an insistence on the 
sameness and distinctiveness of all human beings. The aim has to be to protect and 
build a common world that brings together a diversity of distinctive perspectives on 
shared objects. 
Before I explain how Arendt re-orientated politics in order to strengthen and protect 
these three elements of plurality, let me briefly indicate why she concentrated on 
plurality in the first place. Arendt saw plurality as under threat from various modern 
developments that reduce society to isolated individuals or inseparable collectives. I 
focus on her critique of modern mass society and the rise in human alienation. In 
conditions of mass society, communities have lost the power to simultaneously bring 
people together and ensure their separation. Contemporary society ‘expects from 
each of its members a certain kind of behaviour, imposing innumerable rules, all of 
which tend to “normalize” its members, to make them behave, to exclude 
spontaneous action or outstanding achievement' (1998: 40).8 In other words, 
modern mass society directly attacks the human condition of plurality, because it 
consists of social processes that are orientated towards a conformism of behaviour. 
Such conformity denies the possibility of sharing a world from a plurality of different 
positions, because it prefers sameness at the cost of distinction and a common 
world in-between people. 
Mass society affects plurality through increased alienation of humans from their own 
unique selves and the world they have in common. Arendt highlighted two variants 
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 Arendt saw a similar move happening in the social sciences, where behavioural sciences 
reduced ‘man as a whole, in all his activities to the level of a conditioned and behaving 





of this problem, earth and world alienation. Earth alienation refers to the negative 
effects of a desire in modern science to escape the confines of human earthly 
conditions through technological advances. It is a consequence of increased 
exploration of the earth over the past centuries, whereby the formerly distant and 
unknown became familiar. Continued discovery was thought to require an increase 
in distance between the worldly conditions and the scientist, for example through 
space exploration or laboratory experiments, which is claimed to ensure more 
detailed knowledge of earthly existence (1998: 250f.). Mathematics and its pure 
symbolic language became the arbiter of truth and knowledge. The consequence is 
that human experience of reality becomes irrelevant or reduced to elements in 
complex macro-scale formulas. Plurality is under-theorised as research focuses 
merely on patterns of human behaviour. 
World alienation refers to the loss of an intersubjectively constituted, hospitable 
world through which to give life adequate meaning. This form of alienation is caused 
by a wide array of developments. It emerged from expropriation and wealth 
accumulation, which were allowed to develop their own laws, alien, and even 
hostile, to political practices (1998: 257). World alienation is furthermore an 
expression of the modern sense of an increased loss of certainty about the way 
things are, which led to the tendency in modern philosophy to ‘reduce all 
experiences, with the world as well as with other human beings, to experiences 
between man and himself’ (1998: 254). Such a move, it was hoped, would ground 
knowledge of the world in the rational processes and logical consistency of the 
enlightened person. What humans ‘now have in common is not the world but the 
structure of their minds, and this they cannot have in common, strictly speaking; 
their faculty of reasoning can only happen to be the same in everybody’ (1998: 283). 
Both forms of alienation displace the role that plurality plays for human existence. 
In light of the modern threat to plurality, Arendt’s main project was to provide an 
alternative conception of politics that accommodates the three elements to plurality 
outlined above. Politics played a crucial role because, as I indicated above, Arendt 
challenged a thin conception of plurality prevalent in contemporary conceptions of 
politics. Associations of the political with force, authority and sovereignty reduce 
plurality to the interrelationships between inherently unequal citizens. Politics 
becomes a matter of control by the strongest – including the state. Contra the 





treatment and exchange between members of a political community without which 
plurality cannot be maintained. To strengthen plurality, Arendt proposed an 
alternative conception of politics as a practice that affirms freedom through the 
public appearance of different perspectives on shared objects, which I elaborate in 
the following. 
Arendt understood politics as a practice of acting-in-concert, or action. She wished 
to highlight the ‘joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our 
peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into 
the world by word and deed’ (Arendt, 2006a: 250). Political action is non-
instrumental, orientated first and foremost by the freedom we experience in acting 
together. Arendt separated action from two other, pre-political, human activities: 
labour to produce consumer goods that help us survive, and fabrication to create 
durable things like houses or tables that can help make us less vulnerable to our 
biological condition (1998: 95, 144). Both are embedded in a means-end process 
that meet the human conditions of life – the cyclical movement of the biological 
process – and worldliness – the fact that humans create things that become new 
conditions for their lives and beyond.9 In contrast, the purpose of Arendt’s politics is, 
first of all, to enable the public manifestation of plurality by providing a platform on 
which to express the distinctive ‘who’ of a person. Political action is a form of self-
disclosure. The individual enters the public stage and presents their unique socio-
political position towards the world – how it appears to me – in relation to others 
(Arendt, 2003: 12f.). 
A second way in which Arendt captures plurality in politics is her emphasis on 
action’s dependence, as a form of world disclosure, on an audience. Action is in 
some sense short-lived, because it does not leave anything physical behind. 
Instead, to be made manifest, actions need to be heard, seen, and remembered – 
action continues to exist only through its acknowledgment. For this reason, action is 
closely connected to communicating through speech.10 Alongside the plurality of 
                                                          
9
 Arendt did not deny the importance of all activities coming together to respond to the 
various human conditions, as one might infer from her separation of action from the 
biological demands on our bodies and the need to create a stable and durable world. The 
distinctions also do not mean that Arendt ignored the fact of politics’ close relationship with 
violence and domination. Nonetheless, for the sake of a thick conception of plurality Arendt 
rejected the idea that politics must be about violence and authority. 
10
 Speech is closer to revelation and action without speech loses its revelatory character 





actors who act together, Arendt thus adds a second plurality, the judging spectators. 
The dependence on a community of others is simultaneously action’s potential and 
its limitation. 
Thirdly, a thicker conception of plurality refers additionally to the in-between of 
people. Politics is according to Arendt not ‘so much about human beings as it is 
about the world that comes into being between them and endures beyond them’ 
(2007: 175). A suitable common world must accommodate both sufficient 
separation, so that each person provides a distinct perspective on an object, and 
connection, which ensures that the perspectives remain communicable and related 
to the same object. Action contributes to this common world by producing the ‘fabric 
of human relationships and affairs’ (1998: 95) between those that disclose and those 
that judge and confirm that appearance. Action must therefore entail a consideration 
of the implications of human endeavours for a common world and its continued 
existence beyond one’s own generation. 
Arendt’s thicker conception of plurality and its connection to politics brings with it 
specific frustrations that shape the way we should approach political problems. 
Action is characterised by a threefold frustration, the ‘unpredictability of its outcome, 
the irreversibility of the process, and the anonymity of its authors’ (1998: 220). 
Politics is always exercised in a pre-existing web of human relations, which is likely 
to feature numerous conflicting interests, so that action’s effects are seldom 
controllable; on the contrary, the outcome of action is often unintentional, almost 
never fulfilling its original purpose (Arendt, 1998: 184). Embedded in complex 
processes, action is also the activity with the closest connection to the human 
condition of natality. Arendt emphasised the political freedom that arises from a 
human affirmation of the capacity to begin something new (Arendt, 2006a: 151).11 It 
                                                                                                                                                                    
nonetheless struggled with its seemingly empty character, as speaking, void of interests (cf. 
Pitkin, 1981). This tension cannot be resolved as Arendt’s conception remained fragmented 
and incorporated Homeric, Athenian, Roman, Christian, and revolutionary elements. 
However, Canovan (1992: 137ff.) builds on unpublished lectures to identify Arendt as even 
critical of an overemphasis on action as speech. I suggest that it is therefore more helpful to 
think of her separation of action from instrumentalist projects not in absolute terms but as an 
attempt to show that politics is more than mere zero-sum games of domination and violence. 
11
 Arendt describes action and its capacity for novelty as a ‘miracle-working faculty’ (1998: 
246). Novelty is here not to be understood in absolute terms, because action is always 
conditioned and preceded by previous actions (Arendt, 1981a: 29). Events are new in the 
sense that they change that which has come before in an irrevocable manner (Arendt, 1972: 
5). New beginnings in politics depend on the arrival of new generations of distinct 





is action’s power ‘to break through the commonly accepted and reach into the 
extraordinary, where […] everything that exists is unique’ (1998: 205). 
In light of the frustrations that come with political practices, their unpredictability and 
capacity to begin anew, people constantly attempt to constrain action or to replace it 
through labour and fabrication. Individuals are tempted to instrumentalise politics for 
their specific ends in an endeavour to control the effects of one’s actions and avoid 
the frustrations that come with it. However, to displace acting together in such a way 
is to take away its ability to produce meaning, which reveals itself only through the 
unique direction that interaction takes (1998: 179f.). Such a reduction of politics and 
its uncontrollable, unpredictable qualities misconstrues the plurality that is intrinsic to 
political practices. Politics is instead at its best, when it makes human existence 
memorable in unprecedented ways and, in so doing, expands the sense that 
humans have of the kind of shared reality that they live in. 
This concludes my investigation into The Human Condition. Arendt’s discussion of a 
thicker conception of plurality brings with it a different understanding of politics as 
acting-in-concert. Arendt sees the public sphere not merely as a site of domination 
and violence, but potentially as a space of freedom dedicated to the practice of 
strengthening human plurality. Politics enables a community to discuss appropriate 
action in maintaining and improving the world that its members have in common, by 
ensuring that equal attentiveness is given to the three elements of plurality, 
sameness, distinction, and the common world. Political action is always contingent, 
complex, and open-ended. It is non-instrumental, a practice of freedom to begin 
anew and to disclose among equal peers how the world appears to me. Section 1.1 
thus provides the first insight into the pluralist dimension to judgement: the human 
condition of plurality, in its thick description, necessitates a public sphere, in which to 
express a diversity of views on a shared reality. In the following, I wish to discuss 






1.2 Arendt’s Political Realism founded on Pluralist Politics 
With Arendt’s re-orientation of politics towards a thicker conception of plurality in 
place, I seek to flesh out what Arendt understands by reality, before turning in the 
final section to the conceptions’ implications for political judgement. Arendt 
undoubtedly had a complex understanding of reality. This is visible in her mixed 
response to realist political thought. On the one hand, Arendt’s writing offers 
extensive engagement with the realist canon, including Thucydides, Machiavelli, and 
Hobbes. She shares with various forms of realism an emphasis on a distinct 
conception of the political as crucial to human existence, and a rejection of any 
attempt to displace politics.12 Commentators have drawn on this connection to 
highlight a unique realism in Arendt’s writing that could be fruitfully exploited as part 
of the realist tradition.13 Patricia Owens, for example, has put forward the claim that 
Arendt’s thought can be read as an ‘ethic of reality’ (Owens, 2008: 106). She argues 
that in Arendt’s work we can ‘find a form of “realism” in which attentiveness to reality 
itself and the cultivation of a character trait in which to face and enlarge one’s sense 
of reality are ends in themselves with serious ethical implications’ (Owens, 2008: 
105). Rei Terada (2008) similarly identifies a theory of reality – not to be understood 
in terms of a concern with metaphysical reality, but as a project that considers the 
hold of reality, events and facts, on human activities.  
Arendt’s political thought seems, on the other hand, un- or even anti-realist when 
contrasted with these canonical figures of realism.14 This ‘anti-realism’ finds its 
expression particularly in her rejection of the association of politics with interests, 
violence, and conflict. As I seek to show in this part of chapter 1, Arendt’s account of 
politics embraces the tension between her realist commitments and her rejection of 
certain elements associated with realist political thought. Arendt protected the 
political sphere for the sake of a human need to account for and give meaning to 
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 As Arendt put it, politics is more than a necessary response to the fact that we are not 
rational beings, philosophers, or even angels (2007: 85). For an overview of recent 
formulations of realism in political theory that reject the displacement of politics, see 
(Galston, 2010). 
13
 In particular, commentators emphasise the link between realism in International Relations, 
as represented by canonical figures such as Hans Morgenthau, and Arendt. Recent 
examples include Douglas Klusmeyer (2011) and Felix Rösch (2013). 
14
 Typical of this stance is her rejection of the Weberian reduction of politics to interests and 
coercive power. Peter Baehr (2001) suggests that Arendt provides a comprehensive 





reality together. This need demanded, for her, an opposition to a thin conception of 
plurality that reduces politics to the coordination of particular interests, often 
associated with realism. 
The following discussion brings together Arendt’s scattered remarks about reality, to 
outline what her ‘ethic of reality’ entails as the foundation of her writings on political 
judgement. My analysis proceeds in two steps. Firstly, I introduce the break in 
tradition that for Arendt created unprecedented uncertainty and prevented 
individuals from reconciling with reality. This break in tradition is also an opportunity 
to face reality unmediated by philosophy or other forms of authority. Through her 
analysis of the break, Arendt helps us see the full potential of the role that a pluralist 
politics could play for humans. Secondly, I turn to Arendt’s realism as a particular 
way of facing and coming to terms with reality that has plurality and politics at its 
centre. I conclude by considering Arendt’s response to criticisms of her ethic through 
an affirmation of the centrality of plurality for a sense of reality. 
 
1.2.1 A Break in Tradition 
My discussion of The Human Condition pointed towards the importance of politics 
for strengthening a sense of reality: politics enables the sharing and discussing of 
one’s perspective on the world with others. Arendt understood that in a world 
inhabited by human beings, reality is inextricably linked with the political sphere and 
its mediation of individual, partial perspectives on the world. Reality is ‘a world of 
appearances […] first of all characterised by “standing still and remaining” the same 
long enough to become an object for acknowledgement and recognition by a 
subject’ (Arendt, 1981a: 45f.). Without the testimony by others on the realness of an 
appearance, reality ‘comes and passes away like a dream, intimately and 
exclusively our own but without reality’ (1998: 199). This intersubjective 
understanding of reality connects three elements to plurality discussed in section 
1.1: the common world that appears to us, the person who is affected by the 
appearance15, and the plurality of spectators and actors who confirm that 
appearance. A strong sense of reality is thus only achievable as part of a judging 
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 In Arendt’s words all ‘that existentially concerns you while living in the world of 
appearances is the “impressions” by which you are affected. Whether what affects you exists 






and acting community, that recognises and engages with how things appear to 
different people.16 
But why would we need a sense of reality that is strengthened through the 
encounter of a thicker notion of plurality in politics? One of the main purposes for a 
strong sense of reality is reconciliation – to come to terms with reality. In pre-
modernity, this function was primarily assured by the tradition on which a (political) 
community was founded and which provided the standards of how to render 
experiences intelligible.17 The value of tradition is put poignantly in relation to 
prejudices ‘that we share, that we take to be self-evident, that we can toss out in 
conversation without any lengthy explanations’ (Arendt, 2007: 99). Arendt 
emphasised that humans 
‘cannot live without prejudices, and not only because no human being’s 
intelligence or insight would suffice to form an original judgment about everything 
on which he is asked to pass judgment in the course of his life, but also because 
such a total lack of prejudice would require a superhuman alertness. This is why 
in all times and places it is the task of politics to shed light upon and dispel 
prejudices, which is not to say that its task is to train people to be unprejudiced or 
that those who work toward such enlightenment are themselves free of prejudice 
[…] an epoch in which people could not fall back on and trust their prejudices 
when judging and deciding about major areas of their lives is inconceivable’ 
(Arendt, 2007: 99f.). 
The reconciliation with reality is threatened in modernity by a break in tradition, as 
an expression of the loss of unity between tradition, religion, and authority. This 
unity had offered standards – of ethics and morality – that gave a satisfactory 
meaning to ongoing occurrences and enabled the community to continue in their set 
ways. During her time, Arendt argued, the break in tradition had become a fact to be 
reckoned with. How humans can gain an adequate access to reality thus became 
the central problem of the 20th century.18 We can 
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 Arendt even stated that to ‘be deprived of it [(the space of appearance)] means to be 
deprived of reality, which humanly and politically speaking, is the same as appearance […] 
and whatever lacks this appearance comes and passes away like a dream, intimately and 
exclusively our own but without reality’ (1998: 199). Did Arendt then maintain an absolute 
intersubjectivism where all reality is reducible to partial perspectives and the confirmation by 
others? This seems unlikely. Arendt concluded her essay Truth and Politics by suggesting 
that truth and reality is what we cannot change but must accept (Arendt, 2006a: 259). 
17
 Tradition for Arendt ‘selects and names, […] hands down and preserves, […] indicates 
where the treasures are and what their worth is’ (Arendt, 2006a: 5).  
18
 The centrality of the break in tradition in Arendt’s thought, and the role totalitarianism plays 





‘no longer afford to take that which was good in the past and simply call it our 
heritage, to discard the bad and simply think of it as a dead load which by itself 
time will bury in oblivion. The subterranean stream of Western history has finally 
come to the surface and usurped the dignity of our tradition. This is the reality in 
which we live. And this is why all efforts to escape, from the grimness of the 
present into nostalgia for a still intact past, or into the anticipated oblivion of a 
better future, are vain’ (Arendt, 1973: ix). 
To explore the temporal significance of the break in tradition, alluded to in the quote, 
Arendt returned repeatedly to Kafka’s parable ‘He’ (Arendt, 1981a: 202, 2006a, 
2011). Kafka depicts the individual caught between the antagonistic forces of not yet 
and no longer, between the past and the future. In Arendt’s re-interpretation of the 
parable, another, irreducible force, the present, emerges out of past and future.19 
The present had however little impact on human lives insofar as it was embedded 
in, and bridged by, the certainty provided through traditions. The break in tradition 
therefore does not create a gap between the past and future. Instead, it exposes the 
non-linear movement of time in which the present takes place. This means that the 
break is not only the origin of a highly problematic existential and epistemic crisis of 
humanity, but an opportunity for a different engagement with reality that for Arendt 
draws on the distinct potential of a practice of acting and judging politically. 
The break in tradition provides a chance to move beyond a problematic project of 
establishing universal standards of meaning outside the everyday activities outlined 
above – labour, work, and action. The project began in Ancient Greece and found its 
extreme conclusion in totalitarianism.20 It included a form of teleological progress 
thinking that denied the present any impact on human development (Arendt, 2007: 
74). Arendt joined an illustrious group of critics of the philosophical tradition, 
including Kant, Marx, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche, in their attempt to undo this 
universalising project. However, according to Arendt, these central figures of 
modernity succeeded merely in turning the primacy of transcendental and 
theoretical activities on its head. Their attempts continued the philosophical project 
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 Human’s capacity for new beginnings plays an integral part in the interruption caused by 
the third force to the otherwise continuous flow of events between past and future. The break 
in tradition, in other words, enables an ‘analysis of the temporality of natality itself’ 
(Birmingham, 2006: 18). 
20
 We should not read Arendt’s analysis of this project as embedded in a continuous 
historical narrative. Arendt was averse to causal historic narratives, preferring an analysis of 
the elements, or the conditions that under certain circumstances may or may not come 





by other means (Arendt, 1998: 17, cf. 2006a, 2007).21 Arendt followed her 
predecessors’ efforts to dismantle metaphysics, but she also moved beyond them 
through a new form of political realism orientated towards the role of plurality for our 
sense of reality. It is to this realism that I turn next. 
 
1.2.2 Love of the World 
An insistence on the close connection between plurality, as made manifest by 
politics, and reality led Arendt to a unique ‘realist’ position that is encapsulated by 
the concept amor mundi, love of the world. Arendt asked whether ‘one was capable 
of loving the world more than one’s own self. And the decision indeed has always 
been the crucial decision for all who devoted their lives to politics’ (Arendt, 2006c: 
286). She opposed amor mundi to any nihilistic thoughts and any desire to deny the 
political realities of one’s time. While it is only understandable that people may wish 
to suppress reality during (20th century’s) dark times, such attempts are only 
acceptable, according to Arendt, if they are connected with an honest 
acknowledgement of one’s escapism (Arendt, 2007: 203). Arendtian realism, or love 
of the world, properly sets in when we have to come to terms with facts and events 
that we accept as being real even if we do not wish them to be so. Arendt 
encouraged an ‘attentive facing up to, and resisting of, reality – whatever that may 
be’ (1973: viii). Coming to terms with reality does not simply mean that we normalise 
extreme phenomena such as totalitarianism. Instead, Arendt suggests that we seek 
to understand – that is, by making our knowledge of its unique reality meaningful. 
A commitment to love the world, led Arendt to be highly sceptical of any attempt to 
resolve political problems by applying frameworks with only limited attentiveness to 
the particularities of politics and reality. This scepticism expressed itself in a number 
of ways. Arendt questioned the traditional role of ethics in politics, which she 
identified as providing a framework for judgement that, in moments of crisis, turns 
too easily into mere customs. She rejected a reduction of politics to conflict, but was 
similarly critical of the liberal belief in progress as the peaceful resolution of the 
interrelationship between violence and politics. Her thought aligned with Carl 
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 Arendt’s own appreciation for the Greek and Roman polis has been read as making her a 
‘reluctant modernist’ (Benhabib, 2003) who turns to ancient political thought to flee from 
reality. I suggest such a reading underestimates her attempt to formulate a distinctly modern 





Schmitt and Hans Morgenthau in suggesting that moralism and fighting wars on 
behalf of political ideals, e.g. equality, liberty or justice, would only lead to a 
worsening of war’s brutality (Arendt, 2007: 3; cf. Owens, 2008: 108). Finally, she 
rejected any reference to ‘lesser evils’, because it opens the door to seeing evil-
doing as an acceptable and legitimate course of action (Arendt, 2003: 36). In short, 
her bet, as Terada puts it, was that 
‘an empirical scepticism that asks, “‘Is that the way things really are?” is more 
likely to support a tolerable world, and less likely to support an intolerable one, 
than affirmative fidelity to anything else, no matter how universally or singularly 
good. There are more politicians whose imperial fantasies could be corrected by 
realism than there are ones who could be corrected by ethics’ (Terada, 2008: 
103). 
Ethics and reality are no longer seen as opposites, as conventional approaches that 
measure reality against external universal principles would have it. Instead, coming 
to terms with reality together is the foundation of ethics. Arendt emphasised that the 
need to engage with reality can be a normative project in and of itself – this insight 
will become a key feature of the argument in this thesis. 
Arendt’s practice of this ethic of reality consisted in a continuous engagement with 
the political events of her time, including totalitarianism, the student demonstrations 
of the 1960s, and American foreign policy. Her political interventions were often 
received critically, an infamous example being the angry responses that followed her 
report on the Eichmann trial. Eichmann had been responsible for the mass 
deportation and extermination of Jews in Nazi Germany, and Arendt stood accused 
of seeking to understand and judge Eichmann in isolation from the effects that such 
a desire to understand might have on others (Arendt, 2006b; cf. Rabinbach, 2004). 
In her response to the controversy surrounding the report, Arendt asked ‘what kind 
of reality does truth possess if it is powerless in the public realm, which more than 
any other sphere of human life guarantees reality of existence to natal and moral 
men’ (Arendt, 2006a: 223). Her investigation into the potential of factual truth 
reinforces the connection she provides for judgement between plurality, reality, and 
politics. 
Factual truth is central to politics and emerges out of the partial perspectives of a 
political community. It is susceptible to power and interest conflicts in the public 
sphere, and can even be lost permanently, due to its dependence on experience 
and agreement. Factual truths can nonetheless prove sufficiently stable; take 





not the other way around (Arendt, 2006a: 245). In contrast, philosophical truths that 
enter the political sphere are much more at risk, as they move from one part of 
human existence to a radically different one. Rational truth, like all truths, is turned 
into one opinion amongst many, and its unique qualities, which make rational truth 
so valuable for contemplation and theorising, provide no privileged status in a public 
debate (2006a: 233).22 
In modernity, fraught with the break in tradition, factual truths became increasingly 
undermined and no longer found widespread acceptance. At stake is therefore the 
‘common and factual reality itself, and this is indeed a political problem of the first 
order’ (Arendt, 2006a: 232). In response, Arendt insisted that it is not a problem that 
factual truth depends on appearance and witnesses, and that it is bound up with 
opinions, interests, and passions.23 On the contrary, in light of the threats to plurality 
outlined in section 1.1, contemporary society is dependent on factual truth and its 
ability to engender a diversity of perspectives that, crucially, remain connected to 
concrete objects and events. Factual truth is important for politics because it 
provides the confines in which politics occurs, defining what at any point is seen as 
unchangeable foundation on which to begin something new, to act together and give 
reality meaning (Arendt, 2006a: 259). To ensure that factual truth continues to hold 
this role for humans, Arendt suggested that we replace its connection to tradition, by 
embedding facts in action-in-concert and, as we will see next, political judgement. 
In summary, in this section, I added to the pluralist dimension to judgement, by 
considering the role that politics plays for how humans are able to come to terms 
with reality. My discussion sketched how Arendt positions pluralist politics as a 
suitable alternative to traditions and their capacity to give meaning to a transition 
from the past into an uncertain future. In light of a break in tradition, which forces 
humans to find their own ways of coming to terms with reality, she routinely 
encouraged people to face reality together, in order to come to understand it and 
reconcile themselves with it. 
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 Arendt was of course fully aware of the continuous tendency of philosophers to seek to 
establish rational truths as maxims of political action, but she emphasised that their 
establishment would only provide a ‘pyrrhic victory’ (2006a: 245). Only in the guise of 
examples can these truths be valuable for politics, and they must not be used to transcend 
politics’ unique qualities or for an attempt to coerce assent. 
23
 Indeed, she was particularly concerned about the many attempts to prove factual truths, 
which misconstrue its vulnerability, and the contemporary need to be right for the sake of 





As the second part of my discussion of Arendt’s ‘realism’, I highlighted her 
insistence that ethics start with the political realm and the sense of reality that 
emerges through action’s world disclosure. She proposed a love of the world contra 
comprehensive ethical frameworks that are orientated towards universal principles 
and, according to her, displaced rather than tackled the political problems of her 
time. Her sceptical realism insists on acknowledging factual truths when faced with 
occurrences that go against our view of the world, in the hope of building a common 
world through which to understand these events. My reconstruction of Arendt’s 
thought thus already marks a key shift in how we approach the problem of 
complicity. Arendt offers us a way of thinking about an ethico-political problem as 
preceded and complemented by the challenge of how humans can engage 
appropriately with reality. This problem is, as I have shown, not simply an issue to 
be considered separately, but the foundation of normative projects tout court, 






1.3 Judging Politically through Reflective Judgement  
In the previous two sections I turned to one of the most influential thinkers on 
judgement, Arendt, in order to map out the pluralist dimension to judgement. I drew 
attention to how she re-orientated politics and humans’ engagement with reality 
towards a thicker conception of plurality. I also indicated that Arendt understood 
judgement as the ability of humans to position themselves towards events, issues, 
and people, and through this process to sharpen their sense of reality. In this final 
section of chapter 1, I discuss reflective judgement. Arendt re-interpreted reflective 
judgement as a capacity that, akin to action, is inherently connected to plurality and 
essential to politics. 
Arendt drew on a wide variety of sources to formulate her understanding of 
judgement. In particular, a creative appropriation of Kant’s conceptualisation of 
aesthetic judgement helped her clarify the role that judgement can play for a 
different understanding of human plurality. In a series of posthumously published 
lectures, Arendt interpreted Kant’s Critique of Judgement as providing the political 
philosophy that he never wrote.24 This idiosyncratic interpretation helped her 
displace Kant’s focus on reason and his moral and historical philosophy in the 
earlier Critiques. In its place, as I will demonstrate, she emphasised that plurality 
and intersubjectivity are integral to political judgement. 
In his Critique of Judgement (2000), Kant put forward a formalistic account of 
aesthetic judgement dedicated to theorising the universal conditions, rather than the 
substance, of judgements of taste. He portrayed judging as subsuming particulars 
under universals. When dealing with moral issues, judgement becomes a 
determinate process, where the universals are already given. Aesthetic judgement, 
in contrast, relies on a reflective process where the universals are found through 
abstraction from the particular (Kant, 2000: 5, 179).25 Arendt was particularly 
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 Ronald Beiner later published the series of lectures on Kant’s political philosophy. In his 
accompanying interpretive essay (Beiner, 1982), he maintains that these lectures can 
provide an appropriate interpretation of what Arendt would have written as the final book of 
her unfinished trilogy Life of the Mind. Because the interpretation of her theory relies on a 
reading of her lectures on Kant, it is difficult to criticise Arendt for not sufficiently separating 
her own standpoint (cf. Borren, 2013: 226). 
25
 Aesthetic judgement is further contemplative, non-moral, immediate, i.e. independent of 





attracted to the latter.26 Judged in the singular, autonomously, reflective judgement 
is difficult and uncertain – it lacks a universal rule to subsume the particular under, 
and relies instead on the engagement with other’s perspectives for its validation. 
My analysis of Arendt’s writing on political judgement proceeds in three steps, 
starting with judgement’s role as part of the mental activities that Arendt discussed 
in the trilogy The Life of the Mind. The incomplete project hinted at the potential of 
judgement to connect the autonomous qualities of thinking and willing with political 
action. The two capacities, in turn, provide judgement with the means to connect 
ongoing processes of politics with the past, through imagination and memory, and 
the future, through the ‘I will’. 
Arendt raised the question how judgement can incorporate withdrawal, which is 
necessary in order to gain critical purchase on appearances and an essential 
feature of all mental faculties, and contribute to political practices. To answer this 
question, I move on to Arendt’s re-formulation of two features to political judgement, 
the actor-spectator dichotomy and common sense. Commentators traditionally turn 
to both in search of Arendt’s unfinished theory of political judgement. With regards to 
the actor-spectator dichotomy, I highlight that Arendt’s spectators seek a critical 
vantage point that takes into account a plurality of perspectives without losing sight 
of the ‘it-seems-to-me’. I also emphasise that community sense is both a framework 
preceding judgement, and therefore limited to particular contexts, and the product of 
acting and judging. Community sense provides an open-ended process that 
continuously enables the re-establishment of a shared sense of reality. 
 
1.3.1 The Faculties of the Mind 
Arendt complemented her re-orientation of politics towards a thicker conception of 
plurality, by writing a trilogy on three mental activities, thinking, willing, and judging, 
called The Life of the Mind (1981a, 1981b). She never wrote the final book on 
judgement, due to her death in 1975, and commentators have instead relied on 
earlier and unpublished work to debate what Arendt might have written. This 
suggestive theory of judgement must be read in relation to the challenge central to 
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 Arendt was hopeful that ‘even though we have lost yardsticks by which to measure, and 
rules under which to subsume the particular, a being whose essence is beginning may have 
enough of origin within himself to understand without preconceived categories and to judge 





The Life of the Mind: how to bring together mental activities, which are uniquely 
characterised by a ‘Withdrawal from the world as it appears and a bending back 
toward the self’ (Arendt, 1981a: 22), with a prioritisation of pluralist politics and the 
creation of a hospitable world?27 Arendt’s remarks on judgement form also part of 
her investigation into the complex relationship between mental activities and evil that 
Arendt concentrated on following the Eichmann trial. In response to both puzzles, 
Arendt acknowledged that judging, willing, and thinking are all dependent on some 
form of withdrawal from the space of appearance. As I show in the following, she 
also addressed the importance of plurality for the life of the mind and denied any 
attempt to detach the functioning of mental activities from their effects on politics. 
The Life of the Mind thus offers an initial insight into the connection between 
judgement as a mental, detached activity and a plurality strengthened through 
politics. 
The first book of The Life of the Mind deals with the faculty of thinking.28 Of interest 
for the present investigation is that Arendt saw judgement as connecting thought 
with the space of appearance: judgement is the ‘by-product of the liberating effect of 
thinking, [it] realizes thinking, makes it manifest in the world of appearances, where I 
am never alone and always too busy to think’ (Arendt, 1981a: 193). The connection 
between judgement and thought, gains in importance in relation to two dangers to 
thought in modernity: thoughtlessness and the ever-present nihilistic tendencies 
inherent in all forms of thinking. 
Thoughtlessness describes the failure of the internal conversation through which 
humans deliberate about themselves and the world and decide upon the right 
actions to take. It may also refer to a troublesome desire for rules that can be 
applied automatically with little need for independent thought (Arendt, 1981a: 177; 
cf. Schiff, 2013). Such a thoughtless disposition could prove disastrous for a society, 
because the thoughtless person shows little concern for the effect that the 
application of rules has on other people and the common world. This was, Arendt 
argued, Eichmann’s main shortcoming, leading to a devastating failure of 
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 The mental activities are also not directly conditioned by the human conditions outlined 
above, and they can neither be derived from each other nor reduced to a common 
denominator (1981a: 69f.). 
28
 Thought as contemplation seems inherently passive and invisible. Yet, Arendt insisted that 
thought, despite its tendency to withdraw from the world, is an activity. Thinking is active by 
virtue of its inherently dual nature: I think with myself, both raising questions and answering 





judgement. She noted his constant references to clichés, ‘stock phrases, [his] 
adherence to conventional, standardised codes of expression and conduct’ which 
provide ‘the socially recognised function of protecting us against reality, that is, 
against the claim on our thinking attention that all events and facts make by virtue of 
their existence’ (Arendt, 1981a: 4, 2006b). 
Thought can similarly be dangerous as it lacks a precise end goal, disrupts other 
activities and occurrences, and seeks the withdrawal from the world (cf. Arendt, 
1981a: 176). Arendt identified such problematic tendencies in the projects of 
professional thinkers. She accused philosophers, including Heidegger and 
Descartes, of committing metaphysical fallacies29 that are the result of a struggle of 
the thinking ego with the world of appearance. Drawn to contemplation as the 
maxim of their lives, they seek to close the ‘abyss of pure spontaneity’ (Arendt, 
1981b: 215) of action, by reducing new appearances to what is already known or 
knowable through thought. Philosophers and social scientists share a thirst for 
objective knowledge via an Archimedean point, which requires the withdrawal from 
human affairs but nonetheless claims coercive power in that sphere.30 
Judgement offered Arendt a hopeful response to both ailures, thoughtlessness and 
the dangers of thoughtfulness, insofar as it manifests thought in a pluralist politics. 
Judgement links the continuous critical investigation back to action and the 
appearances that caused humans to think in the first place (cf. Arendt, 1981a: 193). 
By anchoring thought in the space of appearance, political judgement denies a 
withdrawal from sense experiences and the engagement with others. Judgement 
prevents a flight into thoughtlessness by ensuring that one’s thoughts come into 
contact with potential opposition and the kind of contradiction in views which is likely 
to be found in other people’s perspectives. 
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 One such basic fallacy, which she imputes to Heidegger, concerns the conflation of truth 
with meaning. Similarly problematic is the two-world-theory, affirming the absolute distinction 
between being and appearance, and, related to it, the reduction of effects and appearances 
to some underlying cause. 
30
 In terms of the social sciences, Arendt was averse to the Marxist-sociological strategy of 
unmasking – which she later condemned as naïve, sinister, and cruel – and showed 
contempt for ‘functionalism’ (Arendt, 1981a: 27; Baehr, 2007: 343). For Arendt, sociology 
obsessively aimed to reduce any peculiar phenomenon ‘into something that it is not, denying 
its reality and claiming that it is a symptom or token of a deeper substratum remote from the 
world of appearance’ (Baehr, 2002: 808). By constantly perceiving something as a façade 
with an underlying ‘real’, phenomena are reduced to their function (Arendt, 2011: 374f.). This 





Arendt framed thought, in turn, as the negative pre-condition of judgement: thought 
frees judgement from habitual processes of non-thinking. In addition, the foundation 
of judgement in thought brings with it for judgement the capacity for memory and 
imagination, through which the mind can represent that which is no longer present. 
Together, imagination and memory enable thought – and by extension judgement – 
to transcend temporal and spatial distances. They help ‘anticipate the future, think of 
it as though it were already present […] [and] remember the past as though it had 
not disappeared’ (Arendt, 1981a: 85). In the context of the break in tradition, which 
disrupted the flow between past and future, the ability of imagination and memory to 
invoke the past, present, and future are vital tools for judging politically. 
In the second book of The Life of the Mind, which remained less developed than the 
first, Arendt considered the activity of willing. The faculty of the will has become an 
essential part of modern moral theorising in the form of free will. It is seen as the 
source of choice, new beginning, freedom, individual sovereignty, and responsibility. 
Arendt challenged this role, because she identified a troublesome tension at the 
heart of willing. Whereas thought largely deals with the past, the activity of willing is 
orientated to the future, dealing with things that never actually existed; the projects 
produced by a person’s will are therefore inherently uncertain and constantly 
challenge the will as humans cannot stop willing (Arendt, 1981b: 37).31 For this 
reason, the activity is caught in a conflict between the individual freedom of ‘I will’ 
and the constraints that arise from one’s past and present context and shape the ‘I 
can’. Arendt concluded the book with the insight that the faculty of willing, as 
understood in modernity, left her investigation into mental activities at an impasse to 
be resolved by judgement (1981b: 217). 
There have been many different approaches to dealing with the challenges that 
come with the unstable activity of willing, starting with fatalism. Fatalism provides a 
common response to willing and its connection to an uncertain future through the 
claim that what will be, as necessarily being so (Arendt, 1981b: 35f.). Fatalism leads 
to an infinite regress and is dangerous because it annihilates any desire to act – for, 
whether one acts or not has already been decided. Alternatively, one may wish to 
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 Thinking and willing have a strenuous relationship, as the willing faculty aims at doing 
something, whereas thinking is doing nothing. Arendt sought to capture these differences by 
conceiving of tonalities of mental activities. They led her to the description of mental activities 
as the life of the mind: thought’s mood is serenity and tranquillity and willing’s mood is 





embrace the freedom and ability to begin anew found in willing. Such a move 
however sits uneasily with a pluralist public sphere. As Arendt highlighted drawing 
on Nietzsche, the sovereign freedom of ‘free will’ is ‘essentially a passionate 
superiority toward a someone who must obey’ (1981b: 161). Freedom has 
wrongfully become bound up in an activity of commanding and rule over others 
(Arendt, 2006a: 145). The problematic reveals that willing, too, can be a dangerous 
activity with significant impact on the public sphere and plurality. 
Arendt identified in willing a capacity to start something unpredictably new, which 
links free will with action (1981b: 29, 158). However, the freedom that Arendt was 
after is not one of free will, which is orientated towards the individual, domination, 
sovereignty, and the future. Instead, political freedom expresses itself in the practice 
of acting-in-concert. We can thus read the role of judgement in resolving the 
impasse of willing as follows: judgement, as a capacity to make sense of events in 
their irrevocable and contingent character, could help willing by providing 
reconciliation with the past as a starting point for new forms of action. Judgement 
connects the backwards glance of thinking with the future-centrism of the will to be 
brought to bear in the present through acting and judging in concert. 
This brief introduction of The Life of the Mind gives us a sense of the context in 
which Arendt sought to formulate the second crucial activity for her focus on plurality 
alongside action, judgement. Arendt’s insights into judgement are marred by the 
incomplete state of the trilogy. Nonetheless, my discussion delineated some 
important points. In her re-orientation of the activities of the mind, Arendt pointed out 
that willing helps judgement move from an impulse of withdrawal to a motivation to 
act upon the world. The activity of willing brings with it a capacity for new beginnings 
(cf. Fine, 2008). Thought helps judgement break from the immediate worldly 
activities to gain critical purchase on the world, and provides the means of memory 
and imagination. Judgement in turn links the two capacities of thinking and willing to 
political practices and anchors their focus on the past and future in the freedom 
found in acting together and the meaning that emerges from evaluating public 
appearances. The discussion shows that the pluralist potential of judgement 
emerges out of a complex interplay between different mental activities, including 
their often strained relationship to politics. The question remains how judgement, as 






1.3.2 The Judging Spectator 
The binary of actor and spectator in Arendt’s theorising on judgement has been 
hotly debated in the past (cf. Yar, 2000).32 The discussion centred on how she 
brings together Aristotle’s conception of practical wisdom with the Kantian 
formulation of aesthetic judgement.33 My aim is instead to articulate how Arendt 
seeks to re-formulate the relationship between actor and spectator to accommodate 
her understanding of plurality and reconcile the urges for withdrawal and public 
appearance.34 
I highlight two features of Arendt’s re-interpretation of the actor-spectator binary. 
Firstly, she connects political judgement to taste rather than objective knowledge. 
Arendt attributes judgement to a spectator who experiences an appearance and is 
affected by it. The spectator also enlarges their view on the matter by incorporating 
other perspectives on the object to be judged. Secondly, the actor and spectator 
remain deeply intertwined and both rely on plurality for their functioning. The section 
will go through these two features in more detail in that order. I substantiate the 
insights by discussing how storytelling helps express a form of judgement that is 
neither fully affected nor impartial and relies on actors and spectators working 
together. 
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 Richard Bernstein, for example, argued that Arendt’s interpretation offers a ‘flagrant 
contradiction’ (1986: 230) and more questions than answers. Commentators have also 
pointed towards a 1957 letter to Karl Jaspers, to identify a shift in Arendt’s reading of Kant’s 
third Critique (Beiner, 1997: 2; Marshall, 2010: 380). The different readings of Arendt’s 
account will be the subject of chapter 2. 
33
 Aristotle remains the main source for a discussion of phronesis, i.e. practical wisdom or 
prudence. In his work, phronesis is said to be the virtue essential for achieving the good life, 
by enabling access to the universal as it is identifiable in the particular (Aristotle, 2002: VI). 
Prudence enables us to do the ‘right thing, at the right time, and for the right reason’ 
(Surprenant, 2012: 221). Aristotle also has a notion of judgement, krinein, which Arendt 
adopts as judging and deciding (cf. Marshall, 2010: 377). Krinein deals with the essential 
appearance of things and is limited to situations where different judgements are possible. 
Phronesis and krinein are interrelated and, to put it starkly, ‘phronesis minus praxis equals 
judgment. Phronesis is the union of an act of good judgment and the action which is the 
fitting embodiment of judgment’ (Beiner, 1983: 75). In other words, it is possible to make 
good judgements but fail to translate them into an appropriate action. Through its 
interrelation with prudence, good judgement in Aristotle’s thought depends on habituation, 
familiarity, practice, and experience.  
34
 It is not my intention to locate Arendt, once more, between Kant and Aristotle, for her 
contribution is precisely to move beyond the two. This point is put succinctly by Disch (1994: 





The binary spectator and actor emerged in Arendt’s thought as part of the critique of 
professional thinkers addressed in the last section. She was particularly concerned 
with the role of the detached observer, familiar in logical positivism, who relies on a 
strict object-subject distinction and puts an unwarranted emphasis on objectivity. 
Her own spectator is closer to what usually comes to mind when we talk about 
spectators, a crowd that, for example, attends a football game (Arendt, 1981a: 94). 
This spectator exists in the plural (fans, commentators, pundits) and is part of the 
appearances without being directly involved in the action, i.e. playing football. Their 
observations are not orientated towards objectivity, but the production of meaning, 
e.g. which team deserved to win. Spectators, as judges who are not distant 
observers, do not escape the political partiality of their role (Bilsky, 1996: 138). 
For Arendt’s rewriting of the role of the spectator, Kant played an important role. He 
provided her with the image of a judging spectator who looks for the enjoyment of 
the aesthetically pleasing, as an alternative to the philosopher who searches for 
truth and objectivity. The relationship between politics and aesthetics is complex, but 
Arendt drew on judgements of taste because they share with politics that they are 
largely concerned with the unique and particular. Taste and smell are ‘discriminatory 
by their very nature and [...] only these senses relate to the particular qua particular’ 
(1982: 66). The ‘point of the matter is: I am directly affected. For this reason there 
can be no dispute about right or wrong here’ (1982: 66). Taste triggers humans’ 
sense of what is meaningful in the world and mobilises us to take up a position 
towards it – whether we consider it beautiful, right, or good. 
The question is how to move from a sensation of the particular to the pluralist 
politics that Arendt had in mind as the source of coming to terms with reality. After 
all, it is difficult to communicate and discuss one’s experience of this extremely 
subjective and private sense. To move from the private to the political, Arendt drew 
on Kant’s emphasis on disinterestedness, the transcendence of ‘what we usually 
call self-interest, which, according to Kant, is not enlightened or capable of 
enlightenment but is in fact limiting’ (Arendt, 1982: 43). The transformation of a 
personal sense of taste succeeds with the help of imagination through what Kant 
terms an ‘operation of reflection’ (Kant, 2000: §40, 294b). Disinterestedness means 
that judgements withdraw from the direct perception of an object that has caught our 





approval or disapproval (1982: 65). This process allows judgements to include 
further parameters of evaluation alongside the immediate sensation. 
For Arendt the process of disinterestedness can be achieved through training ‘one’s 
imagination to go visiting’ (Arendt, 1982: 43). This practice builds on Kant’s notion of 
enlarged mentality35, but replaces his concern with universalising assumptions – the 
desire for a priori agreement on one’s judgement – with her emphasis on plurality. 
Arendt is also informed by a form of impartiality which she attributes to the Ancient 
Greeks who learned to ‘look upon the same world from one another’s standpoint, to 
see the same in very different and frequently opposing aspects’ (Arendt, 2006a: 51). 
Going ‘visiting’ (1982: 43), or ‘representative thinking’ (2006a: 237), transcends the 
subjective experience by anticipating the future communication with other members 
of society and their distinctive perspectives on the world. Having moved beyond self-
interest, it helps look at an object from many different standpoints, without simply 
adopting them – representative thought is orientated towards the world and does not 
require us to share another person’s perspective. The establishment of an enlarged 
perspective is meant to provide ‘a viewpoint from which to look upon, to watch, to 
form judgments, or […] to reflect upon human affairs’ (1982: 44). Unlike with the use 
of reason, enlarged judgement, aesthetic or political alike, does not produce 
instructions on how to act, but gives meaning to objects and refines our sense of 
reality. 
The incorporation of an affective and representative dimension to judgement has 
become known following Arendt scholar Lisa Disch as ‘situated impartiality’ (Disch, 
1993: 666) – the critical vantage point from within a community and plurality. One 
way in which judgement can express this situated impartiality is through the telling of 
a story about the event to be judged. Storytelling, for Arendt, could help judgement 
by representing a ‘dilemma as contingent and unprecedented and […] [by pushing] 
its audience to think from within that dilemma. It invites the kind of situated crucial 
thinking that is necessary’ (Disch, 1993: 669) to judge in modernity. 
Arendt’s use of storytelling is indebted to Walter Benjamin and his rejection of a 
linear conception of time, particularly of history as progress (Arendt, 1970: 165; cf. 
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 By enlarged mentality Kant means the general perspective that emerges when the object 
is viewed from different standpoints (Kant, 2000: §40; cf. Arendt, 1982: 55f.). Enlarging one’s 





Benhabib, 1990; Herzog, 2000).36 Decades before the extraordinary interest in 
narrativity from the 1980s onwards, Arendt followed Benjamin as she identified in 
storytelling the capacity to give meaning to information without reducing it to that 
information. Exemplary stories avoid providing definitive interpretations of events 
and facts, i.e. they avoid defining the meaning of their content and open it up to a 
plurality of interpretations.37 Arendt’s use of storytelling was further informed by 
Ancient Greece, particularly the way stories were told by Thucydides and Homer 
(Arendt, 1982: 5, 56). They, too, faced extreme forms of violence and showed 
Arendt how to judge through telling a story from a second-person perspective that 
avoids reducing judgement to empathy for the ‘victims of history’. 
This concludes my investigation into the first feature of Arendt’s reformulation of the 
actor-spectator binary: the connection that Arendt put forward between a spectator 
who goes visiting and tells representative stories, and pluralist politics. The second 
feature concerns the interrelationship between spectator and actor. As I highlighted, 
the spectator in her thought becomes a much more active part of politics. Arendt at 
the same time clearly separated their judgements from action; reflective judgement 
is linked to certain features of the spectator, in particular the capacity for withdrawal 
from the world of appearances. She emphasised that the actor who ‘acts never quite 
knows what he is doing’ (Arendt, 1998: 233), in part, as action leads to irreparable 
and unforeseen consequences. Arendt also clarified that all actors have to take up 
the position of spectator from time to time to avoid acting foolishly and unaware of 
action’s consequences. The spectator and actor are ideal types of the judging and 
acting capacity in every human, and all humans deploy a mixture of both positions in 
their everyday lives. In Arendt’s words, ‘this critic and spectator sits in every actor’ 
(Arendt, 1982: 63). 
The interrelationship between actor and spectator expresses itself in politics as 
follows: while action provides the content and origin of politics, which emerges out of 
humans inserting themselves into the world and engaging with each other (Arendt, 
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 Benjamin famously captured his scepticism towards progress through the metaphor of the 
angel of history. This angel moves into the future by looking backwards at the devastation of 
civilisation (1970; Schöttker et al., 2006). 
37
 Arendt also emphasised the role of the theorist as storyteller who ‘dives for pearls’, 
especially when the political sphere is lost. To dive for pearls, in reference to Shakespeare’s 
Tempest, means to turn to the past, not to reminisce and resuscitate it, but to find what over 
time crystallised, survived and was turned into something worth saving (Arendt, 1970: 205; 





1998: 199), the spectators constitute the public realm and give the appearance in it 
meaning (1982: 63). Arendt therefore points readers towards the need to 
acknowledge both the spectator and the actor. The quality of political judgement 
depends on a moving back and forth between them. Action cannot fulfil its role 
without judgements that give it meaning, define what of the appearance is relevant 
and important. Similarly, the spectator’s political judgement relies on the possibility 
of its communication and translation into action. Otherwise, it returns to the 
untenable position of the detached observer. As Arendt emphasised, the ‘condition 
sine qua non for the existence of beautiful objects is communicability’ (Arendt, 1982: 
63). The spectator only opens up the public space through their ability to judge and 
give meaning, if their judgement is communicable. 
A return to Arendt’s use of storytelling illustrates this point. Storytelling provided 
Arendt with the modus operandi of the political sphere that brings together actor and 
spectator. Political actors take to the public stage and reveal their own story. Action, 
with its capacity for natality and unpredictability, continuously produces unforeseen 
stories (Arendt, 1998: 184). The judge, in turn, delineates the political by stating 
what is relevant and meaningful in action. The meaning is only fully revealed at the 
end of the story and only to the storyteller, ‘that is, to the backward glance of the 
historian, who indeed always knows better what it was all about than the 
participants’ (1998: 192). As I suggested above, the historian for Arendt is a 
storyteller and judging spectator that aims for a second-person perspective and for 
situated impartiality. In telling a story the judge also becomes once again an actor, 
inserting their view into the world and continuing the movement between judging 
spectator and actor. 
In sum, in her interpretation of the role of actors and spectators, Arendt fruitfully 
shows that the capacity of judgement to make sense of reality depends on the 
interplay between spectator and actor. Political judgement is always negotiated 
between the particular and the universal, impartiality and partiality. Fully aware of 
this fact, Arendt insisted on tying judgement to a plurality of spectators and on 
anchoring the spectator in experience and the political community. For judgement to 
move beyond mere affectedness and a partial perspective on the world, it has to 
become political, and this means to think representatively, to take into account other 





however also to consider the world from a diverse range of perspectives without 
losing sight of the ‘it appears to me’.  
 
1.3.3 Community Sense 
My discussion of Arendt’s theorising on judgement has thus far highlighted two 
features to political judgement, as Arendt understood it. Firstly, I considered how 
Arendt turned to judgement in order to connect the mental activities of thinking and 
willing to a pluralist politics. Judgement is able to make this link between life of the 
mind and politics, because it uniquely combines withdrawal with interestedness and 
plurality. To understand how judgement is able to do so, my investigation 
highlighted, secondly, that for Arendt the judging spectator and the political actor are 
inextricably related, and that the quality of the spectator’s judgement depends on a 
capacity for disinterestedness and ‘going visiting’. 
This section deals with a second way in which plurality comes into play for 
judgement to combine withdrawal and appearance, situatedness and impartiality. 
Judgement simultaneously draws on a shared world as a framework of reference to 
evaluate political problems and helps reproduce and strengthen the common world 
for future action and judgement. Arendt calls the connection between judgement and 
the community in which judgements are embedded, community sense. I focus on 
how Arendt formulates common, or community, sense as a point of reference that 
never transcends the context and the individual’s position, but neither makes 
judgement merely subjective, contextual, or even impartial. Instead, community 
sense is the product of a continuous, open-ended practice of creating a world in 
which to judge through engagement with a diversity of perspectives on a shared 
object. 
Common sense describes the relation between humans and their common world. 
From Plato’s cave myth onwards, philosophers have looked down upon common 
sense and the philosopher has sought to escape from its constraints to access 
transcendental knowledge. In contrast, Arendt valued common sense. She identified 
the originality of totalitarianism in the loneliness it caused by succeeding in 
separating people from their common world, their common sense and thereby, from 
each other (Arendt, 1973: 475). Modern mass society brings with it a lack of 





world – a situation that is exacerbated by the emergence of totalitarianism (Arendt, 
2006a: 89f.). Common sense is thus both a necessary precondition of modern 
political judgement and uniquely under threat by the effects of modernisation. 
There are two uses of common sense in Arendt’s work: common sense and 
community sense. Both rely for their functioning on the commonality of the world 
and I discuss them briefly to show what role they play for Arendt’s reflective 
judgement. Common sense, in French ‘le bon sense’, refers to a cognitive capacity 
for truth and knowledge considered in the Life of the Mind, Thinking. Common sense 
responds to the worldly context of perception, the feeling of its realness. It builds on 
a 
‘threefold commonness: the five senses, utterly different from each other, have 
the same object in common; members of the same species have the context in 
common that endows every single object with its particular meaning; and all other 
sense-endowed beings, though perceiving this object from utterly different 
perspectives, agree on its identity. Out of this three-fold commonness arises the 
sensation of reality’ (Arendt, 1981a: 50). 
Common sense enables the unification of different sensual frameworks (the object I 
see is experienced as image, the object I hear as sound), because it allows us to 
trace their communality to the same object. The sixth sense offers the bridge 
between private and public sphere, linking up our private sensations that are by 
nature difficult to communicate, with other people’s perceptions.38 Common sense is 
therefore a necessary and important foundation of judgement, without which 
representative thinking could not get off the ground. 
The second use of common sense by Arendt, community sense, refers to a capacity 
for judgement and meaning which Arendt discussed in her lectures on Kant’s 
political philosophy. Arendt drew on Kant’s gemeinschaftlicher Sinn, which refers to 
an ability to judge the communicability of sensations and to gain validation by 
appealing to others (1982: 71f.). Community sense relies on communicability and 
enlarged mentality as the foundation for good judgement. It is neither objective nor 
arbitrary but is called upon by political judgement, through which one can only reach 
agreement, if one manages ‘to “woo” or “court” the agreement of everyone else. And 
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 Common sense is incomparable to the experience of the other senses. It can also not 
simply be reconstructed by thinking, as the sense of realness that comes with common 
sense is outside the grasp of thinking (1981a: 51f.). Indeed, for Arendt, there is a natural 
tension between thinking and common sense, for, thought aims to withdraw from the use of 
sense data and the common world. In spite of this, the common sense has often been 





in this persuasive activity one actually appeals to the “community sense”. In other 
words, when one judges, one judges as a member of a community’ (Arendt, 1982: 
72). The possibility to refer to a community of peers, Arendt realised, is vital to 
judgement in politics, where the standards of judgement are often obscured and 
changing. 
Although Arendt embedded judgement in a community, she did not reduce 
judgement to what is culturally accepted. Membership of a political community does 
not mean that political judgements must trigger an actual public acceptance of one’s 
perspective on the world. Similarly, she did not make the quality of judgement 
dependent on particular characteristics of the judging person, or seek a 
transcendental, a priori process of agreement as visible in parts of Kant’s third 
Critique. Instead, Arendt’s community sense is concerned with the coming together 
of a plurality of differing views on shared objects. Arendt shows how action and 
judgement are embedded in a common world, but also create and maintain that 
world through new ways of giving meaning to experiences together (cf. Borren, 
2013; Degryse, 2011). 
Arendt’s community sense is given concreteness by two further qualifications. 
Firstly, community sense does not demand that one consider all perspectives in 
one’s society, but appeals according to Arendt to the community of judges who have 
similarly gone through a process of affectedness and representative thinking upon 
the matter to be judged (Arendt, 2006a: 221). The community sense is limited to 
incorporating the perspectives of those who have judged, those who one relates to 
in judging, and to those to whom the phenomenon to be judged has appeared and 
matters. Secondly, far from an abstract ideal held in society, the community sense is 
a product of cultivating a practice of judgement in interaction with other members of 
the community. The community sense that a person refers to is characterised by the 
different perspectives one has encountered throughout one’s life, and the 
perspectives and judgements one relies on in making one’s own judgement. The 
quality of judgement is therefore largely dependent on the kind of company we keep 
(Arendt, 2006a: 226). 
These qualifications find their expression in the key mechanism through which 
community sense links the common world and judgement. Exemplarity was Arendt’s 
‘favoured means of improving judgment’ (La Caze, 2010: 78) and refers to a 





(Arendt, 1982: 77) and thus representative of what tables actually should be like.39 
Arendt identified exemplars as bestowing judgement with a general validity, by 
capturing characteristics of many particulars and by often being held by a large 
number of people (Arendt, 1982: 83).40 Examples, such as Achilles’ courage or 
Jesus kindness, lend judgement ‘exemplary validity’ to the extent that they are 
adequate for the particular and contain a concept or general rule of relevance for 
this particular. They provide political judgement with at best a general, but not a 
universal validity: the moment ‘I speak about Bonapartism I have made an example 
of him. The validity of this example will be restricted to those who possess the 
particular experience of Napoleon, either as his contemporaries or as the heirs to 
this particular historical tradition’ (1982: 84f.). Exemplarity thus provides illustrative 
cases as standards to follow in judging and acting, but it also links judgement to 
shared meanings of a political community. Furthermore, judgement and action 
continuously create new exemplars to follow and, in doing so, expand our 
community sense. 
This concludes my introduction of central elements to political judgement as 
formulated by Arendt. The actor and spectator, taste, disinterestedness, 
representative thinking, common and community sense, are concepts through which 
Arendt attempted to delineate a form of judgement orientated by a practice of 
plurality. Judgement constitutes the political by evaluating what appears, giving it 
meaning and expanding our sense of reality. To this end, judgement draws on a 
community of spectators who, in plural, respond to the world-disclosure in action 
and in turn sharpen our sense of reality by making manifest their position towards 
the world. 
Arendt provides important insights into the pluralist dimension to judgement. My 
discussion of her understanding of politics, reality, and judgement showed that she 
put forward a thicker conception of plurality, consisting of three parts: of the 
distinctiveness and sameness of humans and of a common world. Arendt 
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 Arendt provided many illustrations of what she saw as good exemplars to follow. The list 
ranges from historical, literary, to philosophical figures, from Socrates and King Lear, 
Lessing, Karl Jaspers, Rosa Luxembourg, to Berthold Brecht. Although historical events can 
also be exemplary for Arendt (cf. Passerin d’Entrèves, 2000: 251), her particular focus on 
writers and thinkers reveals a problematic tendency towards an intellectualist account of 
political judgement. 
40
 The term exemplarity refers to ‘a particular that in its very particularity reveals the 





responded to the impoverishment of plurality through mass society and 
totalitarianism, by highlighting the potential in human plurality to i) affirm freedom 
and novelty in politics, ii) strengthen a sense of reality otherwise undermined by a 
break in tradition, and iii) judge without falling back on transcendental principles or 
mere subjectivity. The following chapter turns to the reception of Arendt’s project. 
The ensuing debate has highlighted that the pluralist dimension is deeply 
interrelated with a second dimension to political judgement: the relationship between 
structure and agency that frames how humans judge politically. Following a 
discussion of this second dimension in chapter 3 using the works of Margaret 






Chapter 2 – The Debate on Judgement following Arendt 
My aim in this thesis is to think through the practice of political judgement central to 
taking responsibility-for-complicity in systemic injustice, global poverty for example. 
Chapter 1 turned to a prominent scholar in the debates on judgement, Hannah 
Arendt. Arendt draws our attention to the pluralist dimension to judgement, which 
refers to judgement’s capacity to respond to the fact that humans can only make the 
world hospitable together, by thinking representatively and judging objects in their 
commonness. Political judgement depends on and helps create a common world 
that is home to a plurality of perspectives on issues of shared interest, whether it is 
Brexit, humanity’s reliance on fossil fuel, or the introduction of a basic income. 
Chapter 1 also highlighted that, according to Arendt, in modernity the challenge of 
finding new ways for humans to engage with reality precedes ethical theorising. I 
conclude that judgements on responsibility-for-complicity should attend to plurality, 
to gain into focus the common world as a prism through which we can understand 
the effects of complicity in injustice and the ways to address them. 
At the time of her death, Arendt had hardly begun the book on judgement that was 
to form the final part of the trilogy on the life of the mind. Her conceptualisation of 
this faculty is therefore, possibly more than with any other concept, about its 
reception, i.e. about how scholars use her unfinished remarks to articulate what 
would have likely been her theory of judgement. Chapter 2 provides an outline of the 
developments in the debate on political judgement that followed Arendt. I map the 
debate by delineating two phases, the second being composed of no fewer than four 
projects. These projects offer important insights into aspects related to how humans 
judge politically: the contribution of the imagination, the affective and unconscious 
dimensions of being human, the role of storytelling, and of common sense. 
My investigation does not seek to provide a direct contribution to the debates 
surrounding these concepts. Instead, their introduction helps move my overall 
argument on complicity forward in two important ways: firstly, a discussion of 
imagination, the affective and the unconscious, storytelling, and common sense, 
complements Arendt’s path-breaking contribution on judgement and renders it more 
complex. In particular, judgement scholars articulate different ways in which 
judgement can gain a critical purchase on reality, without reliance on transcendent 
values and universal standards and without falling back into relativism. The 





and validity1, and each project opens the space to discuss further, what the 
contributions of the judging person and their contexts are to a particular judgement. 
Arendt judgement scholarship rejects the claim that we must choose between 
subjectivity and objectivity, situatedness and social criticism, and universalism and 
relativism. Commentators argue that any notion of objectivity necessarily arises out 
of the interplay between judging person and their context – as well as out of the 
interaction of a plurality of judges and actors – that demands further theorisation. To 
give an example, if we wish to tackle (the various forms of) homelessness, the 
challenge is not how we, people interested in fighting injustice and theorists, can 
‘correctly’ judge homelessness according to some general standard. Instead, it is 
about finding ways of refining our sense of what homelessness is, who it affects, 
and how to prevent it. For this approach to judgement, we must concern ourselves 
with the existence of a common world that allows us to affirm and broaden our 
sense of homelessness, and this necessarily includes a better understanding of how 
the interplay between social context and judging capabilities shape the common 
world. 
This brings me to the second important movement: each project builds on Arendt’s 
insights into pluralism and shows how it connects to another key dimension to 
judgement, the interrelationship between structure and agency from within which 
judgement emerges. In other words, they turn to the issue of social conditioning 
(and transformation) that underpins plurality. I use the term ‘dualism’ in the following 
to characterise this second dimension, for reasons that will become clear in the next 
chapter. An emphasis on the intersubjective capacities of judgement is no longer 
seen as enough to gain critical purchase on political issues. Instead, scholars seek 
to clarify the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity in judgement that 
frames the pluralist potential, by turning to radical imagination, emotions, the 
unconscious, storytelling, and the pre-discursive structuring of judgement. 
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 Contemporary political theory sought to overcome the difficulties of judgment in the context 
of increasingly pluralist liberal democracies. This led to a convergence of two dominant 
positions in political thought between the 1960s and 1990s. European Critical Theory, 
emerging from the Frankfurt School, overlapped with the tradition of Anglo-American 
Philosophical Liberalism, captured in Rawls’ theory of justice. They shared an increasing 
concern with finding an appropriate link between universal standards and public debate, 
without sacrificing moral universalism for mere public acceptance. However, this mistrust of 
unreasonable debate as foundation for justice norms prevented any full commitment to or 
completion of this hermeneutic turn. The consequence is that the ‘concept of judging is 
eliminated and the just enjoys a pyrrhic victory: freed from the limitations of the politically 





My interest in these debates is therefore an indirect one: I am interested in the 
questions they raise about structure and agency/ objectivity and subjectivity. The 
purpose of the next chapter will be the further articulation of this dimension – the 
interrelationship between the judge and their context – through the works of social 
theorist Margaret Archer. I then turn to how these two dimensions, dualism and 
pluralism, come together and help respond to the problem of judging responsibility 





2.1 The First Phase of the Debate on Reflective Judgement 
The first response to Arendt’s conception of judgement was to weigh the benefits of 
her idiosyncratic theory against what commentators considered to be significant 
limitations.2 It is not my intention here to respond to their concerns directly. The 
initial reception of Arendt’s unfinished theory tended to read Arendt through a 
Kantian lens, foregrounding validity and truth. This approach failed to fully capture 
the centrality of freedom and plurality in judgment that Arendt had in mind. Their 
insights nonetheless warrant a brief introduction, because they continue to shape 
the ongoing debates on Arendt’s project that I address in this chapter. 
From the perspective of the early commentators, Arendt can be seen to provide an 
important contribution to conceptualising political judgement. At the same time, 
these scholars were concerned that her idiosyncratic reading provides such a 
problematic reinterpretation of Kant that it is no longer supported by his insights and 
concepts. A transformation of his aesthetic judgement into a political one, so the 
argument goes, only leads to confusion about what her own position entails. The 
scholars claimed that, ultimately, this confusion severely undermines the potential of 
Arendt’s innovative contribution to the debate. 
One of the triggers of the first attempts at piecing together and evaluating Arendt’s 
theory of judgement lies in Habermas’ (1977) article on Arendt’s communicative 
concept of power. The article created a particular, paradigmatic reading of Arendt.3 
Habermas points to Arendt as a source for a revival of practical philosophy and 
especially to her account of communicative action. However, he criticises her for 
idealising the Greek polis in opposition to modern polities, which Arendt saw as 
pathologies of modernity. Habermas also identifies her as undermining the value of 
rational discourse.  
Of particular concern to the first phase of commentators was Arendt’s use of 
aesthetic judgements for politics and its detrimental effect on truth claims in politics. 
Arendt seemed to share Kant’s concern with how a consensus secured through 
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 This first phase includes the works of Ronald Beiner, Seyla Benhabib, Richard Bernstein, 
Jürgen Habermas, and Peter Steinberger (Beiner, 1982, 1983; Beiner and Nedelsky, 2001; 
Benhabib, 1988, 1990; Bernstein, 1986; Habermas, 1977; Steinberger, 1990). 
3
 Arendt, following Habermas, became known for her humanist side and the emphasis on 
intersubjective communicative forms of action and power which are claimed to contribute to 





judgement can gain validity (Arendt, 2006a: 217). Kant’s Critique of Judgement 
assumes that judgements of beauty, e.g. this rose is beautiful, are not simply 
statements of preferences of the kind ‘I like wine’. Instead, these judgements entail 
an a priori premise of assent as they go beyond individual preferences (Kant, 2000: 
§22).4 Aesthetic judgements can thus gain a general validity. Yet, according to Kant, 
they cannot become universally valid, because the principle ‘beauty’ does not 
exhaustively describe whether a rose is beautiful or not, i.e. there is no universal 
rule to subsume the particular rose under. Arendt, in contrast to Kant, extended the 
limited validity of aesthetic claims to political judgement and emphasised 
furthermore its intersubjective, situated validity. This move led Ronald Beiner (1982: 
136f.) and Habermas to claim that Arendt ultimately left behind a ‘yawning abyss 
between knowledge and opinion’ (Habermas, 1977: 23), because she did not wish 
for rational arguments to close that gap. 
In parallel with this concern over Arendt’s reading of Kant, interpreters also worried 
about Arendt’s decreasing concern with public life. As Arendt emphasised the 
spectator in her later work, judgement became seemingly more retrospective and 
moral: it ironically ‘now seems to be the faculty that comes into play when politics 
breaks down’ (Bernstein, 1986: 233). The interpreters took issue with the 
increasingly historic, distant character of judgement, because Arendt at the same 
time continued to object to the transcendental arguments and immanence found in 
Kant’s moral and political philosophy. What grounds the spectators’ judgements, 
they asked, if it can no longer rely on Arendt’s commitment to pluralism? As I 
suggested at the beginning of the section, this reading remains too focused on 
concerns with validity and truth. In reading Arendt through Kant’s understanding of 
reflective judgement they miss the re-formulation of his theory towards plurality that I 
have outlined in chapter 1 and that has been clarified by a second phase of Arendt 
judgement scholarship. 
 
2.1.1 Phase Two 
A second phase, from the 1990s onwards, showed the virtues of Arendt’s account 
contra these earlier criticisms and responded through various attempts at extending 
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her theory of judgement. Exegetes belonging to this phase reread Arendt’s work, 
incorporated archival material and previously unpublished work, and even re-
examined her theoretical sources – especially Aristotle, Heidegger, and Kant – to 
provide a more nuanced understanding of her contribution.5 From this literature 
emerges an emphasis on how judgement is a key capacity that is present 
throughout Arendt’s thought of the 1940s to 70s.6 Arendt is read as purposefully 
defining judgement both from a political perspective and from within the life of the 
mind. Her theory gains its value precisely through the tension between the two, as 
they have to work together in order to maintain a strong political sphere.7 My reading 
in chapter 1 is indebted to this interpretation, which I find more attuned to Arendt’s 
intentions, and additionally brought the connection between reality, plurality, and 
judgement to the fore. 
The second phase also includes various projects aimed at the extension of Arendt’s 
theory.8 For example, commentators like Zerilli (2012) attempt to show the value of 
liberating judgement from current concerns with validity in political theory. In place of 
this focus, they are concerned with what gives judgement the potential to be world-
building and freedom-affirming. Others have turned to social theorists, notably Pierre 
Bourdieu, to substantiate or balance Arendt’s focus on reflection in judgement 
(Azmanova, 2012; Kornprobst, 2011, 2014; Mihai, 2016b). A large part of the 
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 This phase offers a wide scholarship in defence of Arendt’s account of judgement, which 
includes Leora Bilsky (1996), Annelies Degryse (2011), David Marshall (2010), Waltraud 
Meints (2014), Remi Peeters (2009a, 2009b), Jonathan Schwartz (2016), and Linda Zerilli 
(2005b, 2012). 
6
 The coherence of all of Arendt’s major works via her reflections on the mid-century political 
catastrophes is found already in Richard Bernstein (1996) and Margaret Canovan (1992). 
For the specific link between totalitarianism and Arendt’s response through judgement, see 
Lisa Disch (1994). 
7
 Waltraud Meints’ (2014) comprehensive analysis suggests, for example, that Arendt 
fruitfully upheld a double paradox in her account of judgement, which is present throughout 
her thought: Arendt anchored her thought in a philosophical tradition – that often rejected the 
value of political action and common sense – which she criticises and takes apart to develop 
her own liberated reflective judgement. In addition, Arendt’s work attempts to understand the 
political events of the 20
th
 century that often seem beyond comprehension. This approach 
allowed Arendt to develop numerous binaries throughout her work, binaries that gain their 
value precisely through their tensions, helping her to transcend traditional dichotomies, e.g. 
between praxis and theory, spectator and actor, science and common sense, opinion and 
truth, power and violence, action and thought.  
8
 This category contains scholarship more or less explicitly influenced by Arendt’s theory, 
which does not necessarily seek to respond to the first phase. Beyond numerous articles, 
this category includes Albena Azmanova (2012), Alessandro Ferrara (1999, 2012, 2014), 
Bronwyn Leebaw (2011), Leslie Thiele (2006), Jonathan Schwartz (2016), Maša Mrovlje 





scholarship has also explored specific concepts from Arendt’s theory, especially the 
spectator’s judgement, exemplarity, common sense, and storytelling to make sense 
of contemporary political issues. In what follows, I engage with four representative 
approaches that take forward Arendtian insights in ways relevant for my overall 
project. 
Before I turn to these, one caveat: the ability to judge politically should not be 
romanticised. Robert Fine (2008) notes that judgement has become a philosopher’s 
stone of Arendtian political theory. The sole focus on the mental activity obscures 
the various other aspects of her work. Some judgement scholars (Bourke and 
Geuss, 2009; Krause, 2008; Weidenfeld, 2011) instead choose to avoid Arendt’s 
contribution altogether, generally arguing that the influence of Arendt’s unfinished 
work can be a hindrance to moving the debate on (political) judgement further. I take 
these concerns seriously, but they are problematic insofar as they are shaped by the 
image of Arendt’s theory that emerged from the first phase of scholarship. In 
contrast, I suggest that the various extensions and re-valorisations of Arendt’s 
account can offer a suitable point of departure for current and future scholarship on 
judgement and democratic theory more generally. 
In summary, this chapter has thus far identified two general phases to the debate on 
Arendt’s theory of political judgement. Phase one emphasises problems with 
Arendt’s reading of Kant and a move towards detached, non-political judgement in 
the later works of Hannah Arendt. Phase two responds through revalorisation, 
extension, and rejection of Arendt’s contribution to the political judgement debate. 
The identified positions are not mutually exclusive and can only provide some 
indication of the multifaceted nature of the Arendtian political judgement debate. 
This thesis locates itself within the second phase and its emphasis on the fact that 
judgement played a continuous role in Arendt’s thought. I follow Arendt in her 
creative combination of existential philosophy, Kantian, and Aristotelian influences 
and agree with those scholars who suggest that we give up on the quest of 
identifying an earlier and later Arendt.9 The following sections of this chapter explore 
four contributions to the second phase in more detail. I argue they provide crucial 
extensions to Arendt’s theory of political judgement that turn the focus onto the 
complex interplay between judging person and context. 
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2.2 The World-building Capacity of Imagination 
For the first project that extends Arendt’s theory of political judgement, I turn to 
Linda Zerilli, who, over the last two decades, has continuously built on Arendt’s 
reflections about judgement.10 Zerilli substantiates our understanding of the pluralist 
dimension to judgement in at least three different ways: she refines the 
interpretation of Arendt’s thought (Zerilli, 2005b, 2012), explores judgement’s value 
for feminist theory (2005a, 2015), and draws on Wittgenstein in order to better 
capture what motivates humans to act (2016a, 2016b). Together these three 
projects enable her to articulate a comprehensive alternative to the Kantianism of 
earlier political judgement scholarship. 
I highlight two movements in Zerilli’s writing towards what she terms, following 
Cornelius Castoriadis, ‘radical imagination’ (2005b: 174, 2005a). Firstly, Zerilli helps 
move Arendt further away from elements of Kant’s theorising on judgement that 
have undermined her pluralist project. Instead, she reads Arendt as concerned with 
the danger of logical reasoning in politics, which seeks to coerce and compel – 
rather than foster – agreement. A turn to Wittgenstein enables Zerilli to insist not 
only that Arendt was not focused on validity concerns, but also to reveal the 
problematic assumptions in rationalism and how they hinder the imaginative 
processes necessary for judgement. Secondly, Zerilli expands the conception of 
imagination found in Arendt, by highlighting imagination’s ability to extend concepts 
beyond their original meaning. 
Zerilli helps us understand more fully the freedom-affirming and world-building 
potential of judging politically that Arendt was after. At the same time, her reliance 
on the capacity to persuade and to imagine, also raises difficult questions about how 
context and judge can come together in ways that enable political judgement to 
affirm freedom and build a common world. This section outlines both the potential 
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 Zerilli (2005b, 2012, 2016a) takes up Arendt’s theory in a new context of 21
st
 century’s 
pluralist, multi-ethnic Western societies. Instead of an engagement with the collapse of moral 
principles in Germany and the modern break in tradition, she considers – in dialogue with 
public reason theorists – the difficulties arising from an increase in competing standards and 
claims in the public space. Rawls (1996: 54–61) summarised this challenge as ‘the burdens 
of judgment’ and he, for Zerilli, develops a conservative response, one that limits the 
perspectives and positions admissible to political debate. Drawing on Arendt she develops 
an alternative that emphasises critical judgement as a democratic, ‘world-building practice’ 
(Zerilli, 2012: 8), which ensures the possibility of politics, and therefore, of freedom. For 






and limitations of Zerilli’s work, in order to highlight the movement in judgement 
scholarship towards a concern with the interplay between judge and context 
alongside Arendt’s pluralism. 
My discussion starts with Zerilli’s attempt to disentangle Arendt further from the 
Kantian position towards judgement, and what she terms the epistemological 
problem of the political judgement debate. Arendt, Zerilli reminds us, had made 
plurality ‘the condition of, rather than the problem for, intersubjective validity’; she 
shifted the ‘question of opinion formation and political judgment from the 
epistemological realm, where it concerns the application of concepts to particulars 
and the rational adjudication of knowledge/truth claims, to the political realm, where 
it concerns opinion formation and practices of freedom’ (2005b: 166). Arendt 
however undermined her concern with plurality in theorising judgement, by holding 
on to the distinction between reflective and determinate judgement, which leads to 
two problematic implications. Firstly, Arendt upheld the possibility of pure 
determinate judgement, in the form of logic judgements, e.g. that two plus two must 
be four, which automatically compel us (Arendt, 1982: 72). Thus, only reflective 
judgement is for her truly political. Secondly, her adoption of aesthetic judgement for 
politics led to accusations that she left behind a yawning abyss between knowledge 
and opinion, and failed to account for how rational standards may help validate 
judgements and differentiate between good and bad judgements in a meaningful 
way. Both steps hide the crucial contribution Arendt provided in capturing the 
political qualities of judgement through a thicker conception of plurality. They 
formulate reflective judgement as an incomplete rational process that must rely on 
other means, i.e. a turn to the potential for deliberating with others, to ensure 
adequate judgement. 
Building on Wittgenstein, Zerilli (2016b) questions whether distinguishing between 
purely determinate and purely reflective judgement is possible, by insisting on the 
necessarily aesthetic dimension to knowledge.11 Wittgenstein offers, in Zerilli’s 
reading, a way to break the stronghold of logic on judgement, by questioning why 
something must be a certain way, e.g. why two plus two must always lead to four. 
He helps shed light on what happens if we imagine that someone simply does not 
follow our logic, which we assume to be so intuitively reasonable. What instead 
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seems to play a crucial role as to whether we follow a rule and whether it has a 
compelling, logical character, is its acknowledgement.12 
Judgements of a particular gain their compelling character not from their cognitive 
compulsion, but from ‘finding the right expression, one that I accept because it 
satisfies me’ (2016b: 142). This means that all judgements, even more determinate 
ones, presuppose aesthetic values about what ought to be. Validity arises out of 
persuasion; that is, giving facts the appropriate, satisfactory meaning according to 
these values. To judge compellingly, Zerilli concludes, is possible because, and not 
despite, of the aesthetic character of judgement. Judgements do not require an 
adherence to narrow conceptions of truth and logic (Zerilli, 2016b: 130f.). A suitable 
(democratic) theory of political judgement should therefore leave behind the search 
for coercive rational standards, to support a practice of giving meaning to particulars 
through persuasion.13 
The second contribution that I wish to highlight in Zerilli’s work concerns her 
insistence on the freedom-affirming potential of imagination. Zerilli criticises Arendt 
for her failure to utilise imagination beyond its reproductive contribution (2005b: 
163). In connection with The Life of the Mind and the spectator’s judgement, I 
pointed out in chapter 1 how Arendt identified in the imagination a faculty that 
enables humans to make present what is absent, and to view an issue from different 
perspectives, thus transcending the limitations of subjectivity. Zerilli suggests that 
this interpretation of the activity of imagination is not sufficient to respond to ‘the 
problem of the new’ that Arendt brought to judging politically. The use of imagination 
in Arendt’s thought does not help us understand how ‘members of democratic 
communities, can affirm human freedom as a political reality in a world of objects 
and events whose causes and effects we can neither control nor predict with 
certainty’ (Zerilli, 2005b: 162). For this project, a notion of imagination is needed that 
is not reproductive, but generative and spontaneous, and thus able to extend the 
reference of judgement beyond its original meaning (Zerilli, 2005b: 163). For Zerilli, 
radical imagination goes beyond this representative function, because it opens the 
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public space to ‘values that have not yet found expression in the sense of a 
determinate concept’; through imagination, humans ‘hold to an imaginative 
extension of a concept beyond its ordinary use in cognitive judgments and affirm 
freedom’ (2005b: 171). Judgement that exercises the imagination becomes for Zerilli 
the capacity to create new connections in the shared world and to help give them 
meaning without returning to an application of existing rules or given concepts. The 
spectators’ judgement creates ‘the space in which the objects of political judgement, 
the actor and actions themselves, can appear, and thus alter our sense of what 
belongs in the common world’ (2005b: 179). 
To illustrate the shift in focus on political judgement, Zerilli turns to Frederick 
Douglass’ famous speech ‘The Meaning of July Fourth for the Negro’, from 1852, as 
exemplary political judgement at the boundaries of deliberative discourses. She 
shows how the aim of the speech is not an immanent critique of public reason, in the 
hope of conveying the rational character of anti-slavery argumentation. Instead, 
Douglass attempts to reveal the hypocrisy of claims to rationality, through various 
means of rhetoric, including sarcasm and irony. The aim is not to convince his 
audience by reference to shared beliefs, but to ‘gain critical purchase on what each 
takes for granted’ (Zerilli, 2012: 18). Our responsibility as theorists and listeners 
therefore cannot be to redeem Douglass’ public unreason as public reason, but to 
acknowledge the political, transformative force of ‘a form of speaking and judging 
that unsettles how we understand those principles and the apparent coherence of 
the “we” that denies its contingent and exclusionary character’ (Zerilli, 2012: 19). 
This introduction to Zerilli’s argumentation gives us a sense of the position she 
seeks to adopt. Her work helps move Arendt and her insights into the pluralist 
dimension to judgement further away from a Kantian concern with validity and the 
subsumption of the particular under universals. Zerilli turns Beiner’s and Habermas’ 
‘yawning abyss’ on its head: it is not the case that Arendt failed to account for the 
need for rational standards in politics because she turned to aesthetics. Instead, 
Beiner and Habermas neglected the necessarily aesthetic dimension to the 
functioning of rational standards. Zerilli’s emphasis on the importance of persuasion 
also raises a number of difficult questions: what makes persuasion a tool that 
contributes to democracy rather than one that simply manipulates? Specifically, 
what can we say about the social practices from which persuasion emerges in order 





ways? How can we ensure that judgement helps affirm freedom and strengthens a 
community’s sense of reality – without returning us to a concern with validity and 
epistemology? I show in chapter 3 that much more can and should be said along 
this dimension by engaging with the relationship between structure and agency. 
Zerilli’s work is attentive to the issue of social conditioning, including through her 
contribution to feminist debates. Zerilli challenges feminists’ overwhelming concern 
with the ‘subject question’ (Zerilli, 2005a: 10) which fails to recognise the conception 
of political freedom found in acting together as an alternative to the freedom 
associated with free will and domination which feminists critique. Amongst others, 
Lois McNay, in turn, raises doubt about Zerilli’s capacity to evade the problem of the 
‘subject question’, which is considered to be pivotal to the issue of social 
conditioning. The ‘emergence of the radically new is almost always mediated 
through and therefore constrained by, the confines of embodied existence and 
understanding’; a conception of politics that seeks to transcend these ‘confines in 
order to intervene more creatively in the world’ must account for ‘their limiting 
effects’ rather than dismissing the effects ‘in favour of the postulation of an inchoate 
potentiality’ (McNay, 2014: 16).14 The limitations are visible with regards to Zerilli’s 
use of Douglass’ speech as an illustrative example of political judgement: she 
seems to reduce reflective judgement to speech acts that target ways of thinking 
about the common world. 
I share Zerilli’s commitment to Arendt’s thicker conception of plurality, which I take to 
be irreducible to the issue of subject formation, or social conditioning more 
generally. The challenge that arises out of my reconstruction of Zerilli’s contribution, 
as I see it, is therefore how to uphold the human capacity for radical imagination and 
persuasion without falling back on an intellectualist account that obscures the 
embeddedness of imagination and persuasion in the interrelationship between 
structure and agency, which, following Archer, I call dualism. The dualism of political 
judgement, put simply, must work together with, rather than come at the cost of, the 
pluralism identified in chapter 1. 
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In summary, Zerilli follows Arendt in focusing on the practice of freedom in 
judgement, but she also extends her understanding of imagination and works with 
Wittgenstein to emphasise that persuasion, and not narrow conceptions of 
rationality, is central to its functioning. Radical imagination contributes to the pluralist 
project by helping a political community extend the shared meaning beyond what is 
known and knowable. Both persuasion and imagination, as I have shown, also open 
the space to discuss further the issue of social conditioning that inevitably confronts 
us following a departure from a search for transcendental validity. The issue gains in 





2.3  The Affective and Unconscious Layers to Judgement 
My discussion turns to a second project aimed at extending Arendt’s conception of 
judgement. I engage with Arendt scholars who have contributed to a broad 
movement in academia that seeks to capture the role of the unconscious and the 
affective layers to how humans judge politically. This project, too, turns our attention 
further towards the second dimension to judgement, the processes of social 
conditioning from within which judgement emerges, by challenging our views on how 
humans respond to their environment. The movement is made further visible by my 
(Arendtian) responses to a problematic tendency in political theory to replace an 
emphasis on rationality with an embrace of the unconscious and affective. The turn 
away from deliberation ultimately retains the stark distinction between cognitive and 
non-cognitive processes that animates rationalism and fails to give full credence to 
the complexity of judging practices. I show throughout the coming chapters that 
such a strategy misconstrues judgement in both its dualism and pluralism.15 
Judgement’s affective and unconscious dimensions gain in importance following 
theorists’ move away from determinate conceptions of political judgement, towards 
an emphasis on its creative world-building potential. The discussion of imagination 
and persuasion in the last section made it clear that a focus on rationality is simply 
not enough for the cultivation of good judgement. Indeed, to put it starkly, it is the 
aesthetic as well as the non-cognitive elements which help give rational standards 
their potential for agreement, by making them seem satisfactory and reasonable to 
us, without requiring much deliberation. 
Zerilli has added insights into the non-conscious and affective layers to judgement, 
as have other political theorists (Bennett, 2009; Connolly, 2002; Gunnell, 2007, 
2013; Zerilli, 2015). Since the 1950s, the conception of judgement has also 
increasingly been an object of interdisciplinary, psychological research (Hibbing et 
al., 2014; Thiele, 2006: 60).16 Thiele’s Heart of Judgement (2006) provides one of 
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 The strategy takes many different forms, but is held together by an inability or 
unwillingness to account for the interpenetration and distinct qualities of the social, the 
deliberative, and the unconscious. I will refine my critique of this problem in chapter 3 
through the distinction between duality and dualism. 
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with psychological literature, e.g. Judith Shklar’s (1990: 27) adoption of psychological 
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the first systematic accounts of the un-/sub-/non-/pre-conscious and affective 
contributions to human judgement that engages critically with both philosophical – 
including Arendt – and psychological literature on decision making. His book serves 
as one of the key starting points for introducing this difficult and underdeveloped 
side to the Arendt judgement scholarship.17 I turn first to the connection between 
judgement and the unconscious, before moving in the following section to the 
affective and emotional contributions to judging. 
 
2.3.1 Judgment and the Unconscious 
The role of the non-/sub-/unconscious in the process of judging politically remains 
heavily contested. One explanation for this is that judgement provides an unusual 
case of belief formation. It is unusual, because we can only speak of judgement if it 
is made intentionally, has arisen out of at least some degree of reflection, and builds 
on some form of evidence. At the same time, judgements have drag effects similar 
to perception, which elude awareness. As Victoria McGeer and Philiip Pettit 
succinctly put it, judgements are ‘subject to silent forces that are as powerful and 
unrelenting as gravity and that curve the space of reason in ways that is difficult for 
us to detect’ (McGeer and Pettit, 2009: 64). Human beings are therefore not by 
nature ‘the enlightened masters of where our judgement goes; having been selected 
for survival, not for insight, our natural instinct is a wayward ally in the struggle for 
truth’ (2009: 65). The source of many of the disagreements about conceptualising 
judgement, as well as the motivation for the rationalist projects that turn to 
transcendental and logical reasoning to strengthen the ‘intentional side’ to 
judgement, can be traced back to this inherent tension between intentionality and 
‘drag effects’ in judgement. 
With this initial, important observation in place, my discussion turns to the 
psychological literature on judgement, zooming in on human decision-making. 
Psychology and neuroscience have provided various insights into the role of the 
non-conscious in judgement. Historically, psychology dealt with judgements through 
decision theory, which reduced judgements to models of efficient information 
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thesis. 
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processing and probabilistic reasoning (cf. Thiele, 2006: 60). This mind-as-machine 
approach is problematic for it invites an infinite regress problem: the reasons for 
judging something in a certain way presuppose reasons for these being the right 
reasons, which in turn presuppose reasons and so on ad infinitum. Human beings 
are not able to continuously engage in this kind of exhaustive reasoning prior to 
choosing an appropriate action. Such ‘hyper-rationality’ (2006: 63) would undermine 
optimum performance. 
Contemporary decision theory has instead shown that to judge successfully, human 
beings rely on many mechanisms that help avoid the infinite regress of exhaustive 
reasoning.18 These mechanisms describe mental short cuts known as heuristics.19 
They provide quick ‘dirty’ judgement, but may also lead to systematic errors, in 
which case the mental short cuts are defined as biases (Thiele, 2006: 63). Biases 
are not inherently bad or wrong, keeping us from fulfilling an ideal of enlightened 
beings. Instead, while attempts to decrease common biases are important, mental 
shortcuts are indispensable to navigating efficiently and effectively our complex 
world (2006: 67f.).20 
These neuroscientific and psychological insights gain in importance for the present 
investigation into responses to Arendt’s theory of judgement, with the emergence of 
a broad movement that seeks to introduce the evidence on the non-conscious into 
political theory. The various positions on ‘neuropolitics’ (Connolly, 2002) come with 
above all a 'shared anti-intentionalism’ (Leys, 2011: 443).21 As a consequence, in 
recent years, this extensive and insightful literature has provoked a number of 
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 Research has explored how human beings in making judgements focus on, for example, 
verbatim instead of gist information, rely on hot cognition (sub-conscious emotional reaction 
to information), and respond to affective cues (Clore and Huntsinger, 2007; Corbin et al., 
2015; Cornwell et al., 2015; Hibbing et al., 2014). 
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 Modern decision science has identified many heuristics, including the sunk cost effect 
(past investments encourage non-beneficial future investments), the rationalization effect 
(only reasons supportive of pre-judgements considered), and the self-confirmation effect 
(focus on confirming opinions). 
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 To give an example, ethnic stereotyping increases with decrease of individual’s attention. 
Knowledge of these effects cannot prevent misjudgements fully, as these effects are very 
robust, and often lead to overestimating one’s decision ability. 
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 Their aim was not only to deny the hold of logic and reason on political theory, but also to 
move beyond the focus on language and deconstruction of post-structuralism, particularly in 
cultural theory. In its place, they emphasise the layered character of political judgement and 
argue that deliberative democratic theories have not been able to account for the visceral 





cautious voices, including Zerilli, that challenge the underlying empirical evidence 
and ideological commitments.22 The criticisms highlight how judgement scholarship 
is entangled in a disagreement over what an appropriate conceptualisation of the 
relationship between the intentional and non-conscious contributions to judgement 
might look like that enriches, rather than come at the cost of, a commitment to 
pluralism. 
First of all, it is worth emphasising that critics of the embrace of specific neuro-
scientific evidence in political theory do not deny ‘that many bodily (and mental) 
processes take place subliminally, below the threshold of awareness. Who would 
dream of doubting that they do?’ (Leys, 2011: 456). Instead, they challenge the 
impression that to accept the importance of habituation in the form of sub-threshold 
automatic processes, e.g. the movement of fingers to play a piano, must necessarily 
entail that we hold on to the idealisation of the mind as a disembodied 
consciousness. Such a move comes to easily with a rejection of the role of the mind 
altogether, which opens up the space for a ‘victory’ of the unconscious in politics 
and political theory. It raises serious concerns in relation to political judgement at a 
theoretical and practical level. 
Theoretically, scholars including Zerilli (2013), challenge the fruitfulness of 
approaching political problems through a focus on different brain functions. Such a 
focus inevitably misconstrues socio-political phenomena in their complex inter-
subjective character and the import of psychology/science. Nudging and other 
popular approaches to human behaviour seek to solve socio-political issues by 
bypassing cognitive processes. They may seem particularly powerful as they target 
the immediate reactions of humans and have a direct impact on mass behaviour, 
but they consistently ignore the multi-layered character of social processes. 
Practically, the all too enthusiastic turn to the visceral, embodied contributions to 
decision making comes with significant dangers for politics. The embrace of 
neuroscience in political theory is a reaction to right wing strategies of tapping into 
xeno- and homophobic, sexist and other problematic sentiments in Western 
democracies at the sub-threshold, i.e. visceral, level. In response, leftist politics is 
ultimately encouraged to open the doors to a race to the bottom of (unpredictable) 
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 John Gunnell (2013), for example, challenges the insights provided by the influential 
neuroscientist Antonio Damasio on which much of the political theory use of psychological 





manipulation schemes. This strategy turns critical judgement into an 
epiphenomenon, an irrelevant afterthought of non-conscious processes.23 Both at a 
theoretical and practical level of politics, there is thus a problematic tendency to give 
up too easily on the potential of public spheres and on the difficult project of freeing 
politics from intellectualist approaches to deliberative democracy (cf. Livingston, 
2012). The non-conscious contributions to judgements play an important role as a 
part of the processes of making sense of social reality; the relationship between 
deliberation and the visceral in judgement is not in a zero-sum game. 
Alex Livingston (2012) powerfully illustrates this point, by using the example of the 
changing public attitude to smoking. The increasingly widespread visceral reaction 
of disgust in connection with smoking must be thought of in the context of a 
longstanding debate and enduring efforts to bring home the negative impact of 
smoking cigarettes on humans. The changing engagement with smoking can neither 
be reduced to the conclusions of abstract reasoning that smoking is morally wrong 
or unhealthy, nor is it the mere effect of visceral tools to ‘train’ humans to give up on 
their bad smoking habits. Instead, socio-political practices offer the basis for critical 
reflection as a separate source of transformation and meaning, irreducible to these 
forms of manipulation, and it is their complex interplay that has proven key in 
changing the public attitude towards smoking. 
Without evaluating the extent to which the critique of the neuro-political approach is 
justified, what might we take from this investigation into the unconscious layers to 
judgement? With Thiele, we can state positively that poor judgements are poor 
because they fail to exploit the various human capacities usually involved in 
judgement at its best. Good judgements put a ‘panoply of deliberative and intuitive 
faculties to work in the perception and appraisal of multi-faceted problems’ (Thiele, 
2006: 152). After all, moral judgements are for most people ‘a product of intuitions 
that have been shaped through active participation in socio-cultural environments, 
and occasionally refined by propositional discussions’ (2006: 136). Judgement is 
neither reducible to rationality, retrospectively fully reconstructed by it, nor is 
judgement reducible to a mere unconscious bias.24 In terms of the approach I am 
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 An uncritical embrace of neuro-scientific research, Zerilli suggests, reveals a questionable 
belief in scientism as the arbiter of political decision making. 
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 Reason gains in importance for judgements when someone’s intuitions clash, leaving the 





developing in this thesis, judgement theories must account for unconscious 
contributions to our ‘making sense of reality’ that are part of complex socio-political 
processes and practices and that cannot easily be disentangled from them. 
 
2.3.2 Judgment and the Affective 
Following on from the discussion of the non-conscious contributions to judging, I 
now turn to the interrelated and equally hotly debated issue of the affective 
dimension to judgement. Since the 1990s scholars across the humanities, 
psychology, and the social sciences, build on the work of Henri Bergson, Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari, William James, Brian Massumi, Baruch Spinoza, and 
Alfred North Whitehead to challenge the belief in rational progress, that is, in 
enlightened reason replacing ‘irrational’ emotions. They ‘hesitate to conceptualize 
emotion and rationality as different beasts entirely, and they hesitate even more to 
map these faculties onto different categories of people (masses vs. elites, western 
vs. non-western publics, etc.)’ (Heins, 2007: 715f.; see also Bickford, 2011; Clore 
and Huntsinger, 2007; Clough and Halley, 2007; Clough, 2009; Protevi, 2009). The 
scholars reject the privileged position that is given to cognitive knowledge, or 
knowing that, when describing the relationship between humans and their world. 
Indeed, emotions are often given the primary role as providing the necessary 
motivation for moral behaviour – the cognitive knowing is embedded in the 
embodied knowing how. 
In contemporary political theory, the foundation of the current debate on emotions 
for judgement lies in Neo-Kantian reason, which displaces emotions, as expressed 
in the thought of Habermas and Rawls (cf. Bickford, 2011; Krause, 2008; Liljeström, 
2016).25 These problems have resulted in the postulation of a wide variety of 
alternatives to rationalism, from virtue theory and the communitarian critique of 
Rawls, care ethics and Martha Nussbaum’s work on political emotions, to various 
                                                                                                                                                                    
language leads to retrospective justification of one’s motivation in rational terms (which 
therefore may differ significantly from the actual judgement process). 
25
 Rationalists of this category tend to subordinate affect to a conception of reason as 
immune to the implications of actual sentiments prevalent in a society. While these accounts 
may accept the importance of emotions as motivating force, they wish to downplay affect’s 
role in their thought to present people as autonomous, rational, and with a strong sense of 





Humean approaches.26 The emergence of an affective turn has at times reproduced 
the traditional dichotomy between emotions and reason by overemphasising the 
embodied, non-cognitive nature of emotions (Zerilli, 2015, 2016a).27 
The tendency becomes visible when we turn to the definitions of the interrelated 
phenomena affect, emotions, sentiments, and feelings28. Take the definition of 
affect, which is generally used as a concept to describe the ‘bodily capacities to 
affect and be affected’ (Clough and Halley, 2007: 2).29 In affect theory, it is the name 
given to ‘those forces – visceral forces beneath, alongside, or generally other than 
conscious knowing, vital forces insisting beyond emotion’, and the ‘persistent proof 
of a body’s never less than ongoing immersion in and among the world’s obstinacies 
and rhythms, its refusals as much as its invitations’ (Gregg and Seigworth, 2009: 1). 
In contrast, the concept of emotion captures an at least ‘minimally interpretive 
experience whose physiological aspect is affect’ (Terada, 2003: 4).30 The description 
of affect in these terms holds onto a problematic dichotomy between the conscious 
‘signifying (“emotional” and intellectual) processes held to be captive to the fixity of 
received meanings and categories’ and, on the other hand, the ‘non-conscious 
affective processes of intensity held to be autonomous from signification’ (Leys, 
2011: 450). 
                                                          
26
 Care ethics (Gilligan, 1982) provides a corrective to rationalism, adding to the 
dispassionate moral judgement of rationalist theories of justice, a feeling of care for others, 
emerging from the private sphere, which provides important additional knowledge for the 
right action. In philosophy, Martha Nussbaum continues to be central for highlighting the 
crucial role emotions may play in politics (Nussbaum, 2013). A fear of relativism means that 
she reintroduces rationalist tendencies into her affective theory (cf, Krause, 2008: 59ff.). 
Emotions ‘thus appear conveniently amenable to political reforms’ (Degerman, 2016: 17). 
Krause (2008) also explores in detail the Humean, sentimentalist contribution on emotions. 
27
 Zerilli suggests that far ‘from the radical departure from modern philosophical accounts of 
human action and judgement that its advocates often claim it to be, affect theory can be read 
as another chapter in a familiar debate about the relationship between conceptual and 
nonconceptual modes of orientation to the world’ (2016a: 240). 
28
 Feeling may provide a common term referring to affect and emotion, as the sensation that 
is personal and biographical, e.g. I feel pain, where emotions are social and affect is to some 
extent pre-personal (Shouse, 2005). An emphasis on affect’s pre-personal qualities does not 
mean that affects are not mediated through the various regimes ordering our body and 
everyday lives (Grossberg, 2009: 316). 
29
 Affect is further defined as the ‘prepersonal intensity corresponding to the passage from 
one experiential state of the body to another and implying an augmentation or diminution in 
that body’s capacity to act’ (Massumi, 1987: xvi). 
30
 Emotions can be read as presupposing ‘beliefs, judgments, and desires, which are 
partially the product of a social environment. The object of an emotion is made up of 





I have already addressed the problems with this strategy in relation to the 
unconscious and will not repeat them here. This section also does not seek the 
comprehensive evaluation of the various stands of the affective turn and its main 
concerns with the body and emotions. Instead, I take up the crucial cue that 
emerges from their embrace of a more sustained engagement with how humans 
really make judgements. I put forward assumptions that add to the insights by Thiele 
and Zerilli on the unconscious and maintain the balance between reason and affect. 
Firstly, emotions are affective states and to some extent conscious feelings that 
motivate humans to judge their context. Emotions provide a commentary on 
circumstances that helps prioritise information and supports appropriate reaction. 
Without these affective contributions, rational judgement would have no direction, no 
interests to judge in the first place – it would become a world-less judgement. Affect 
‘is what sticks, or what sustains or preserves the connection between ideas, values, 
and objects’: to be affected is ‘to evaluate that thing. Evaluations are expressed in 
how bodies turn toward things’ (Ahmed, 2009: 29, 31). At the same time, emotions 
can leave humans in a state that makes them vulnerable to prejudices and to 
jumping to conclusions. Indeed, as shown in countless studies, emotions are very 
easily manipulated (Thiele, 2006: 170). To strengthen good judgement therefore 
requires ‘acknowledging, exploring, cultivating, and integrating affect’ (Thiele, 2006: 
199) without neglecting its imbrication with reason. It means to identify emotions not 
merely as a necessary, albeit unwanted part of human life, but as an important pre-
condition for good judgement. 
Secondly, emotions can distort judgements and the perspectives they provide on a 
shared world. They require awareness of their potentially negative effects, rather 
than a naïve support of affect against rationalism. Arendt is often noted for her 
emphasis on the negative effects that publicly expressed emotions can have on 
politics.31 One of the recent studies of Arendt on emotion concludes that Arendt 
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 Particularly her book On Revolution provides a clear separation of a political sphere, with 
its abstract ideals of ‘greatness’, ‘honour’, and ‘dignity’, from sentiments, especially collective 
emotions. She rejected the corruption of solidarity by interpersonal, modern pity, with its 
incorporation of primarily social concerns, e.g. poverty (Arendt, 2006c: 88). Collective 
emotions are problematic insofar as they group together individual misfortunes and relate 
these to abstract ideal groups – ‘the poor’ – that political action by default fails to respond to 
because of their vague character (Arendt, 2006c: 90). Whereas compassion for Arendt 
provides the foundation for individual reaction to needs experienced in immediate 
encounters, pity offers a ‘falsely idealistic, deliberately engineered emotion that reproduces 





identified in modernity a democracy threatened by ‘all too inflated moral emotions, 
while the appropriate technical and organizational means required for practical 
assistance are lacking’ (Heins, 2007: 724). To acknowledge this danger is not to 
revert back to rationalism as an attempt to repress and ignore emotions, which 
leaves democracy dangerously unprotected against their undemocratic expression 
(Mihai, 2014: 31). It is also not to argue that judgements of specific groups of people 
are more emotional – and therefore worse. 
Thirdly, a concern with the affective and emotional elements to judgement must 
remain tied to the overarching project that arises from the pluralist dimension to 
judgement, in particular a concern with reality. I discussed in chapter 1 that Arendt’s 
ethic of reality was often received critically; part of this reception goes back to claims 
of a lack of sensitivity to the emotional and affective dimensions to political action.32 
Arendt scholars dispute this reading: they emphasise for example that if ‘we take 
[….] heartlessness and coldness as mere quirks of personality, we deprive 
ourselves of alternatives to intimacy and empathy’ (Degerman, 2016: 6f.). 
Judgements attentive to emotions need to be part of a form of empathetic, 
intersubjective impartiality instead of a ‘passionless objectivity’ (Thiele, 2006: 186). 
This impartiality is not a form of sympathy, a coming ‘face-to-face with the Other’, 
but the project of coming ‘face-to-face with reality in the presence of others’ (2006: 
88).33 
In summary, my analysis of a second project that extends Arendt’s theory of 
reflective judgement highlighted the need to account for the non-conscious and 
affective layers to judgement. The challenge, however, is how to find a position in-
between the rationalist and the affective paradigm, both of which tend to uphold a 
problematic dichotomy between the affective, non-conscious processes and 
cognitive reasoning. Accounts of judgement, informed by insights into imagination 
and the unconscious and the affective, must become more attuned to the non-
deliberative contributions to judgements; the affirmation of a non-intellectualist 
approach to judgement, in turn, requires awareness of how these unconscious and 
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 As recent research on the role of emotions in Arendt’s thought emphasises, this reading 
relies too much on a narrow, selective reading of her work (Degerman, 2016; Heins, 2007; 
Nelson, 2006). 
33
 This alternative to sympathy is important in a ‘world burdened by claims that subjective 
preferences are the final word’; relativism suggests ‘epistemologically and ethically isolated 






affective contributions intertwine with the particular demands of the pluralist 
dimension to judgement. Arendt judgement scholars, in their endeavour to be 
attentive to both the potential of pluralism and the contribution of the affective and 
unconscious, thus open the space to develop a more suitable account of social 





2.4 The Situated Impartiality of Storytelling 
The third direction in which Arendt’s theorising on judgment has been fruitfully 
extended, is the relationship between judgement and storytelling. Chapter 1 
discussed that the Arendtian practice of action and judgement together form an 
activity of world disclosure that constitutes telling a story and giving it meaning. In 
light of the importance of storytelling in Arendt’s thought, the practice has attracted 
much attention in subsequent scholarship. Of particular interest has been the 
capacity of stories to give meaning to particular events and appearances without 
reducing the meaning to the details of that event and appearance. Stories can 
potentially convey a reflective judgement on behalf of the storyteller, and encourage 
those receiving the story to judge politically – that is, to enlarge their perspective on 
reality by engaging with different perspectives on a shared issue and, in so doing, to 
build new common meaning. 
This section builds on scholars of Arendtian storytelling, Lisa Disch, Maria Pía Lara, 
and Jade Schiff, to argue that storytelling becomes an important means to capture 
human experiences of reality in new, meaningful ways. In particular, I highlight that 
these commentators extend Arendt’s insight on the pluralist dimension to judgement 
by pointing out that storytelling can be critical and disclosive, but also potentially 
obscuring. The scholarship agrees that Arendt continues to be informative on the 
topic of storytelling, despite her unsystematic reflections on the practice. They also 
conclude that Arendt has insufficiently shed light on criteria for adjudicating between 
stories, as well as on the connection between stories and socio-political practices 
(Stone-Mediatore, 2000: 95). 
Arendt scholars on storytelling have engaged with the practice in a variety of 
different contexts. Each setting comes with new insights, but also reproduces the 
central movement from pluralism towards the dualist dimension to judgement. To 
evaluate the potential that Arendt’s thought offers for debates on narrativity, Disch 
(1994) situated Arendt’s innovative approach to storytelling and judgement in the 
context of the postmodernism-modernism divide. She searches for an alternative to 
the two sides, which rejects the Archimedean impartiality without either falling for 
dogmatism, attributed to modernism, or scepticism, identified in postmodernism. 
For Disch, Arendt’s most provocative contribution is her notion of ‘visiting’, which 
proposes to combine impartiality and situated interestedness by looking at an issue 





plurality of contesting positions not to reconcile them in a general statement of 
principle but to arrive at a public interpretation of the event’s meaning. Such a 
judgement is only provisional, and defending it does not involve proving it is right’ 
(1994: 208). Storytelling departs from the ‘premise that it is precisely because they 
[stories] call for interpretation – that they cannot be taken literally’ (1994: 9). Pluralist 
stories help capture ‘the ambiguities of a social reality that is never linear but many-
sided and multidimensional’ (1994: 9). Storytelling thus encapsulates a form of 
judgement that accepts that its content is not self-evident and conclusive, and 
refrains ‘from the rhetorical moves that would give one’s position the appearance of 
unquestionability’ (1994: 4). Visiting, or representative thought, proposes to find a 
middle ground between an embrace of telling the stories of the marginalised, who 
are said to provide particularly ‘objective’ insights (fundamental to modernist 
literature) and the absolute rejection of any form of objectivity in storytelling 
(defended by postmodernists) by turning to public engagement with perspectives.34 
The extension of Arendt’s thought on storytelling to the modernism-postmodernism 
debate also reveals the limitations of a focus on plurality for judgement and 
storytelling. Disch concludes that Arendt remained insufficiently clear on how 
storytelling can be both situated and maintain sufficient critical potential. Arendt 
cannot answer what for Disch are the fundamental questions surrounding the need 
for storytelling: how ‘to find a way to speak critically from experience without the 
dogmatic parochialism that asserts my experience as an unquestionable ground of 
my authority’? And, how to ‘hold various claims to experience open to question 
without the reluctant scepticism that postpones decision making to the point where it 
becomes politically paralysing’ (1994: 209)? These are the kind of questions that 
cannot be answered through a focus on plurality alone, but require the theorisation 
of a second dimension that responds directly to the situated character of judgement. 
The second Arendtian scholar working on storytelling, Maria Pia Lara (1998, 2007) 
explores the potential of narratives in the context of past injustice, evil, and the 
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 The modernist position is concerned with legitimacy gained through rational discourse. 
While its proponents acknowledge the failures of Enlightenment, they nonetheless continue 
to hold on to the central belief in the possibility of progress. They accommodate the limits of 
the main narratives in society that become too easily instruments of power and domination, 
and turn instead to the critical potential found in the stories told that capture marginalised 
voices. Postmodernism opposes this perspective through a radical scepticism towards 
collective agreement. Its exegetes emphasise storytelling’s capacity to reveal the 
constructed character of any claims in society and finds emancipatory potential in 





marginalised role of women in society. The third context is of particular interest to 
the argument put forward in this chapter.35 In connection with Arendt’s discussion of 
Rahel Varnhagen, Lara considers the contribution of feminist narratives in revealing 
‘the concrete nature of personal struggles’ (1998: 46) of women in modernity. 
Narratives play a constitutive role in relation to subjectivities and shape how we 
become moral agents. The telling of stories, notably by writers such as Jane Austen, 
can help women gain knowledge about their identities and position in society, which, 
in turn, enables them to rewrite the narratives of their own identity, and of justice and 
equality in society. Narrative ‘identities are achievements, they are guided by a 
cognitive role – a “praxis-oriented” discernment and understanding of the agents of 
action in becoming selves through narrative clarification and grasping for 
consistence in one’s own life’ (1998: 71).36 In short, Lara reflects on how women like 
Arendt, Simone de Beauvoir, or Jane Austen, used aesthetics to tell stories that help 
rewrite identity claims. 
Lara draws on Habermas to identify in storytelling an illocutionary force, i.e. the 
capacity to enable mutual understanding. By ‘“recovering” the role women played in 
the past, by taking seriously the way they conceived their lives as struggles for self-
clarification, contemporary narratives gain the “illocutionary force” not only to 
increase women’s self-esteem, but to alter the conception of who women are’ (1998: 
77).37 Lara reads storytelling as ‘the articulate social weaving of memories, the 
recovery of fragments of the past, the exercise of collective judgment, the duty to 
“go against the grain” and promote, with the retelling, a performative frame for a 
“new beginning”’ (1998: 40). She offers an Arendtian reading of storytelling that sees 
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 Lara insists that through storytelling that constitutes reflective judgement, a community can 
reshape the standards with which to describe evil, and, together, can come to terms with 
what has happened. She argues that, in order for narratives to teach us something about 
evil, wrongdoing and cruelty, they must combine their aesthetic character with intersubjective 
standards of moral judgment (2007: 79). The function of narratives entails not only the 
reshaping of identity claims, but also a learning from catastrophes, for, ‘those concerned with 
our past catastrophes […] grasp that actions of human cruelty entail an open ended process’ 
(2007: 87). Thinking and judgement thus become not only “prophylactic faculties” preventing 
the evil of thoughtlessness Arendt described in relation to Eichmann. They contribute to the 
continuous process of seeking to understand past evil and establish ‘normative criteria for 
new courses of action’ (2007: 50). 
36
 Contemporary feminist narratives additionally rewrite the identities told through Austen’s 
stories, to re-shape the past and project a different sense of equality and democracy into the 
future. 
37
 Arendt thus provides an important starting point for feminist narratives, despite her difficult 






the past not as a fixed background for political action but as central to it: the 
continuous re-figuration of the past through stories gives meaning to the present. 
Through ‘memory and recollection, narratives reorder past injustices and envision 
the possibility of a new start through the powers of judgment’ (Lara, 1998: 36). 
Lastly, Schiff (2014) considers storytelling in relation to the failure of affluent 
societies to respond to global poverty and in relation to Arendt’s insights into 
thoughtlessness, Sartre’s bad faith, and Bourdieu’s misrecognition (2014: 10). Her 
aim is to elaborate on the role that stories play in how the privileged cultivate 
responsiveness towards suffering.38 She identifies an underestimation of the 
resilience of the dispositions of thoughtlessness, bad faith, and misrecognition, 
which curb our ability for responsiveness by engendering stories that obscure 
human’s capacity to transform systemic injustice. Her work helps us question any 
uncritical enthusiasm in relation to situated impartiality and illocutionary force. Her 
work denies any desire for an easy solution achieved through the one-sided search 
for the critical potential of narratives. Instead, she highlights how stories can both 
obscure and illuminate suffering, depending on their production and reception. In 
light of this dual contribution of stories, Arendt failed to ask a crucial question, why 
we choose to tell stories that obscure our ability and responsibility for transforming 
injustice (Schiff, 2014: 23). Awareness of the dispositions that encourage us to tell 
obscuring stories – that facilitate our incapacity to think, our choice to lie to 
ourselves, and our forgetfulness of the contingency of social formations – is a pre-
condition for an affirmative theory of human responsiveness. Only following such a 
step, i.e. the investigation into the issue of social conditioning, can we provide a 
rounded conception of reflective judgement in which storytelling can prove 
invaluable as creative, world-building capacity, as opposed to the facilitating role in 
relation to practices of complicity with systemic injustice. 
I conclude that scholars who extend Arendt’s writing on storytelling hold on to her 
commitment to the pluralist dimension to politics and judgement. They also 
challenge Arendt with regards to her lack of clarity on the issue of how judgements 
can be impartial and critical, illuminating or potentially obscuring. The hope that 
Schiff, Lara, and Disch seem to share is that, through the turn to ‘situatedness’, we 
can begin to understand why certain narratives can gain situated impartiality, 
transform identity claims and inequality, and cultivate responsiveness. The third 
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project thus aligns with the first and second in combining the pluralism to judgement 
with questions of social conditioning that are not merely understood as obstacles 





2.5 The Pre-Discursive Structuring of Judgement 
The three projects analysed thus far, offer different, invaluable responses to the 
question of how to overcome the coercive force attributed to rational validity claims 
in politics. Together, they shed light on an affective and viscerally informed 
judgement that tells stories and imaginatively creates new meaning, affirms 
freedom, and continuously rebuilds our common world. This section concludes my 
reconstruction of responses to Arendt’s thought by tracing two influential attempts to 
refine the conception of common and community sense. Alessandro Ferrara’s 
extensive work on exemplary judgement contributes to a turn towards reflective 
judgement in contemporary political theory, by focusing on standards of human 
flourishing in the hope of saving a Rawlsian political liberalism. Albena Azmanova 
builds on Arendt’s reflective judgement and seeks to establish a critical theoretical 
position freed from Habermas’ transcendental turn towards Kantian moral 
universalism. Again, these thinkers acknowledge that a concern with the pluralist 
dimension to judgement must be supplemented with an adequate engagement with 
the difficult issue of social conditioning. 
Ferrara (1999, 2012, 2014) seeks to expand Rawls’ political liberalism through the 
reflective judgement turn in political theory. He supports a form of ‘oriented reflective 
judgement’ (Ferrara, 2012: 40) guided by the ‘force of what is as it should be or the 
force of the example’ (2012: 2f.). The cogency of exemplars is unlike the cogency of 
laws or principles in that it is ‘entirely self-referential, immanent to the subject matter’ 
(2012: 21). This kind of exemplarity is familiar from great works of art whose quality 
is irreducible to universal standards of beauty. 
The challenge that Ferrara identifies is how this exemplarity can move beyond its 
cultural origins, without falling back on traditional forms of foundationalism. In 
response, Ferrara combines a focus on exemplary validity with a thick conception of 
common sense which grounds authenticity. He describes authenticity as the 
enduring fusion of norms and facts that is directed towards the ‘concrete universal’ 
(Ferrara, 2012: 40) of human flourishing; judgements are exemplary insofar as they 
expand and realise ‘our’ sense of what constitutes a flourishing life. Ferrara’s work 





coherence, vitality, depth, and maturity (Ferrara, 2012: 3, 32).39 These standards are 
situated and can change over time. They find their expression in a shared and 
universally held sense of whether one’s own life is stagnating or flourishing. 
The concern that Ferrara’s important contribution to debates on common sense and 
exemplarity raises is that he remains too closely connected to the project of seeking 
standards of validity outside the public sphere. A commitment to a ‘pre-social realm 
of shared intuitions’ means that his pre-discursive structuring of judgement 
understates ‘the problem of entrenched social division and deep difference’ and thus 
under-theorises ‘the antagonism and conflict that these may produce in political 
interaction’ (McNay, 2018: 12). Azmanova’s work can be seen as responding to this 
challenge. She focuses our attention on ‘the encoding of structurally produced 
injustice into the phronetic – experience-based – structure of public reason and the 
way these codes are activated in the course of argumentation and judgement’ 
(2012: 179). Azmanova agrees that these sources of injustice, ‘structural dynamics 
of social (re)production)’ and the ‘social origins of identity stratification’ (2012: 179), 
have been neglected by public reason theorists due to their particular concern with 
idealising assumptions that make attentiveness to social context unnecessary. 
Azmanova takes Arendt’s conception of judgement and of common sense as a 
starting point for articulating the structural encoding of judgement. She gains from 
Arendt that political judgement is intersubjectively and pre-discursively patterned: 
the spectator’s judgement is made in reference to a plurality of spectators who give 
meaning to events. Judgement is shaped by this plurality of perspectives 
independently of the spectators’ actual communication of their judgements. The 
middle ground that Arendt provides between particular and universal, in the form of 
the intersubjective general, is thus inherently structured by social practices. 
However, Arendt’s account is ill-equipped for fully laying bare this social coding of 
judgement, because she is primarily concerned with giving the appearance of 
particulars meaning. As a consequence, her conception of reflective judgement 
neglects the structures of privilege and disadvantage that influence, without 
determining, the appearance of any particular (Azmanova, 2012: 147). Azmanova 
concludes that political judgement should instead be concerned with exactly those 
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 The abolition of slavery constitutes such an exemplary judgment. Further examples are 
the institutionalisation of human rights, and more recently, the election of Barack Obama in 
2008, which gave expression to a sense of equality otherwise insufficiently realised in the 





phenomena that capture these patterns, e.g. of power or systematic injustice, rather 
than what Arendt focuses on – the unprecedented. 
Azmanova calls the distinctions that form a community sense and frame judgement 
the ‘paradigms of articulation and signification’ (2012: 161), or ‘matrix of relevance’ 
(2012: 157). The matrix of relevance has a horizontal and vertical dimension. By 
‘horizontal signification’, Azmanova means the way judgement is made in reference 
to a plurality of spectators and their separate perspectives, which give meaning to 
appearances. Vertically, reference points for judgement are ordered in hierarchies of 
significance, e.g. what is to be seen as an important issue according to the 
community’s worldview. Azmanova draws attention to the social code that is 
embedded in both dimensions, in the meaning and significance given to points of 
reference prior to judgement. Judgement becomes a ‘process of simultaneous 
cognitive and evaluative signification’ (2012: 161) which enables norms contestation 
and consensus building through the pre-discursive structuring of judgement in its 
horizontal and vertical dimensions.40 
Azmanova provides a more expansive conception of the pre-discursive matrix of 
relevance that underpins the practices of the plurality of judging spectators, by 
emphasising the social coding of the matrix. Whereas for Arendt, common sense is 
primarily agential, the result of judging spectators enlarging their perspectives 
through engagement with others, Azmanova conceives of structuring as primarily 
social. In order to uphold Arendt’s project, judgement scholars must therefore find 
ways of attending to the social without denying human plurality and without falling 
prey to a heroic view of agency. A focus on social structuring, in turn, bears within it 
a problematic tendency visible in Azmanova’s writing: her response to the primarily 
social structuring of judgement is overly agential. As Mihaela Mihai elaborates, 
Azmanova ‘maintains a firm belief that the solution lies with the flexibility and 
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 A focus on the social patterns that shape judgement changes also our view on exemplarity 
and the example as a central tool that links judgement and common sense. Azmanova 
suggests that we concentrate on the distinctions that make an example comprehensible to 
members of a certain society. Examples embody and disclose a ‘selective societal code of 
valorisation’ (2012: 176). This code of exemplarity cannot be reduced to the factual 
knowledge of the context and origin of an example, nor is it the mere product of moral 
assessments. To give an example, we may have judged an issue by referring to the 
exemplary courage of Achilles. The success of turning the position we take up into a political 
judgement that is communicable to others and transcends our partial perspective on the 
world, does not depend on excellent knowledge of the Trojan War, nor the approval of 
Achille’s behaviour through moral deliberation. Instead, it is dependent on the meaningful 





instability of the matrix, which she sees as forever vulnerable to the power of 
discursive confrontations’ (Mihai, 2016b: 35). The question that neither Azmanova 
nor Arendt can therefore fully answer, which lies at the centre of this thesis, is this: 
how can we uphold a focus on an ethic of reality through critical judgement and 
simultaneously account for the way power shapes its very categories? I propose that 
a dual approach to judgment is needed, one that considers political judgement from 
two perspectives, by i) analysing the pre-discursive structuring of judgements, and ii) 
by considering how humans face and come to terms with reality through the 
capacity for reflective judgement. To achieve this, we need to delve even further into 
the second dimension to judgement – the interplay between structure and agency – 
than has been proposed by the various Arendt scholars discussed in this second 
chapter. 
In conclusion, the purpose of this chapter was to introduce the debate that followed 
on from Arendt’s writing about reflective judgement. My analysis traced two phases 
to the debate and aligned this thesis with the second. The chapter discussed four 
attempts at extending Arendt’s theory, with a view to preparing the ground for an 
engagement with the topic of social conditioning. Zerilli’s work revealed that, once 
we depart from a concern with the epistemological problem of judgement, 
persuasion and radical imagination offer vital mechanisms that ensure judgement’s 
world-building and freedom-affirming potential. Through the ability to persuade and 
to re-imagine what is shared in a community the issue of social conditioning takes 
centre stage for theories on judgement, but remains insufficiently addressed by 
Zerilli. Secondly, I considered the enthusiasm for studying the affective and non-
conscious layers to judging. Drawing on Zerilli and Thiele, amongst others, I 
affirmed that a suitable account of the pluralism of judgement must take note of 
these elements of political judgement, which, in turn, require us to address how they 
are connected to the intersubjective practices of a pluralist politics. Thirdly, the 
chapter discussed different accounts of storytelling, a practice deeply interrelated 
with action and judgement. The work of Disch, Lara, and Schiff highlighted how 
Arendt scholarship holds on to Arendt’s pluralism, but also conceptualises situated 
human agency as key to a critical form of storytelling, and by extension judgement. 
Finally, Azmanova and Ferrara provide important insights into common sense, one 
of the key concepts in Arendt’s thought. Azmanova, in particular, highlights the need 
to address the social patterning of judgement, which we need to account for if we 





In short, beyond the invaluable insights into judgement that the debate provides, it 
also clearly states that any adequate account of political judgement must tell us 
more about the interrelationship between judge and context that constitutes political 
judgement. How are persuasion, imagination, the unconscious, the affective, stories, 
and common sense patterned to enable and constrain the pluralist potential in 
political judgement? The debate on political judgement therefore makes it evident 
that I will only be able to address the problem of ‘responsibility-for-complicity’ that 
animates this thesis, once I have delved more deeply into the issue of social 
conditioning, the core of debates on ‘structure-agency’. It is to this matter that 





Chapter 3 – Margaret Archer’s Dualism of Structure & Agency 
‘Men make their own history, but they do not 
make it just as they please’ 
(Marx, 2008: 15) 
Central to research in social science is the debate on the relationship between 
structure and agency. The questions founding this debate are: how can we define 
structures and to what extent do they influence, constrain, enable, or even 
determine agency?, and, what is agency and what are its distinctive properties and 
powers? Structure is an ambiguous concept. It can refer to anything from stable 
patterns of aggregate behaviour to systems of human relations amongst social 
positions (cf. Elder-Vass, 2010; Porpora, 1989). Typical examples include class, 
gender, race, or more generally the capitalist system. Agency is a similarly opaque 
term. At the most general level, agency refers to a person’s ability to act and 
respond to their social context – which includes a capacity for non-action and 
passivity. 
In political theory, different interpretations of the relationship between structure and 
agency inform accounts of power, complicity, responsibility, freedom, and 
democracy. Their puzzling interrelationship is also central to any attempt to 
conceptualise political judgement. Indeed, judgement always involves an individual’s 
positioning in relation to a political context. The interplay between structure and 
agency shapes the very nature of the judgement process. It is the purpose of this 
chapter to shed further light on how structure and agency impact on political 
judgement. 
In the previous two chapters, I turned to Arendt’s theory of political judgement, 
driven by an interest in how humans can judge their complicity in injustice and 
oppression. My discussion highlighted her commitment to a thicker notion of plurality 
that focuses on the well-being of the common world alongside the sameness and 
distinction of being human. Chapter 2 considered critical extensions of Arendt’s 
theory that reveal the limitations of a focus on plurality for conceptualising 
judgement. The challenge of theorising judgement has become one of how to 
provide an account of situated human agency underpinning an emphasis on human 
plurality that captures more fully what makes judgement both critical, capable of 





perspectives on the world. The present chapter meets this demand by turning to 
social theory and recent debates on structure and agency. 
A discussion of Archer’s realist social theory is particularly valuable for the current 
investigation into political judgement, as her elaboration of the distinct powers of 
human agency alongside social structures helps enrich Arendt’s pluralism. In 
Archer’s own words, her project seeks ‘to put forward a model that is recognisably 
human; one that retains Arendt’s notion of the “Human Condition” as entailing a 
reflexive “Life of the mind”’ (Archer, 2016: 138). Her thought responds to what she 
identifies as de-humanising tendencies in social theory that arise out of the 
conflation of the distinct causal powers of structure and agency. For her, the 
relationship between structures and agency is not merely of a conceptual interest, 
but holds a place at the core of human existence, which is always experienced as 
both free and constrained.1 Archer terms this ‘authentic’ feeling the ‘vexatious fact of 
society and its human constitution’ (Archer, 1995: 2). The purpose of an 
investigation into political judgement must therefore be to respond appropriately to 
this enduring feature of the human condition (1995: 1f., 29). Archer’s commitment to 
an analytical dualism of structure and agency provides the second dimension to the 
account of political judgement that I wish to put forward in support of theories on 
judging responsibility-for-complicity. 
Chapter 3 is dedicated to mapping out three central features of Archer’s response to 
the vexatious fact of society. First, section 3.1 elaborates on the commitment of 
analytical dualism to a temporal and analytical distinction between structure, culture, 
and agency. Section 3.2 explains how dualism helps judgement theorists 
complement Arendt’s thick conception of plurality with a sophisticated understanding 
of social conditioning. I highlight the possibility to uphold an object- and subject-
focus that does not fall back on an unwarranted ‘objectivism’ – the desire for an 
Archimedean point from which to judge impartially – or a form of radical 
‘subjectivism’ – the desire to reduce all criteria of judgement to the ‘it-seems-to-me’. 
In section 3.3, I introduce Archer’s work on reflexivity as internal conversation, which 
she identifies as the key mediation process between structures and agency. 
Judgement is the manifestation of thinking in the world and is inconceivable without 
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 Because of the link to the human condition, the engagement with this experience affects 
how we judge and how we theorise judgement equally. The insights in this chapter, while 
(meta-)theoretical in character, are therefore also of relevance in thinking about improving 





a suitable account of reflexivity. I reconstruct Archer’s insights into how reflexivity is 
socially patterned and contributes to social transformation and how reflexivity is 
changing in late modernity in conjunction with broader structural and cultural 
transformations that impact the way judgement is exercised in society. 
In sum, I turn to Archer to shed further light on the issue of social conditioning: how 
we may account for human agents who shape their own world – what Marx 
described as ‘making their own history’ – and the conditions that constrain and 
enable their capacity to do so – ‘but not as they please’ (Marx, 2008: 15). Her work 
helps map out the second dimension of political judgement – the implications that 
arise out of the vexatious fact of the human condition. The connection between 
Arendt’s pluralism and Archer’s dualism will be further teased out in relation to the 
particular problem that this thesis responds to, judging responsibility and complicity, 





3.1 Archer’s Contribution to the Structure-Agency Debate 
Before I map out Archer’s realist social theory, centred around her analytical 
distinction between structure and agency, a brief introduction of the structure-
agency problematic that she engages in is helpful. The structure-agency debate 
consists of three fundamental problems for the social sciences: first, the generic 
problem of how a self can be both a subject and an object.2 Second, the analytical 
problem of who the participants in a person’s inner dialogues are. Third, the 
explanatory problem of describing what role society plays in this conversation. 
Together, they lead to the dichotomies of structure-agency, micro-macro, and 
collective-individual.3 
The responses to the three questions are diverse and often incompatible, ranging 
between voluntarism and determinism, methodological individualism and 
structuralism (Archer, 2003; McAnulla, 2002, 2006). Individualism reduces 
structures to the actions of the collective of actors and everything social to the 
individual. Archer defines this as upward conflation. Structuralism, or downward 
conflation, reduces the individual to Durkheim’s ‘indeterminate matter’ (Durkheim, 
2014: 87) whose thoughts and emotions are collective. Put together, these positions 
reduce either agency or structures to an epiphenomenon, instead of focusing on 
their distinctiveness and interplay (Archer, 1995: 65). 
In the last few decades, the debate moved beyond the extremes of structuralism 
and individualism towards an effort to bring structure and agency together. Notable 
representatives of this project include Anthony Giddens’ structuration theory (1984) 
and Bourdieu’s habitus (1990). Archer identifies in their accounts a central 
conflation, which approaches structure-agency through what she terms a ‘duality’. 
Characteristic of this duality of structure and agency is an emphasis on the 
inseparability of structures and agency – two sides of a coin – and a focus on the 
structured character of action (Archer, 1995: 93). The duality is unable to capture 
the individual’s experience of feeling both constrained and free, because it holds on 
to a focus on the interpenetration of structure and agency that obscures how 
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 In relation to Kant, this problem can be formulated as one of self-awareness. Archer has 
pointed out that the difficulties of dividing between a subject and an object is peculiar to his 
use of the terminology of perception – I cannot see myself – but not other senses (Archer, 
2003: 53; Kant, 1983: 73). 
3
 Archer links these three problems of structure-agency with American Pragmatism, and 
William James, Charles Peirce, and George Mead, respectively
 





structure and agency are interconnected but nonetheless separable in important 
ways. As Archer puts it in relation to Graham, a person she interviewed for her 
research on reflexivity, for proponents of a duality 
‘there never comes a point at which it is possible to disentangle Graham’s 
personal caution (a subjective property of a person) from the characteristics of 
his context (objective properties of society). […] ‘Graham’ has now become so 
inextricably intertwined with his social background and foreground that it is no 
longer clear who is ‘standing back’. Therefore, it becomes impossible that 
Graham can deliberate upon his circumstances as subject to object, because 
these are now inseparable for ‘Graham’ (Archer, 2003: 12). 
I show the problems with this approach in chapter 4 in relation to the challenge of 
how to judge responsibility-for-complicity. For now, the present chapter is dedicated 
to spelling out what Archer’s alternative, an analytical dualism of structure and 
agency, entails. 
The framework of analytical dualism focuses on a temporal and analytical distinction 
between structure and agency. The aim is to move beyond simplistic empiricist 
notions of allocating causality to one or the other (1995: 69). The ethnic prejudices 
that continue to have a negative impact on the success of job applications in the UK, 
for example, are neither the sole consequences of racist HR divisions nor the mere 
product of a colonialist past. Structure and agency are for Archer also not different 
aspects of the same thing, i.e. the more agential or structural part of a singular 
phenomenon or mechanism, but should instead be conceived of as quite different, 
with distinct powers and characteristics. Structure and agency need to be separated 
in order 
‘(a) to identify the emergent4 structure(s), (b) to differentiate between their causal 
powers and the intervening influences of people due to their quite different causal 
powers as human beings, and, (c) to explain any outcome at all, which in an 
open system5 always entails an interplay between the two. In short, separability is 
indispensable to realism’ (1995: 70). 
The separation allows her to distinguish between subjective and objective 
contributions to social interaction. Structural and cultural properties, with their 
                                                          
4
 Emergence entails that properties and powers of one stratum (structure and agency) are 
anterior to those of others (society), precisely because the latter emerge from the former 
over time. After the emergence, the powers and properties defining and distinguishing the 
strata have relative autonomy from one another and exert independent causal influences 
that are the subject of study of analytical dualism (1995: 14). 
5
 (Relatively) open systems are characterised by producing outcomes that are not fully 





powers of constraint, enablement, and motivation, objectively shape the situations 
agents encounter involuntarily. Humans, in turn, subjectively define their concerns 
and through their reflexive deliberations produce courses of action, by subjectively 
determining their practical projects vis-à-vis their objective circumstances (2003: 
135). The rest of the chapter is concerned with elaborating on the objective and 
subjective contributions, followed by a discussion of reflexive deliberation and its 
role in judgment. First, let me provide a brief introduction into how Archer imagines 
that structures and agency come together to transform society. 
 
3.1.1 The Morphogenetic Approach 
Archer’s realist social theory entails an alternative model of social transformation, 
which she terms the morphogenetic approach.6 The approach relies on a layered 
ontology, where every social outcome is the consequence of an interplay between 
the irreducible properties and powers of structure, culture, and agency. Key to this 
model is that structures are assumed as necessarily pre-dating the action that 
reproduces and changes them (1995: 15). The assumption enables the analytical 
distinction – and only the analytical distinction – of the causal contributions and 
properties of structure and agency along a temporal horizon – before, during, and 
after a particular action. Of course, in reality, such a distinction is difficult to make. 
The central question for a morphogenetic approach of society is this: when does 
transformation rather than reproduction happen following the interaction of structure 
and agency?, and vice versa. To answer it, Archer offers four propositions that help 
map out the key elements of structural-agential interplay. Firstly, she states that 
because dualism insists on a temporal distinction between structures and agency, 
there must be internal and necessary relations between and within social structures 
that exist prior to present action. They are the consequences of past processes of 
social conditioning. Take, for example, the pupil-teacher or the privileged-
disadvantaged relation. The position of teacher (privileged) only makes sense in 
connection to the social position of pupil (disadvantaged) and the relationship 
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 The morphogenetic approach both provides an explanatory model, seeking to explain 
social conditioning through the elaboration of the interplay between structure and agency at 
various stages, and an analytical tool, seeking to capture historical constellations and why 
they developed in particular ways. The final section 3.3 returns to the transformative model 





between these two positions as part of the educational (economic) system has 
relatively enduring characteristics that shape action and agency in the present. In 
order to address political judgement adequately, we need to consider the structures 
that exist prior to judgement. Similarly, when we judge politically, we need to 
consider how the pre-existing relations between social positions shape our 
judgements. 
Secondly, Archer proposes that structures exert causal influences on social 
interaction, what social theorists term social conditioning: social practices are always 
processes of re-structuration (1995: 140).7 Re-structuration means that as humans 
attempt to shape their context, they, too, are shaped. The transformation of 
structures takes time and includes existing structures showing temporary resistance 
to transformative action. Structures encourage action that contributes to their 
continued existence; change is constrained by vested interests, which refer to the 
costs and benefits of action produced by structures. Vested interests are attached to 
the social positions available in a society and the vested interests of different 
positions interact: the vested interests of one position are in relation to, and cause 
frustration or reward in, a different position (1995: 206). Privileged members of 
Western society, for example, have a vested interest in ignoring the plight of others 
which comes with their privileged life-styles.8 The dualism of structure and agency is 
therefore complemented by various other analytical dualisms, including the dualism 
between actor and social position.9 
Thirdly, Archer claims that causal relationships between groups and individuals exist 
at the level of social interaction. Fourthly, social interaction elaborates social 
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 Re-structuration means in turn that, while a continuous flow of action exists, each social 
activity is different from the previous, because of the unprecedented constellation of 
structure and agency that resulted from previous activities, which provides new constraints 
and opportunities for activities. Social groups, for example the social group of teachers, 
similarly remain continuous, whereas the components of social groups, i.e. specific teachers, 
change over time (1995: 73). 
8
 Vested interests are not causal social forces in the empiricist sense of causality, they can 
be reflected on and, to be effective, they require a certain level of social acceptance (1995: 
205). However, a person’s neglect of the constraints and conditions that come with social 
positions and the structural context may lead to further limitations on future actions (1995: 
208), as Archer clearly opposes any flirtations with voluntarism. Successful transformation of 
structures is likely to result not only in a change of structures, but also in a change in these 
vested interests and the opening up of new social possibilities and constraints. 
9
 Social positions necessarily pre-exist their adoption. Even if an actor seeks a new position, 
this position needs to first be conceived of and defined in some form in society, before the 





structures by modifying the internal and necessary structural relationships and a) if 
morphogenesis occurs, developing new ones b) if morphostasis continues, 
reproducing these existing relationships (1995: 168f.). The three phases of the 
morphogenetic approach are therefore conditioning, interaction, and elaboration or 
reproduction.10 
The model can be reused in connection with culture. For Archer, structural emergent 
properties, social and physical, are to some extent distinct from cultural ones by 
virtue of their dependence on material resources (1995: 175). I follow Archer in 
largely concentrating on the structure-agency problematic, turning to the distinct role 
of culture where necessary.11 In a cultural model of transformation, ‘social structure’ 
is replaced by ‘cultural system’ and ‘social interaction’ with ‘socio-cultural interaction’ 
(1995: 169). A society remains morphostatic at the macro-level if one of the two 
spheres, culture or structures, experiences large-scale changes, whereas the other 
sphere reproduces the pre-existing order. Under these circumstances, society 
remains continuous as the changes in culture or structures are simply absorbed: 
new structures retain the same meaning as the previous material formations, or new 
ideas and concepts build on the old structures. To give an example, the emergence 
of environmental concerns does not lead to society-wide changes unless the ideas 
about a healthy planet are linked with transformations to the capitalist framework of 
profit-maximisation underpinning modern societies. 
Analytical dualism and the morphogenetic approach are at the heart of what I term 
the second dimension of political judgement: judgement’s embeddedness in 
complex processes of social conditioning. Judgement scholarship seeks to 
understand social conditioning as the source of (and obstacle to) the critical 
potential of judgement. Archer tells us that this potential emerges from the 
subjective contributions of agency in interplay with the objective contributions of 
structures. Social conditioning always presupposes the existence of relatively 
enduring social structures and any social process entails three phases: conditioning, 
interaction, and elaboration or reproduction. With the analytical dualism and 
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 In the case of an emerging structure or position, the three phases are emergence (instead 
of conditioning), interplay (interaction), and outcome (elaboration). 
11
 Nick Hardy (2019) interprets this emphasis on structure over culture as one of Arendt’s 






morphogenetic approach in place, the rest of chapter 3 focuses on the implications 





3.2 A Dualist Approach to Stratified Objectivity and Subjectivity 
To fully understand the relevance of Archer’s response to the vexatious fact of 
society through analytical dualism, I take one step back and return to Zerilli, whose 
theory of radical imagination I introduced in chapter 2. She offers the most recent 
contribution to the debates on political judgement following Arendt. Her (2016a) 
criticism of democratic theory and affect theorists establishes the following demand 
for further theorising on judgement that I seek to meet using Archer’s analytical 
dualism: that we reorient ourselves away from an ‘impossible’ objectivism or 
subjectivism and towards a plurality of democratic actors, who generate a common 
world through the discussion of different perspectives on a shared issue. What does 
she mean by an impossible subjectivism and objectivism? 
Zerilli (2016a) emphasises that resistance to cognitivism does not require an 
acceptance of realism with capital R and, with it, the desire for objective knowledge 
that arises out of the transcendence of our partial perspectives on the world, i.e. an 
impossible objectivism. This acceptance, however, as Zerilli shows, has been a 
common mistake, and it risks severely undermining the potential of non-cognitive 
alternatives. She therefore criticises both cognitivists – Neo-Kantian public reason 
theorists – and non-cognitivists – affect theorists reducing judgement to 
preconscious dispositions – for a shared sense ‘that our ordinary criteria of judgment 
are not good enough and are in need of some sort of correcting supplement’ (Zerilli, 
2016a: 4). Their common mistake is that they see plurality not only as central to 
Western democracy, but also as its greatest threat. For, the ‘idea that something 
must ground mutual intelligibility in the political realm risks entangling us in fantasies 
concerning the nature and power of rules that lead us to lose track of our own part 
or voice as democratic citizens in deciding what will and what will not belong to the 
common world’ (2016a: 22). As we saw in chapter 2, judgement scholarship cannot 
rely on a commitment to a thicker notion of plurality orientated towards a common 
world alone. The question that Zerilli therefore raises is how we can complement 
pluralism with a focus on subjectivity and objectivity that ‘situates subjective 
response at the heart of anything we consider objective’ (2016a: 25) and transcends 
the ‘impossible choice between objectivism and subjectivism’ (Zerilli, 2016a: 19). 
To respond to this question I take two insights from Zerilli’s argument that serve as a 
useful starting point for conceptualising a suitable object- and subject-focus. Firstly, I 





avoid unqualified references to an external world that displaces the role of 
judgement and action in politics – what Zerilli terms the voice of democratic citizens. 
I agree in the following that however promising references to a mind-independent 
reality may seem, it is difficult to justify these references. We should be cautious 
about the capacity of scientific or political judgements to correctly interpret that 
reality. At the same time, a theory of judgement must account for how the potential 
of reflective judgement is not limited to the inclusion of different perspectives. Zerilli 
(2016a: 36) notes that to judge politically is to engage with perspectives on a shared 
object that gives judgement its meaning. What is needed then is a concern with an 
object irreducible to our subjective engagements with it, but not sufficiently external 
(and independently accessible) that it could become the (sole) arbiter of good 
judgement. 
Secondly, I take from Zerilli an Arendtian concern with the worldless and radically 
subjectivist character of modern mass society, in which the political space available 
for exploring our perspectives on the world has dramatically shrunk and each 
individual becomes isolated. A suitable response must formulate political judgement 
as an activity that can once more enliven that common world through a threefold 
focus: on the thick conception of plurality, put forward by Arendt, alongside a 
concern with objects external to our perspectives, and the ‘it-seems-to-me’. All three 
are always open to improvement and contestation through political practices of 
strengthening our sense of reality. They are also deeply interrelated, as a thick 
notion of plurality includes both the sameness and distinction of the persons judging 
and acting, and a world that people can only make hospitable together, and that is 
independent from any perspective on it. 
In short, I suggest that a turn to Archer’s distinction between dualism and duality can 
help judgement scholars balance the need to account for an object-orientated form 
of judgement without introducing unwarranted references to a mind-independent 
reality. It also helps incorporate a concern with the subjective perspectives that 
animate judgements, without perpetuating a form of radical subjectivism that comes 
at the cost of a hospitable common world and the objects to be judged. In the 







3.2.1 Critical Realism 
How can we think of structures as independent from human agency? What do we 
even mean by independent and does Archer not ultimately obscure the relational 
character of human agency? To put it more forcefully, is Archer moving us back to 
the position of the detached observer which I rejected in chapter 1 and 2? Archer’s 
analytical dualism is deeply intertwined with the philosophy of social science critical 
realism and to understand what Archer is after I now turn to that philosophy. Critical 
realism (CR), short for transcendental realism and critical naturalism, is a variation 
of scientific realism, particularly concerned with social scientific practices.12 
Originally centred on the work of Roy Bhaskar, CR now encompasses a multitude of 
positions and claims.13 Archer extended critical realism through a series of books 
and projects dealing with social ontology, structures, agency, and culture and has 
become a key proponent of this philosophy. 
The section provides a brief introduction of key concepts of critical realism: 
emergence, stratification, open system, generative mechanisms, causal demi-
regularities (tendencies), and the intransitive and transitive objects of knowledge. 
Some of these concepts have already come up in previous sections. I want to use 
them in the following to argue that critical realism provides, above all, a rich 
language to describe a multi-layered reality accessed through our social practices 
but irreducible to these practices. Critical realism is a meta-theory that enables 
judgement scholarship to focus equally on the plurality of perspectives and the 
object to be judged. 
Critical realists argue that any social sciences’ approach requires an explicit position 
on key dimensions including ontology, epistemology, the relationship between the 
material and the ideational, and on the structure-agency question (cf. Rivas, 2010: 
204). At the level of ontology and epistemology, CR opposes philosophies that 
adhere to empirical realism, which limits knowledge to what can be experienced. As 
an alternative, Bhaskar offers transcendental realism, which he defined as follows: 
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 Its proponents share a concern with the consequences of the realist turn for social 
research and Porpora (2013: 25) argues that critical realism is best thought of as a non-
reductive Marxian approach. 
13
 On parallel developments of CR, see Douglas Porpora (2015). Bhaskar’s thought has 
gone through a basic, dialectic and meta-phase. This thesis follows many critical realists in 






‘For transcendental realism, the objects of knowledge […] are neither 
phenomena (empiricism) nor human constructs imposed upon the phenomena 
(idealism), but real structures which endure and operate independently of our 
knowledge, our experience and the conditions which allow us access to them’ 
(Bhaskar, 2013: 25). 
Transcendental realism, or ontological realism, entails a belief in a mind-
independent world, which consists of intransitive objects whose continued existence 
remains independent from human activity, e.g. sound. These objects act on the 
transitive world, including ‘the antecedently established facts and theories, 
paradigms and models, methods and techniques of inquiry available to a particular 
scientific school or worker’ (Bhaskar, 2013: 21), through generative mechanisms. 
The formulation of mechanisms serves to explain how the world is and why certain 
things function in specific ways. Generative mechanisms can be thought of as the 
‘way of acting of a thing’ (Bhaskar, 2013: 51) (its force), rather than the necessary, 
general or universal causal connection between specific events (if-then) (Porpora, 
2015: 46, 49f.).14 Through the CR lens, the purpose of social research is ‘the quest 
for non-observable generative mechanisms whose powers may exist unexercised or 
be exercised unrealized, that is with variable outcomes due to the variety of 
intervening contingencies which cannot be subject to laboratory closure’ (Archer, 
1998: 190). 
Key to CR’s ontological realism is that reality is stratified into the empirical, the 
actual, and the real (Bhaskar, 2013: 56). Generative mechanisms are part of the 
intransitive realm of the real, which means that we cannot measure or experience 
them directly. These mechanisms are constantly active with their own independent 
powers. As they interact and influence each other, their powers may or may not be 
actualised and lead to specific effects. The intake of alcohol, for example, is likely to 
impede the capacity of humans to think rationally (whatever we mean by that). The 
likelihood of a generative mechanism causing a particular effect can be referred to 
as tendency: drinking alcoholic beverages tends to cause ‘irrational’ behaviour. The 
empirical layer to reality offers what can be experienced and measured as 
observables, i.e. a person being drunk. Research into social phenomena must 
consider all three realms, the real, the actual, and the empirical. 
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 What critical realists mean by mechanisms is best understood by giving some examples: 
gravity, the structure of an atom, the mechanics of a clock, or human rationality. Each 






To maintain the multi-layered character of reality, CR turns to theories of 
emergence: characteristic of emergent properties for critical realists is that they are 
unilaterally dependent, taxonomically irreducible, and causally irreducible and 
efficacious (Bhaskar, 2012: 12). This means in simple terms that society as 
emergent strata is dependent on the existence of both structures and human 
agents, but it also has properties and powers irreducible to the specific properties 
and powers of structures and human agency. 
Of course, the current investigation does not seek to map out what social research 
ought to be like, nor is it concerned with philosophy of (social) science. Nonetheless, 
the turn to ontological realism gives us a sense of how to maintain a focus on an 
independent object irreducible to our knowledge of it, and helps take the common 
world seriously as a causally efficacious object that contributes to our well-being. In 
what follows, I will routinely refer to the importance of accounting for a multi-layered 
reality, and one key thing I have in mind is the role played by emergence and by the 
separability of the empirical, the actual and real, for how we approach a social 
context not of our choosing. Accepting that objects are not simply what we make of 
them, that they do not bend to our judgements upon them does however not mean 
that they can be the source of unmediated ‘objectivity’. 
Alongside an insistence on ontological realism, critical realists like Archer embrace 
epistemological relativism. This form of realism accepts that any conceptualisation 
of the world is relative to our regional practices at a specific time. Epistemological 
relativism includes the language we use to describe phenomena, the debates we 
are participating in and therefore the knowledge we can use to make our claims and 
observations.15 Through its commitment to epistemological relativism, CR guards 
against over-stretching predictive claims, as it emphasises the limits of scientific 
social study and its political character.16 
Critical realism combines its views on ontology and epistemology with an account of 
social transformation that seeks to provide a careful attribution of power to agents 
and avoid individualism/voluntarism or holism/structuralism (Joseph and Wight, 
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 Epistemological relativism also includes the instruments we use to access this mind-
independent world. For example, without the microscope or telescope we would be unable to 
see certain objects of study. 
16
 Critical realists furthermore support methodological pluralism, because they accept that 
objects of study are multifaceted, dynamic, socially constructed, and often unobservable, 





2010: 51).17 In particular, CR points to the fact that human’s emergent power of 
mind, as irreducible to matter, creates a society that in comparison to the natural 
world is to a much larger extent an open system.18 Key to this openness is that 
people have a capacity for intentionality and they can reflect critically on their 
performance, with significant causal implications. Although social structures set 
limits to human action, they do not pre-determine them.19 In other words, 
socialisation describes an achievement rather than an unconscious mechanical 
process, in which skills, competencies, and habits reproduce or transform society 
(1998b: 216).20 
A commitment to epistemological relativism does not mean that CR reduces the 
search for knowledge to relativism. Archer and her colleagues commit to the 
possibility of rational justification (or judgemental rationality): despite epistemological 
relativism, according to CR, some theories are always rationally better than others. 
We can make judgements because the objects of our theories are not reducible to 
these theories and therefore resist (to some extent) the postulation of innumerable 
different theories about them. This resistance of reality to our theorisation about 
reality enables the differentiation between good and bad theories. In other words, 
the separation of ontology and epistemology is central to establishing whether one 
theory can be rationally perceived as more complete in its ontological description 
than another (Bhaskar, 1998a: xi). Truth is therefore to some extent tied to practical 
adequacy, as CR emphasises that knowledge must ‘generate expectations about 
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 These contributions have to be weighed against its short-comings. Critical realism does 
not provide a theory of politics, and relies on at times vague core concepts or research 
criteria and limited insights into how to address judgement rationality and methdological 
pluralism (cf. Kurki, 2010: 144). 
18
 Largely open systems cannot be made subject to laboratory closure. In terms of causality 
they exhibit what Tony Lawson termed demi-regularities, which, unlike causal laws, describe 
‘a partial event regularity which prima facie indicates the occasional, but less than universal 
actualisation of a mechanism or tendency, over a definite region of space-time’ (Lawson, 
1998: 149). 
19
 A society is never entirely open, otherwise prediction would not be possible, and it is 
difficult to see how social interaction under such unstable circumstance could occur (cf. 
Joseph and Wight, 2010: 149ff.). 
20
 The interplay allows CR to avoid both reification in their conceptualisation of the 
relationship between structures and agency, which perceives human relations as 
independent facts of nature, and voluntarism, which ignores the conditions and unintended 
results of action in favour of the intentions of actors. Agency is always conditioned by 
structures and reproduces or transforms these more or less consciously, but structures, 
despite their relative stable nature and independence, are also inherently dependent on 





the world’ that ‘are actually realized’, and ‘intersubjectively intelligible and 
acceptable’ (Sayer, 1992: 69).21 
To give an example, global warming is unobservable insofar as humans can only 
experience climate change through its effects. Global warming may be the result of 
one or more generative mechanisms interacting, and for CR exists independently of 
us acknowledging it happening. As other effects may interact, global warming could 
also not be actualised nor be experienced. However, as is widely accepted, the 
denial of global warming in leading industrialised countries, or the focus on only 
specific easily visible effects of global warming, has significant repercussions for any 
attempt to respond to global warming, showing the importance of accounting for the 
multiple layers of reality. CR therefore emphasises the need to consider whether an 
account of global warming describes reality more adequately than another – which 
remains independent from any scepticism towards human’s capacity for knowledge 
and judgement. 
In sum, a commitment to ontological realism for CR incorporates the belief that a 
theory portrays not only a transitive object of knowledge, embedded in specific 
historical and regional practices, but also makes reference to an intransitive object 
of knowledge. Any ‘adequate philosophy of science must be capable of […] 
sustaining both (1) the social character of science and (2) the independence from 
science of the objects of scientific thought’ (Bhaskar, 2013: 24). The ‘holy trinity’ – 
ontological realism, epistemological relativism, judgmental rationality – provides the 
starting point for an appropriate engagement with social ontology, and by extension 
the issue of social conditioning. 
What I hope to have made clear, and what I take from this brief discussion of the 
key commitments of CR, is that critical realists and judgement scholars share a 
concern about tendencies to reduce, conflate, or otherwise misconstrue the 
complexities of reality. Furthermore, both, in different ways, reject the 
‘epistemological question’ (Zerilli, 2005b: 162). They differ in that judgement 
theorists have successfully highlighted the potential in human plurality, contra a 
problematic objectivism that desires a priori criteria for adjudicating value conflicts. 
CR, in contrast, emphasises the continued importance of asking ontological 
questions and insists on the independence of objects from scientific inquiry, contra 
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social sciences’ preoccupation with epistemology and the empirical (Norrie, 2016: 
392). These differences are important; for, critical realists provide a framework that 
accounts for political judgements that are orientated towards a shared object 
independent from the individual perspecives on it, while maintaining the socially 
constructed nature of our knoweldge of this object. As Realism, it demands attention 
to a stratified reality with unobservable entities, but this reference to reality does not 
come at the cost of democratic citizenship. Critical realists insist tirelessly on the 
contingency of judgements and their embeddedness in political practices of giving 
meaning to a world. Political judgements are about something and Archer and her 
colleagues help us realise the complexity of that something that a judging person 
inevitably has to negotiate. 
 
3.2.2 Archer on Being Human 
Archer complemented the focus on ontological realism with a humanising project. 
Contra upward, downward, and central conflation, the separation of structure and 
agency enabled her to ask what uniquely characterises ‘being human’ as irreducible 
to society.22 She insists that there can be no society without people and that social 
theorising therefore has to avoid ‘evacuating agency’ (Archer, 2000: 306) to 
strengthen the social. Her project is the ‘re-emergence of humanity, meaning that 
due acknowledgement is given to the properties and powers of real people forged in 
the real world, which overcomes the present poverty of social theory’ (2000: 306). At 
the same time, her realism is explicitly non-anthropocentric, in part because of the 
critical realist insistence on the separation of what is from how humans perceive it.23 
Archer therefore adds to the object-focus in section 3.2.1 a subject-focus without 
falling for an ‘impossible’ subjectivism, i.e. the belief that all that matters, is what 
matters to a person (2000: 23; cf. Chernilo, 2017: 197). I will now introduce key 
concepts that frame Archer’s argument on stratified agency in relation to two 
important conceptual distinctions: between the human being as person, as social 
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 Structuralism conceives of agency as indeterminate material, as empty vessels moved by 
social forces. Other problematic conceptions include agency as idealised human beings 
capable of changing society at will, alone or collectively, and, thirdly, agency as describing 
social humans, which conflates the person and social agent (Archer, 1995: 251). 
23
 Archer also emphasises how humans share with other animals their embodied 
engagement with the world and that discursive practices are only secondary to this shared 





agent, and as social actor, and between human’s engagement with the natural, 
practical and social (or specifically discursive) order of reality. 
Archer offers a stratified view of being human, which argues that the ‘mind is 
emergent from neurological matter, consciousness from mind, selfhood from 
consciousness, personal identity from selfhood, and social agency from personal 
identity’ (2000: 87). She states that human beings are persons insofar as they have 
a self-perceived identity – a sense of self – based on a continuous consciousness 
(1995: 282).24 The sense of self is best understood as self-awareness that ‘it is the 
same self who has interests upon which constraints and enablements impinge and 
that how they react today will affect what interests they will have tomorrow’ (1995: 
282). Prior to, and ‘primitive to, our sociality’ (1995: 284), the sense of self is 
experienced through the use of bodily powers from an early age, which leads the 
person to the differentiation between one’s self and the environment (2000: 125f.). 
Human beings keep this emergent sense of self throughout their lives. The self-
aware and embodied person holds a capacity for social innovation, labelled by 
Arendtians as natality: ‘human beings have the unique potential to conceive of new 
social forms. Because of this, society can never be held to shape them entirely’ 
(1995: 289). 
A person’s sense of self emerges out of embodied practices and is necessarily pre-
linguistic (2000: 124). This stratification of personhood draws on an analytical 
distinction between three orders of reality: the natural, practical, and social.25 The 
orders of reality are interrelated, but they also pose different, and often conflicting, 
challenges and potentials for human agency.26 Each comes with distinct forms of 
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 Archer relies on the Lockean formula of selfhood as body plus continuity in consciousness, 
but merely insists on a sufficient rather than a perfect continuity (Archer, 2000: 137). The 
‘eidetic and the procedural [memories], supply a continual resort for defining our selfhood, 
above and beyond our bodily identity. They are thus the modern ways of specifying what a 
neo-Lockean means by the “continuity of consciousness”, which is something distinct from 
perfect recall’ (2000: 152). 
25
 The similarities to Arendt’s thought are clearly visible, starting with their distinction 
between the biological/natural, practical/fabricating, and social/political spheres and 
activities. Of course Arendt’s emphasis on the role of speech and appearance goes beyond 
Archer’s concerns, nonetheless both share the concern with the failure in modern philosophy 
to give primacy to practice (Archer, 2000: 145; Arendt, 1998; Sindic, 2013). 
26
 In everyday life these orders are often difficult to separate, but this observation should in 
turn not lead to, for example, the conclusion that other orders can be reduced to the social. 
An account of social conditioning attentive to human agency has to accommodate these 
different influences that come together to shape a more or less unified response of humans 





knowledge, concerns, and emotions. Humans engage with the natural order of 
reality to ensure their physical well-being. The embeddedness in the natural sphere 
of experience leads to embodied knowledge (2000: 9). We seek performative 
achievements in relation to the practical order by mastering objects – what Arendt 
called fabrication and the demands of worldliness – and gain practical knowledge. 
Interactions in the social order provide a sense of self-worth and come with 
discursive knowledge.27 Each order of reality brings with it distinct concerns and 
affective cues that lead to different clusters of emotions which provide commentaries 
upon our concerns (2000: 195, 203).28 Concerns together with emotions enable a 
prioritisation of what we care about and thus the prism though which individuals 
interpret their life (Chalari, 2009: 151).29 
Through the distinctions, Archer challenges the dominance of an approach in 
sociology that defends the primacy of language and the social order for the 
development of human agency (2000: 121). Practical action and the differentiation 
of the person according to Archer are fundamental to humans’ way of being in the 
world before the acquisition of language.30 At the same time, Archer also embraces 
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 Embodied knowledge has three distinguishing characteristics, its ‘object, its unawareness 
and its embeddedness’, as ‘it is based on sensory-motor interactions with nature’ (2000: 
162). The human possesses it without awareness of its cognitive content and it is limited to 
being exercised through direct contact with nature. Practical knowledge is characterised by 
being procedural, implicit, expressed in skills of the body, and tacit; it allows understanding 
reality through practice instead of discursive deliberation and abstract theorising (Archer, 
2000: 166). Discursive knowledge entails scholarship and results out of the abstract attempt 
to understand causal powers, i.e. how things really work. 
28
 In the natural order, the first-order emotions – emerging from the body-environment 
relation – are experienced viscerally, e.g. physical pleasure and pain (2000: 199). In the 
practical order, emotions are experienced as competences that arise from the relationship 
between the subject towards objects in the world. Emotions provide information on the 
successful performance of practical tasks, e.g. the euphoria or frustration we feel in whether 
we successfully managed to put up a painting. In the discursive order, emotions are 
concerned with self-worth, their imports are normative and they emerge out of a 
subject/subject relationship. Humans transform first-order emotions into second-order 
emotional commentary through the process of reflexivity. Reflexivity helps humans review, 
articulate and monitor or transmute the emotional commentary. 
29
 Ian Burkitt challenges that Archer limits emotions to individualised commentaries, which is 
said to miss the role of relational emotions, i.e. the way humans emotionally identify with 
others and how this affects their internal conversation (Burkitt, 2012: 463). Reflexive 
dialogues entail feelings and emotions not just as ‘attendants to reflexivity; they are the basis 
and motive of reflexive thought, […] our thoughts are always coloured by emotion so that we 
never see the world in a neutral way’ (2012: 469). 
30
 Archer puts forward three arguments to justify a primacy of practice. Firstly, that bodily 
self-consciousness is shared by all higher animal species rather than being ‘social gifts’ 





an emphasis on human relationality and sociability, as visible in her next distinction, 
between actors and agents. Human beings are also agents, i.e. part of a collective 
with certain aims and privileges, prior to becoming actors. We are agents by virtue 
of our position in society, for example our ‘working class’ background amongst other 
social distinctions. Agents, as groups or collectives, have properties irreducible to 
individual people, agency is a relational property of people (1995: 274).31 This 
means that although humans have a relatively independent sense of self, 
personhood is always already embedded in a context that shapes the logic of future 
action. The social actor, in contrast, emerges out of a person’s active pursuit of 
goals in society; an actor – always singular – is irreducible to agency – always 
collectively held – and irreducible to the person (Archer, 1995: 280). Socialisation 
entails that humans become aware of the distinction between self and others, and 
between the social and the non-social, and that they use performative and memory 
capacities in order to learn how to take part in social practices (2000: 126). 
In summary, we cannot start theorising a phenomenon such as judging 
responsibility-for-complicity, without an adequate account of the people who engage 
in social transformation and reproduction. According to Archer, such an account 
necessarily has to tell us something about their distinct personhood, which is the 
crucial source of innovation and of the ‘it-seems-to-me’ on which Arendt’s pluralism, 
rests. It also has to consider human’s engagement with different orders of reality, 
the prevalent forms of agency in society, and the particular social actors that emerge 
from the interplay between person and social agency. A focus on the distinct 
properties and mechanisms of structure and agency thus amounts to a commitment 
to a mind-independent, stratified reality alongside a concern with subjectivity that is 
embodied, self-aware, and emerges out of a varied engagement with the world. In 
the following, I turn to one of the key mechanisms that mediates between objectivity 
and subjectivity, or structure and agency, reflexivity. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
developing their self through practice as they learn to distinguish between our self and the 
world outside of it, e.g. a hot instrument, which we learn to avoid. Finally, Archer argues that 
humans are pre-disposed to judge if social conditions are de-humanising or not (2000: 124). 
31
 Agency adds a second morphogenesis/-stasis cycle, or double morphogenesis/ -stasis: 
the agents are themselves transformed in the process of changing the social system they 
engage in. Humans can be corporate agents who are organised and share a motivation to 
change society in certain ways. They can also be primary agents, grouped together by virtue 
of their similar life chances and position in relation to society’s institutions. Primary agents 
are seemingly passive but they contribute to social transformation by providing a response to 





3.3 The Mediation between Structure and Agency through Reflexivity 
As the final piece of the puzzle, I explore reflexivity as a neglected focus alongside 
the emphasis on reflective32 judgement, which I developed in chapter 1 and 2.33 
Without reflexive agency there can be no judgement; the internal conversation is 
one of the key features that mediates between structures and agency, between the 
internal and external world, and between the subjective and objective. Any account 
of political judgement must therefore tell us something about this mechanism that 
inevitably and fundamentally shapes how humans judge and create a common 
world. In section 3.3.1, I address Archer’s empirical research that captures the 
stratified character of reflexivity from within which judgement and action develops. 
Humans think differently and these differences are not random, plus, they have 
important socio-political implications. In section 3.3.2, I turn to her work on late 
modernity to shed light on how the mediation process of reflexivity is changing 
amidst broader structural and cultural transformations. If we wish to think through 
the problem of how to judge responsibility-for-complicity, we need to take stock of 
the changes to reflexive agency in late modernity. 
In her book Structure, Agency and the Internal Conversation (2003), Archer points to 
a negative consensus on the relationship between structure and agency in social 
theory that rejects the position of social determinism, i.e. the denial that agency has 
a causally efficacious role to play for social transformation. Beyond this, agreement 
is rare. Debates cover the ontological status of agency and structure, the relation 
between the objective and the subjective, or even, the possibility of transcending 
these distinctions through central conflation. The only constant seems to be the 
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 Archer distinguishes reflection as the ‘action of a subject towards an object’, for example 
reflecting on the merits of ‘Brexit’ or whether it is safe to cross a road, from the self-
referential character of reflexivity in the form ‘subject-object-subject’ (Archer, 2009: 2), i.e.: 
what are the effects of ‘Brexit’ for me, or is this road safe for me to cross. Clearly, the 
boundary between these two categories is hazy. I refer to reflective judgement primarily to 
indicate a focus on representative thinking and the engagement with a plurality of 
perspectives. 
33
 Arendt pointed to the mental activities of thinking and willing as central places of 
contestation in post-foundational modernity, but her philosophical treatment of reflexivity 
remained underdeveloped. Archer shares this view on Arendt’s account of thinking and 
challenges Arendt’s suggestion that the inner dialogue resembles talking to a friend (Archer, 
2007: 67). Archer’s research in turn can be criticised for linking reflexivity too closely to its 
implication for action, neglecting the distinct role of thinking captured by Arendt and 





often-unquestioned acceptance of a notion of human beings as reflexive beings that 
are embodied, intelligent and open to social influences. 
At the same time, reflexivity remains under-conceptualised and under-researched. 
The concept has instead become popular in recent years as external phenomenon 
attributed to social systems rather than individuals (Archer, 2008: 2).34 In contrast, 
Archer turns to reflexivity as an internal phenomenon, constituted by an internal 
conversation, that mediates between structure and agency.35 She claims that 
reflexivity possesses genuine interiority, is ontologically subjective and causally 
efficacious. It is exactly these irreducible, distinctive personal properties of reflexivity 
that makes reflexivity the missing mechanism of mediation required for an ‘adequate 
account of social conditioning’ (Archer, 2003: 16). 
Archer defines reflexivity as ‘the regular exercise of the mental ability, shared by all 
normal people, to consider themselves in relation to their (social) contexts and vice 
versa’ (Archer, 2007: 4). Reflexivity is a personal emergent property, which gives 
people authorship over their own social projects and makes them active agents 
(Archer, 2003: 34, 94). Internal conversation is the talk all people ‘have with 
themselves, within their own heads, usually silently and usually from an early age’ 
(2007: 2). It provides a prism through which to negotiate between the internal and 
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 The popularity of terminology such as reflexive sociology or reflexive modernity culminated 
in the extended reflexivity thesis in social theory, which identifies an increase in reflexivity – 
referring to a need and ability to shape one’s own identity – in Western society over the last 
few decades (cf. Adams, 2006: 512). What this thesis entails may vary extensively. Giddens 
and Ulrich Beck, for example, identify the lack of social structure as a basic feature of late 
modernity, leading to heightened reflexivity (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; Giddens, 
1991). Archer and other critical realists in turn take issue with their claims of institutionalised 
individualism. They reject the portrayal of the relationship between traditionalism and 
reflexivity as zero-sum, where extended reflexivity becomes the response to a decline in 
structures and the emergence of self-culture (Archer, 2012: 3). 
35
 A point of debate has been the relationship between habitus as Bourdieu conceived it and 
Archer’s reflexivity. The link between habitus and reflexivity led to extended discussion 
between Archer and other researchers, through numerous channels and platforms. Many 
suggest the two projects complement each other in specific ways (Adams, 2003, 2006, 2007; 
Caetano, 2015; Chandler, 2013; Elder‐Vass, 2007; Elder-Vass, 2010; Farrugia, 2013; 
Fleetwood, 2008; Mouzelis, 2008; Mutch, 2004; Sayer, 2009; Sweetman, 2003; Vogler, 
2016). Archer however rejects the hybridisation of the two key mechanisms for social 
conditioning at ontological, theoretical, and empirical level. She seems to reduce habitus to 
routine, and her critics therefore argue that she obscures the creative potential of the non-
cognitive and more generally provides a problematic preference for activity over passivity 
(Burkitt, 2016). Due to these clear lines drawn on both sides, it seems most useful to think of 
habitus and reflexivity, as Archer and Bourdieu conceive of them, as different tools that help 





the external context, and between the personal and the social.36 Over time, the 
reflexive practice produces a modus vivendi that responds to the varied concerns 
that arise from the three orders of reality. This modus vivendi frames how a person 
perceives a context. Archer terms the failure to formulate such a prism, through 
which to evaluate the various demands that our context puts on us, ‘fractured 
reflexivity’ (Archer, 2003: 164). The notion of fractured reflexivity overlaps with what 
Arendt refers to as the incapacity to think, or thoughtlessness, in that both lead to an 
inability to act and judge by engaging with one’s context appropriately. In Archer’s 
terms, for fractured reflexives the sequence – concerns, projects, practices – 
becomes distorted and leaves the person in a state of passivity and emotional 
distress.37 I now turn to Archer’s empirical research to elaborate further how 
reflexivity links structure and agency and the macro- and micro-levels of society, 
followed by a discussion of its changing role in late modernity. 
 
3.3.1 Research into Modes of Reflexivity 
Archer provides the first comprehensive empirical research into reflexivity through 
internal conversation.38 Her analysis builds on two series of explorative interviews, 
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 Central for the mediation process is the negotiation between the social expectations and 
personal concerns, personal identity and social identity. Personal hierarchies of concerns 
shape the internalisation of the external context through interpretation and elucidation. The 
mediation through the social hierarchies of expectations follows the internalisation of the 
external context. Social hierarchies are interrelated with personal hierarchies of concerns 
and are themselves filtered through the modus vivendi. 
37
 Fractured reflexivity may cause drifting without developing an active agency, which can be 
resolved through changes in the context of reflexivity (2012: 290). For example, impeded 
reflexives, a subgroup of fractured reflexives, can sometimes substitute their rejected natal 
background with new friend relations in order to exercise their preferred mode of reflexivity. 
Expressive subjects, another such subgroup, lack a personal identity formation process, 
which would help mediate external information and shapes internal concerns and emotions; 
they do not, however, see this as a lack (Archer, 2012: 281). 
38
 The path-breaking research has been criticised, with critics for example arguing that the 
causal powers of structures and their temporal pre-existence to action often seem to play a 
secondary role (Caetano, 2015: 4). Although her work on the internal conversation is set in 
the framework of her realist social theory, with each book focusing on a different element, 
the question remains if Archer succeeds in describing the interplay between structure and 
agency at the level of reflexivity in her empirical work. Archer also stands accused of 
undermining the role of structures by describing them as only affecting the projects human 
beings reflect upon, but not the reflection itself – how socialization can also happen internally 
(2015: 8). Ian Burkitt (2012: 464) also criticises Archer’s positioning of reflexivity as private 
and sees in her statement that reflexivity provides a relatively autonomous personal property 
a big step down from the original realist position claiming structure and agency to be 





conducted in Coventry and at her department at the University of Warwick 
respectively, as foundation for a trilogy of books on the subject (Archer, 2003, 2007, 
2012). This research enabled her to identify three main modes of reflexivity, 
alongside what she categorises as underdeveloped and fractured reflexivity (2012: 
250).39 The three modes of reflexivity are communicative (CoR), autonomous (AuR) 
and meta-reflexivity (MeR) (Archer, 2003: 165).40 The research indicated that these 
modes of reflexivity are distributed unevenly across society and that almost all 
participants had one distinctive dominant mode, either communicative, autonomous, 
or meta-, with a small group possessing two dominant modes of reflexivity (2007: 
94). I introduce their key characteristics briefly, before elaborating further on the 
relevance of these insights for the argument put forward in this thesis. 
Communicative reflexives (CoRs) externalize elements of their internal conversation 
through discussion and the solving of problems intra-personally, as they mistrust 
their private deliberation (2003: 167). They adopt a ‘thought and talk’ reflexive 
approach that relies on contextual continuity, surrounding themselves with an 
extended circle of trusted friends and often a large family that defy modern 
atomising tendencies.41 CoRs consequently show ‘smooth dovetailing of concerns’ 
(2003: 169) by prioritizing family and friends over other concerns and other potential 
sources of happiness. Communicative reflexives seek to maintain their social 
horizon, once identified. They therefore tend to be apolitical as they believe that they 
have already established their desired micro-cosmos (2003: 184). In her sample 
from Coventry, the CoRs constituted 21% of the sample of interviewees (2007: 27). 
In her sample of students from the sociology department at Warwick University, 
Archer identified CoRs to be the smallest dominant group of reflexivity with 13%, 
shrinking in their final year to 9% (2012: 128). This can be explained by the group’s 
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 The group of students showing underdeveloped reflexivity was small in number, 12, and 
showed no correlation to gender or mode of reflexivity (Archer, 2012: 129). 
40
 Recent research in the post-colonial context of Sri Lanka has also indicated the wider 
applicability of these modes beyond the Western context (Wimalasena, 2017). 
41
 Communicative reflexivity, in other words, requires numerous reciprocal relations between 
the self and social institutions, such as the family, church, school/university, partners, and 





tendency not to recruit and the development of students’ reflexivity into other modes 
throughout their studies.42 
Autonomous reflexives (AuR), in contrast, are decisive and self-assured and see 
their deliberative process as self-sufficient. Their attitude arises not out of arrogance 
but rather out of suspicion of alternative positions. AURs are willing to include 
others’ expertise on their own terms (2003: 210). Similar to CoRs they are good at 
dovetailing their concerns (2003: 213), but are individualists and search for 
contextual discontinuity and ‘supra-contextual knowledge’ (2003: 251). The AuRs 
are shown to have articulate social concerns and to lack relational goods – they 
were ‘parented by two individuals rather than by a couple’ (2012: 168).43 Their 
reflexive approach is task-orientated.44 In contrast to the other groups, AuRs are 
uncritical of employment in corporate enterprises or governmental bureaucracy, but 
see it as a means to an end; they incorporate ethical concerns into their personal 
agendas (2012: 188). They therefore represent for Archer the Third Way/ lib/lab 
position in politics (2012: 205). 
Meta-reflexives – who constituted 20% of the Coventry sample and 39% of the 
sociology student sample – use their reflexive deliberation to interrogate their sense 
of self (Archer, 2003: 255). They are critical of the possibility of effective action in 
society and problematize the social order instead of normalizing or internalizing it.45 
Their reflexive approach is therefore value-orientated. As ‘loners’, they neither 
replicate the natal background nor accept normative conventionalism (2012: 208).46 
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 Those that turned CoRs during their studies, six of the twelve students that had initially 
possessed underdeveloped forms of reflexivity, showed some patterns: they often are the 
first in their family to go to university and are motivated by a wish to make their parents 
proud or by personal uncertainty instead of enthusiasm. Furthermore, the CoRs did not take 
gap years, relied on help to make a decision on whether to go to university and had 
extended families. They showed a lack of confidence, undecidedness and generally a lack of 
a plan or project (2012: 129ff.). 
43
 This led to a contextual incongruity within their family and they tend to be encouraged to 
take gap years and shed local roots. They attach low value to the social order, instead 
heavily investing in the practical order, e.g. learning instruments, sports or languages. 
44
 Friendships are, as a consequence, not a high priority and of low interpersonal intensity. 
Relationships arise out of shared practical interests, for example out of playing instruments 
or sports together (2012: 179). 
45
 Meta-reflexivity does not necessarily translate into particularly good or extensive reflective 
judgement, although some parallels apply as meta-reflexives problematise the world. 
46
 Towards their family they tend to be argumentative but quick to forget or reconcile, move 





They receive relational goods, especially familial stability, support for university entry 
and financial help (2012: 245), but their MeR develops as they encounter mixed 
messages concerning normative claims about the social order, leaving them to find 
their own position from a young age. They had to disengage from their natal context 
first, to be able to re-engage with the social order in their own terms and concerns. 
The university degree is hoped to help in this direction and MeRs are particularly 
adamant about the importance of the degree (2012: 246). Disenchanted with politics 
because of the similarity between parties (and what they perceive as a general 
failure of governance), they emphasise voluntarism and charity, and at the global 
level, support social movements, such as Greenpeace. 
Drawing on this brief overview, one might conclude that meta-reflexivity seems most 
suited to Arendt’s pluralist politics, whereas autonomous reflexives’ instrumentalism 
is detrimental to acting-in-concert and judgement. There is certainly something to 
this observation and Archer, like Arendt, recognises these tendencies. As I 
elaborate further in the following section, Archer seems to put much weight on the 
increase in reflexivity and meta-reflexives. Both theorists thus make connections 
between politics, morality and thinking that raise worries about ‘intellectualism’ (cf. 
Walsh, 2017).47 However, Archer also adds significant caveats to her claims on 
reflexivity. Reflexivity is only one, important, property of human agency. The 
dominant mode of reflexivity that a person ultimately exhibits is not statically linked 
to socio-occupational backgrounds or stable from birth onwards.48 In addition, none 
of the participants in the interviews scored 0 on any of the modes, which shows that 
they only varied in the degrees of possessing each mode of reflexivity. Indeed, 
Archer (2010) also highlights that the demands on reflexivity vary according to the 
order of reality, with the social sphere the least habituated, and that humans use 
different modes of reflexivity depending on the context. This complicates any 
conclusions that we might wish to draw from this explorative research. 
Instead of hypothesising further about the ‘suitability’ of different modes of reflexivity 
for a pluralist politics, I conclude that Archer’s research affirms key points of Arendt’s 
                                                                                                                                                                    
comes to having their own family, even though they appreciate what their parents have done 
for them (2012: 211). 
47
 In brief terms, I reject a privileging of meta-reflexivity, because it tends towards what Fine 
(2008) called the philosopher stone of Arendt scholarship, which seeks to find a universal 
key to resolve all political problems.  
48
 Archer instead indicates a tendentious link between the dominant mode of reflexivity and 





underdeveloped account of thinking. She shares a concern with fractured reflexivity, 
or in Arendt’s terms thoughtlessness, and its effects on humans and society. She 
affirms and adds concreteness to the heterogeneity of the person, which emerges 
out of the patterned, but distinct internal conversation, that underscores Arendt’s 
commitment to a thick conception of plurality. Archer also moves beyond Arendt’s 
insights in important ways. Arendt turns to Socrates for a sense of everyday thinking 
(Arendt, 2003: 167f.), and thus privileges an ideal form of thought. Archer’s 
sociological approach, in contrast, upholds her dualism by tying thought to a 
‘functional general theory of society’ (Walsh, 2017: 171), where each mode plays a 
different economic, social, and political role that shapes the trajectory of society. 
Archer argues not only that humans think differently, but also that these variations 
have larger, micro- and macro-scale, implications for society. The modes of 
reflexivity produce distinct stances towards opportunities for social mobility and 
these reflexive stances ‘constitute the macro-micro link’ (2003: 343), because they 
provide one of the most basic means of orientation of subjects to society. 
In the case of communicative reflexives, their modus vivendi is continuous with the 
subject’s original context and tends towards social immobility. CoRs tend towards 
contextual continuity, which leads them to take up evasive stances towards social 
mobility and to react to tasks in a self-sacrificial manner; they are willing to sacrifice 
social opportunities to maintain their natal context. AuRs tend towards contextual 
discontinuity and react strategically towards social mobility.49 They reveal a self-
disciplinary stance towards social tasks, and this makes autonomous reflexivity a 
personal power for social mobility (2007: 190). Lastly, MeRs tend towards contextual 
incongruity and exhibit subversive stances towards social mobility. MeRs are 
characterised by volatility, both through recurrent contextual incongruity and a 
tendency to frequently re-qualify, leading to a voluntarily chosen sideways mobility 
and a gravitation towards work in the third sector (2007: 252). They react to tasks in 
a self-transcendent and questioning manner (2007: 316). 
Archer shows us that human beings’ engagement with their internal and external 
context comes with significant implications for society and she links reflexivity with 
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 The AuR disengages from the natal context and develops nascent practical concerns that 
are to be exercised independently and expressed and realized in appropriate social contexts 
(2007: 151). This leads to reinforcement, revision, or redefinition of the AuR’s concerns in 
relation to their contextual reception until a modus vivendi is established, one that 





social mobility. I conclude that an analysis of reflexivity matters not only because 
how people think and act is socially conditioned – the social gets into our heads in 
some important way – and because reflexivity is deeply shaped by human 
interdependence and by our emotions. Attentiveness to reflexivity matters because 
the internal conversation provides a genuine personal contribution to social 
transformation without which social formations could not be explained, judgement 
could not be understood, and responsibility would not get off the ground. 
 
3.3.2 The Late Modern Context 
Following on from the insights into the patterns of reflexivity, this section situates 
reflexivity in relation to the transformations of late modernity. Archer provides ample 
evidence of the changing context of political judgement and suggests that active, 
reflexive agents become increasingly important in shaping the move towards late 
modernity.50 Late modernity refers to the period from the 1980s onwards that began 
with the launch of the World Wide Web and the ‘expansion of multi-national 
corporations and the deregulation of finance markets’ (Archer, 2012: 4). It is 
characterised by ‘giving way to a morphogenesis that is increasingly unbound from 
its morphostatic fetters’ (2012: 4). To reiterate, morphostasis occurs in a society 
when the interaction of agency, structure, and culture leads to an overall 
reproduction of the status quo. This state allows for morphogenesis in one sphere, 
for example the transformation and emergence of new cultural entities, whereas the 
overall formation is characterised by continuity. 
At a high level of abstraction, developed countries can be identified as having 
started off from morphostatic social formations. Societies were governed by 
negative feedback loops and a lack of alternatives in both the cultural and structural 
orders that together discouraged innovation. Modern formations are characterised 
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 Archer’s theorisation on late modernity responds to the influential work on late modernity 
by Giddens, Beck, Zygmunt Baumann, and Hartmut Rosa. The first three theorists have 
been highly influential by accounting for late modernity as liquid modernity (Bauman), risk 
society (Beck), and high or late modernity (Giddens) (Bauman, 2013; Beck et al., 1994; 
Giddens, 1991). They are often connected for their shared transcendence of modern class 
analysis as they concentrate on late modern individualism (cf. Atkinson, 2008; Dawson, 
2010). Rosa (2013) provides a comprehensive critical theory analysis of the move towards 
late modernity that identifies a change in the temporal structures of society at the heart of 
this last stage of modernisation. For a critique of their approaches from a critical realist 





by simultaneous morphostasis in one sphere and morphogenesis in another. The 
contextual discontinuity caused by urbanisation or industrialisation continued to 
enable habituation, due to the relative slowness of the overall changes in modern 
society. The crucial question for critical realists is what the concrete generative 
mechanisms are that helped morphogenesis take off and become increasingly 
unbound in late modernity – but never fully – from the maintenance of the overall 
morphostatic framework of pre-modern and modern society. 
The synergetic cooperation between science and capitalist enterprises from the 
1980s onwards provides a suitable example of a generative mechanism that helped 
transcend the cyclical motion of morphostatic society (2014a: 12f.). This generative 
mechanism also emblematically captures critical realist efforts to show the potential 
for positive social transformation, contra the often negative portrayal of the move 
towards late modernity. Technology linked capitalist innovation and university 
research in a hitherto unknown manner. While this interplay between science and 
capitalism is open to exploitation by capitalist enterprises, it also provides the 
starting point for new alternative strategies, as deployed by techno-scientific 
‘diffusionists’, e.g. the founders of Wikipedia. The conception of a future 
‘morphogenic society’ thus becomes also a normative project in which, so the claim 
goes, morphogenesis itself produces stability, as a continuous drive for more 
positive, post-capitalist transformation in a non-determinate manner.51 
Particularly valuable in Archer’s conception of late modernity is her insight into how 
different modes of reflexivity respond to the late modern context – with significant 
implications for their social mobility and distribution in society. Archer identifies a 
new imperative of reflexivity, as ‘increasingly all have to draw upon their socially 
dependent but nonetheless personal powers of reflexivity in order to define their 
course(s) of action in relation to the novelty of their circumstances’ (2012: 1). 
Instead of a form of institutionalised individualism, the reflexive imperative is based 
on an increasing and accelerated double morphogenesis of both structure and 
culture leading to almost constant social transformation (2012: 41f.). 
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 Archer puts a particular emphasis on the new forms of stabilisation provided by a 
particular mode of reflexivity she identified in her empirical research, meta-reflexivity. In 
addition, she notes that although the intensification of morphogenesis leads to new forms of 





The far reaching implications of the reflexive imperative are particularly visible in 
attempts to protect oneself from change, which, in late modernity, becomes itself 
part of the process of reflexive deliberation, in full awareness of the increasing costs 
of such a choice (Archer, 2012: 305). To keep the current socio-economic and 
cultural context, a person can no longer rely on old shortcuts and instead has to 
constantly reflect upon the changes in society and attempt to stop or follow them. 
The continuation of the status quo is therefore no longer reproduced unquestioningly 
over generations. Instead, it has to be constantly and consciously maintained, which 
leads to higher risks and costs. 
These new circumstances are more beneficial for certain dominant modes of 
reflexivity, and, as a result, a decline or increase of different modes of reflexivity is to 
be expected. CoRs are particularly unprepared for these developments, with their 
aim for contextual continuity and dovetailing of opportunities, which leads to a 
decline in their numbers in society (2012: 165).52 Change has simply become too 
widespread to be responded to by intergenerational socialisation. As this process is 
seen as unstoppable in advanced societies (2012: 305), communicative reflexives 
will decline and leave space for an increase in autonomous reflexives, who benefit 
from their strategic attitude to the new options of social mobility available to them 
(Archer, 2012: 205). 
The contextual incongruity and extensive requirement to reflect deliberatively could 
eventually lead to the morphogenetic social order being dominated by meta-
reflexivity, alongside an increase in fractured reflexives. Archer argues that fractured 
reflexivity is not a transitional phenomenon and should therefore engender an 
acceptance and accommodation at the level of civil society (Archer, 2012: 291). This 
is especially prescient, as their increase coincides with the decrease of 
communicative reflexives, leaving fractured reflexives with a double negative 
burden: internal anxiety and disorientation without external, collective support, 
traditionally provided through communicative reflexives’ social solidarity (Archer, 
2012: 190). 
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 In relation to the students considered in her research, Archer argues that the combination 
of decreasing relationships between parents and children and the British emphasis on 
studying away from home may cause contextual incongruity and result in immobility and 
‘impeded reflexivity’. The thus impeded reflexives are no longer able to connect the familiar 





In summary, I discussed how Archer identifies a morphogenesis of both structure 
and culture, which results in widespread social transformation (2012: 4f.). Change 
has become too far-reaching to be responded to by intergenerational socialisation 
and, in consequence, a new imperative of reflexivity emerges and transforms the 
distribution of modes of reflexivity in society. These initial thoughts on late modernity 
suggest that the structural context has indeed changed significantly compared to the 
context of Arendt’s work on judgement. Critical realist analysis of late modernity 
goes far beyond the transplantation of Arendt’s theory of political judgement into the 
context of value pluralism, put forward by the second phase of judgement 
scholarship.53 In addition to the break in tradition, which Arendt identified, late 
modernity offers expansive socio-cultural transformation and changes to the 
distribution of reflexivity in society. An adequate account of the dualism of 
judgement must therefore also take these late modern changes to both the judge 
and context of judgement into account. 
In conclusion, chapter 3 looked at the issue of social conditioning. I turned to a 
recent proponent of the structure-agency debate, Archer, who responds to the 
vexatious fact of society that humans feel both constrained and free. Archer offers 
an analytical dualism that helps separate out the emergent properties of structure, 
culture, and agency at an analytical level, which together constitute social 
transformation. Structures pre-date action, but they also depend on agency for their 
continued existence. A critical realist, Archer defends both objectivism and 
subjectivism: the practice of attending to mind-independent objects that are stratified 
into observable and non-observable layers and the practice of attending to what it 
means to be human – a stratified agent with a sense of self, that is embodied, 
relational, emotional, and capable of social innovation. Section 3.3 turned to the key 
mediation process between agency and structure, reflexivity, as a subjective, 
causally efficacious, and internal phenomenon that shapes the kind of political 
judgements humans are likely to make. While Arendt points to reflexivity as central 
place of contestation in post-foundational modernity, notably in the form of 
thoughtlessness, her philosophical treatment of reflexivity remained 
underdeveloped. Through Archer, we gain a paradigmatic empirical research that 
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 The latter’s re-contextualisation of judgement has continued Arendt’s work by showing its 
enduring relevance vis-à-vis a particular puzzle (value pluralism), which risks obscuring the 
demands on politics and political judgement that come with late modernity. Instead, this 






brings to light the stratified character of reflexivity from within which judgement 
develops. Without reflexive agency there can be no judgement. Political judgement 
and the common world it constitutes are thus inevitably shaped by patterns of 
reflexivity. Archer’s research into late modernity also reveals how varied human 
responses to different transformations in late modernity are. It shows how the 
increased cultural and structural transformation leads to a change in distribution in 
reflexivity, putting new weight on human’s capacity to think – and by extension to 
judge and act upon the world. 
The purpose of this chapter has been to shed further light on how structure and 
agency impact on political judgement. I take from Archer that this second dimension 
to political judgement requires attentiveness to the dualism of structure-agency or, in 
short, objectivism, subjectivism, and their mediation through reflexivity. A focus on 
the distinct properties and mechanisms of structure and agency amounts to a 
commitment to a mind-independent, stratified reality alongside a concern with 
subjectivity that is embodied, emotional, relational, capable of social innovation, and 
with a sense of self, emerging out of a varied engagement with a stratified world. 
The dualist approach enables judgement scholars to attend to the object and subject 
of judgement, without denying their interrelation or the crucial role that a public 




Chapter 4 – Judging Responsibility-for-Complicity 
‘It rests on the old fallacy that good people 
make for a good society, which denies 
emergent structures any role in shaping societal 
outcomes’ 
(Archer, 2014b: 34) 
How should we judge our complicity in complex patterns of injustice to enable 
positive social transformation? How can we address mechanisms of disavowal that 
inevitably frame how humans respond to this problematic feature of our common 
life? It is with these kinds of questions in mind that this chapter elaborates the 
practical implications of bringing Arendt’s and Archer’s projects together. In other 
words, I focus on the entrenched problem of how to judge our complicity in and 
responsibility for systemic injustice and violence. The aim is to refine the theoretical 
toolkit undergirding public discussions on complicity. 
The conceptualisation of complicity and responsibility is faced with a threefold 
problem in relation to judgement: in judging responsibility-for-complicity we 
encounter difficult questions concerning how we identify systemic injustice and our 
complicity in and responsibility for unjust outcomes. We also need to think about the 
costs and benefits of attributing complicity and responsibility to specific groups or 
individuals. And lastly, we need to judge carefully what it means to acknowledge our 
entanglement with exploitative and dominating practices. Engagement with the 
problem of judging ‘responsibility-for-complicity’ thus inevitably entails discussions 
about the limits and potential of humans’ judging capabilities, especially in relation to 
the extent to which a person could have gained sufficient knowledge of the broad 
and seldom obvious wrongdoing they contributed to. There is a wide literature 
dedicated to this complex challenge and it is in dialogue with it that I try to highlight 
the merits of my thesis. 
My analysis begins by offering a brief discussion of the dominant legal and moral 
philosophical conception of complicity and responsibility. This conception emerges 
as inadequate in its focus on de-contextualised individuals and their intentional 
contributions to wrongdoing. My analysis then considers two critical alternatives, a 
post-structuralist responsibility-in-complicity account and Iris Young’s social 
connection model, both of which I introduce in 4.1. Their approach is more 
accommodating to the kind of sophisticated understanding of the relationship 




responsibility-in-complicity broadens out complicity and equates it with the 
inescapable fact of human interdependence. An acknowledgement of this 
foldedness of being human, its proponents argue, could potentially lead an 
individual to accept their embeddedness in unjust forms of sociability, which, in turn, 
should motivate their efforts to tackle individual contributions to injustice. The social 
connection model, on the other hand, argues for a collective responsibility that 
should arise whenever an unjust system prevents us from identifying culpable, 
powerful agents. A suitable response to the background conditions of systemic 
injustice, its proponents argue, can only take the form of collective action. 
These theories serve as the foundation for more recent, ongoing debates on an 
‘ethics of responsiveness’, spanning across a wide variety of positions in 
contemporary political thought. In section 4.2, I focus on four representatives whose 
work helps reveal the shortcomings of the responsibility-in-complicity and social 
connection model: that the ability to cultivate responsiveness to suffering is 
presupposed rather than theorised. Concerned with how humans disavow their 
responsibility-for-complicity, each scholar defends a different means of cultivating 
responsiveness. To improve the receptivity of the privileged, Applebaum 
encourages continuous heightened vigilance. Schiff relies on pluralist narratives of 
crisis that show the contingency of social formations. Critical of the reliance on 
sensitizing the privileged to suffering, Hayward argues for the disruption of habitual 
action through interventions by the powerless. Last but not least, Myers proposes an 
Arendtian re-orientation of responsibility towards caring for the world. 
The ethics of responsiveness provides an important advancement from the legal 
and moral philosophical understanding of social conditioning and its role for judging 
responsibility-for-complicity. Its proponents attend to how oppressive structures 
constrain our ability to experience and grapple with the suffering of others. The 
ethics acknowledges the situated character of human agency and accepts that 
structural constraints are an important part of being in the world. However, despite 
their sophisticated approaches to judging complicity, each of the above mentioned 
scholars holds on to what Archer has criticised as a duality. While I use the term 
here with some abstraction from its original context,1 I seek to capture the following 
core elements, which – I argue – are present in the ethics of responsiveness to 
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varying degrees: an emphasis on inseparability between structure and agency, 
which are described as two complementary sides of a coin and require a focus on 
the structured character of action (cf. Archer, 1995: 93). The emphasis on 
inseparability leads to an oscillation between ‘(a) the hyperactivity of agency, whose 
corollary is the innate volatility of society, and (b) the rigid coherence of structural 
properties associated […] with the essential recursiveness of social life’ (1982: 459). 
Informed by the duality, the ethics of responsiveness is – on my reading – caught 
between the identification of overpowering structures that leave little room for 
receptivity, on the one hand, and a hopeful vision of (limited) responsible agency 
that arises from the normative project of a dispositional ethics of responsiveness, i.e. 
a desire to identify ways of cultivating responsiveness towards suffering, on the 
other. The ethics tends to describe structures primarily as a negative context – the 
unjust system – which undertheorizes how different structures may open up the 
possibility of resistance. Agency is identified as unreflectively reproducing deeply 
entrenched social injustices. Exponents obscure the ever-present potential of 
agency as a source of innovation and responsiveness, and instead overemphasise 
receptive agency that is produced in moments of structural disruption or through the 
telling of appropriately critical stories. As a consequence, the ethics of 
responsiveness bears within it an impulse to seek refuge in a break-through crisis or 
other ways of circumventing, rather than accounting for, the interplay of structure 
and agency, and its complex framing of responsibility. In other words, I argue that 
even these more critical and structurally attentive theories that emerged in response 
to the individualist account of responsibility fail to capture the dualism of structure 
and agency and, with it, the potential in reflective judgements on responsibility-for-
complicity. 
The chapter thus maintains a focus on the issue of social conditioning, which is key 
to my contribution to both the debates on responsibility-for-complicity and 
judgement. Section 4.3 delineates my proposal for conceptualising judging 
responsibility-for-complicity, the hybridisation of Arendt’s and Archer’s thought. 
Drawing on my discussions in the previous chapters, I conclude that political 
judgement has two interrelated dimensions: political judgement, firstly, describes a 
practice of seeking to gain critical purchase on what we share in common. It relies 
on the creation of a hospitable common world that enables us to refine and enlarge 




acting together. This common world is constituted out of both the things a 
community has in common, and the views that are developed through the 
imaginative and actual exchange of perspectives on these objects. Political 
judgement, secondly, entails grappling with the mystifying interrelationship between 
structure and agency in order to recognise both the objective and subjective layers 
to reality. For judgement to respond to these two dimensions – to pluralism and 
dualism – it must be embedded in a less reductive ‘ethos of reality’: the cultivation of 
a stance towards reality that affirms a multi-layered, shared reality and cares for how 
this reality can be transformed into a suitable world-in-common. Judgement 
contributes to this project through its orientation towards how structure, agency, and 
plurality simultaneously and continuously shape the common world, as the prism 
through which to judge political problems. The hybrid emerging out of my discussion 
of Arendt’s and Archer’s work, I argue, can help overcome the problems I discuss in 
relation to the existing literature on responsibility and complicity, and shed new light 





4.1 The Problem of Judging Complicity and Responsibility 
The visions of society on which the various positions on responsibility and complicity 
build are radically different, despite a shared normative aim of positive social 
transformation. These images are best assessed by looking at how they deal with 
the interplay of structure and agency. The legal and moral theoretical debates are 
built on the classic scenario of the heist (Lepora and Goodin, 2013: 55). They 
ascribe clearly defined/definable roles to agents and focus on discrete acts, which 
can then be evaluated through the application of universal legal/moral rules. I will 
argue that this image is highly reductionist and inadequate for conceiving complicity. 
The alternative accounts of responsibility – including the ‘social connection model’ 
and the ‘responsibility-in-complicity’-approach – move away from an understanding 
of ethics as the following of pre-given rules. They object to theorising complicity as 
amounting to intentional discrete failures to comply with legal and moral principles. 
Its representatives, including Iris Young and Mark Sanders, are orientated by an 
image of structural injustice and oppression where responsibility cannot be easily 
reduced to identifiable agents without misconstruing the systemic character of 
injustice altogether. A more appropriate response, they argue, requires reflective 
judgement, which entails a particular sensitivity and attentiveness to the way the 
world is structured. In the following, I will provide a brief introduction of both 
positions – the dominant, moral-legal philosophical perspective, and the critical 
alternatives – and their key arguments, in order to gain a better sense of the 
complex challenges to conceptualising responsibility and complicity. 
 
4.1.1 The Moral and Legal Philosophical Paradigm 
Moral and legal analytical philosophy has traditionally used the concept of complicity 
as an analytical tool to identify marginal contributions to wrongdoing. Philosophers 
belonging to this tradition seek to enable positive social transformation by attributing 
moral blameworthiness and/or legal culpability to indirect participations in 
wrongdoing (Ciurria, 2011; Gardner, 2007; Jackson, 2015; Kadish, 1985; Kutz, 
2000, 2007, 2011; Lepora and Goodin, 2013). For this dominant account on 
complicity, someone is judged to be complicit if they do or omit to do something, 
thereby wrongfully contributing to the primary wrongdoing without being the primary 




Conceptions of complicity are embedded in a broader discussion about questions of 
responsibility and guilt. Debates on responsibility have similarly developed a 
dominant moral and legal framework which, following Iris Young (2011), can be 
termed the standard or liability model of responsibility.2 For those defending the 
standard model, allocating responsibility to concrete acts of easily identifiable moral 
wrongdoing is said to help prevent abuses by powerful people, to encourage the 
powerless to seek justice, and to morally challenge those who can influence 
outcomes that harm others. The liability model ‘enables us to keep in focus the very 
question of the difference that agents can make to outcomes and to cast a critical 
eye on attempts by powerful agents to escape their own responsibilities’ (Hayward 
and Lukes, 2008: 12). In the following, I engage the main tenets of this perspective 
to illustrate that, far from helping to judge complicity, its concern with ensuring 
appropriate identification of blameworthiness and culpability obscures the complex 
context from within which complicity arises. 
In the legal context, the aim is to develop frameworks that identify complicity in such 
a way as to enable successful prosecution in criminal courts. The legal perspective 
is thus ‘unabashedly “reductionist”’ (Osiel, 2009). Its doctrine of complicity, known 
also as the law of aiding and abetting or accessorial liability, commonly describes an 
accomplices’ intentional help with or influence on principal wrongdoing (Kadish, 
1985). Initially an analytical tool in domestic law, accessorial liability moved to 
international law to respond to the kinds of challenges Eichmann and other 
perpetrators posed to justice, starting with the Nuremberg Trials and expanded in ad 
hoc tribunals in Yugoslavia and Rwanda (Aksenova, 2016; Schabas, 2000, 2001). 
An appropriate conceptualisation for the purposes of international criminal law 
required a significant departure from the conventional domestic cases of complicity, 
e.g. a heist or murder (Clapham, 2003; Osiel, 2005). Nonetheless, international 
criminal law holds on to complicity as analytical tool to attribute individual criminal 
responsibility in the context of collective wrongdoing.3 
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 Clarissa Hayward (2017: 397) calls this the ‘cause + control’ view, where responsibility for 
harm applies only if the agent was the cause of the harm and that action was under their 
control. For an extensive critique of the reward-punishment-blame-praise view of moral 
responsibility, see Bruce Waller (2011). For a discussion of the history of the concept 
responsibility, see Frieder Vogelmann (2017). 
3
 To this day, the physical or bureaucratic distance between accomplices and the atrocity, 




Complicity in moral terms provides a broader conceptual tool than the one found in 
legal philosophy.4 Put simply, it is possible that someone is held morally responsible 
for complicitous behaviour without committing a crime. This allows moral philosophy 
to address a wider array of questionable acts, but the broader reach in turn 
complicates significantly the attribution and identification of complicity. Moral 
philosophical takes on complicity have responded to this challenge through a distinct 
emphasis on causation, intention, and knowledge as standards for identifying 
someone as complicit.5 Particularly influential have been Chiara Lepora and Robert 
Goodin’s emphasis on knowledge and Christopher Kutz’s on participatory intention 
as central to identifying complicity. Lepora and Gooddin understand complicity as an 
actor’s implication in another’s wrongdoing, who should or could have known the 
primary agent’s intentions (2013: 42). Kutz (2011) suggests that a focus on shared 
intention offers a helpful way to move beyond a narrow focus on causation and to 
explore the broader context of moral responsibility. Attributing complicity accordingly 
requires not only finding out the extent to which the accomplice was essential to the 
wrongdoing, including the causal connection and proximity to the wrongful action; it 
also requires a consideration of the accomplice’s intentions: did they approve of and 
support the burglary?6 
The common feature in the moral and legal perspective on complicity is their focus 
on individual, identifiable actors. Additionally, this framework traditionally embraces 
a backward-looking approach to complicity – seeking to identify whether a person’s 
discrete action contributed to wrongdoing. Theorists are increasingly introducing 
forward-looking criteria, moving from a strategy of retribution to risk-reduction, and 
incorporate collective dimensions to agency (Kutz, 2011: 149). Nonetheless, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
pressures on the mind-sets of accomplices during oppressive regimes, continue to prove 
uniquely difficult for legal philosophy and international law to deal with (Aksenova, 2016). 
4
 According to Gregory Mellema (2011) the legal and moral debates of complicity remain 
largely separate. They reveal a different focus, legal theorists being mainly concerned with 
how to successfully prosecute perpetrators and accomplices. 
5
 As explored by Chiara Lepora and Robert Goodin (2013), these standards of complicity 
help separate different activities, too easily summarised under the term complicity. Related 
concepts include connivance, contiguity, collusion, collaboration, condoning, conspiring, and 
full joint wrongdoing. 
6
 These are commonly termed the actus rea (guilty act) and mens rea (guilty mind set) 
requirement in legal theory. John Gardner (2007) for example insists that complicity 
necessarily requires a causal contribution by the accomplice to the principal wrongdoing. In 
contrast, Kutz (2007) suggests that such causal necessity applies only to accomplice liability 




academics favouring a more structuralist lens on complicity find this analytical 
approach inherently flawed (Afxentiou et al., 2016). Their criticisms invoke typical 
problems associated with methodological individualism, notably the isolation of 
activities from their specific social context and history. When focusing on collective 
action problems, e.g. global poverty or climate change, analysis remains wedded to 
aggregating individuals’ acts.7 This ‘atomistic’ or individualist8 account of complicity 
thus presupposes identifiable wrongdoing and wrongdoers and a deliberate act of 
complicity. 
Not being complicit is presented as the norm of human existence, which means 
complicity is confined to the explicit breaking of laws or to openly immoral behaviour. 
The framework operates under the tacit assumption that ‘the accomplice could avoid 
being complicit and walk through life never failing to avoid it’ (Afxentiou et al., 2016: 
2). This makes the dominant framework unable to capture the numerous ways in 
which temporally dynamic structures shape the context of complicity and thus affect 
the many dimensions of socially embedded human agency (cf. Mihai, 2019). It risks 
underestimating structures of complicity that, in their pervasiveness, make 
complicity seem necessary or inevitable, often as a choice between two forms of 
complicitous action. 
A preference for explicit acts of contributing to wrongdoing, and for connecting 
complicity to blame and culpability, leads the legal and moral philosophical approach 
to assume that a trade-off is inevitable between ensuring that complicity is easily 
identifiable and the larger normative goal of identifying and judging marginal, but 
significant, contributions to wrongdoing. As Osiel (2009) acknowledges, this 
approach is unabashedly reductionist. It risks becoming self-defeating, foreclosing 
any serious attempt to provide a fuller description of social injustice. In response, 
this dissertation’s goal is to provide insights on how to overcome these blind-spots 
through my ‘hybrid’ account. First, however, I examine the existing alternative 
perspectives to the legal-moral philosophical ones. They show how we can theorise 
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complicity without leading to a trade-off between improving the attribution of guilt 
and capturing a complex social reality. 
 
4.1.2 Two Critical Alternatives 
In this section, I will provide a brief outline of the two main alternatives, a post-
structuralist responsibility-in-complicity account and Young’s social connection 
model. They show that complicity can be conceived in ways that avoid the 
shortcomings associated with a focus on identifying marginal contributions to 
wrongdoing and culpable, responsible agency. The two alternative accounts 
attribute complicity to a wide variety of people for their indirect everyday 
contributions to systemic injustice, in relation to which they have a collective, 
forward-looking responsibility and a duty to change structural oppression. There are 
also notable differences between the two critical alternatives: while both retain the 
focus on the actions and situation of the privileged and the marginalised, Young’s 
social connection model is coloured by Arendt’s insights on political responsibility 
and orientated towards transforming the common world. In contrast, post-
structuralists emphasise personal responsibility orientated by a self-other binary.9 
Both theories provide equally useful ways of conceiving complicity. I evaluate their 
contribution in section 4.2. 
Iris Young’s posthumously published Responsibility for Justice (2011) builds on 
Arendt’s insights into responsibility and complicity. Young takes up Arendt’s 
distinction between guilt and political responsibility to argue that we have a political 
responsibility for changing injustice, even if we cannot be identified as blameworthy 
or culpable.10 Arendt (2003) had argued that under the Nazi regime the possibility of 
claiming neutrality towards the injustices committed decreased significantly. She 
nonetheless insisted that only a small group of people could be claimed to be guilty 
and legally culpable. Arendt instead turned to political responsibility and suggested 
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 Young and her followers do not accept the totalising, general meaning of complicity-as-
being, central to the post-structuralist perspective. Jade Schiff, for example, rejects the 
overwhelming character of foldedness as a pre-condition for taking up responsibility. She 
emphasises that encounters of the other and the responsibility that arises out of them, are 
always situated, dependent on the context and stories we tell ourselves (2014: 26). 
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that humans can have political responsibility in relation to crimes against humanity, 
because of their membership in a political community. 
Young both challenges Arendt’s understanding of responsibility and sets out to show 
that Arendt has a complex conception of political responsibility that accommodates 
her own, different interpretation of responsibility. It is, Young argues, ‘a mystification 
to say that people bear responsibility simply because they are members of a political 
community, and not because of anything at all that they have done or not done’ 
(Young, 2011: 79). Her challenge of Arendt leads us back to the concern with 
complicity as wrongdoing, so central to moral and legal conceptions of complicity. 
Young remains closer to the dominant framework and its focus on complicity as 
attributable to specific contributions, but she explicitly moves beyond a concern with 
culpability and blameworthiness. 
Young’s proposed social connection model of responsibility takes up Arendt’s 
analysis of responsibility in the context of structural social injustice. By this she 
means the systematic ‘domination or deprivation of the means to develop and 
exercise’ the capacities of a large group of people, which enables ‘others to 
dominate or to have a wide range of opportunities’ (Young, 2011: 52). As an 
example, Young relies especially on the systematic exclusion from the housing 
market of the economically vulnerable. This structural injustice is irreducible to 
individuals’ choices or the actions of powerful institutions, for example landlords’ 
associations. Young’s model therefore seeks to understand how humans interact in 
complex ways to produce outcomes they would themselves consider to be unjust 
(2011: 108). 
Young concludes that a suitable response requires collective action to resolve the 
background conditions of injustice. She articulates a shared responsibility by those 
who contribute to structural processes with unjust outcomes. Her notion of 
responsibility falls on anyone, by virtue of the 
‘fact that they are aware moral agents who ought not to be indifferent to the fate 
of others and the danger that states and other organised institutions often pose to 
some people. This responsibility is largely unavoidable in the modern world, 
because we participate in and usually benefit from the operation of these 
institutions’ (2011: 92). 
Thus, while not distributing blame, Young insists that ‘we can and should be 
criticised for not taking action, not taking enough action, taking ineffective action, or 




criticise the others with whom we share responsibility’ (2011: 144). We have an 
imperative to take up political responsibility, which also entails an imperative to 
engage in politics in the first place.11 
Young’s collective responsibility has proven an important starting point for current 
debates about cultivating responsibility for systemic injustice. She elaborates further 
the problems of responsible agency, once separated from questions of guilt, while 
upholding Arendt’s high demands for such responsibility. The scholarship on 
complicity remains largely sympathetic to her approach. A particular concern has 
been the rather abstract and idealised conception of responsible agency. The 
theorists to be discussed in section 4.2 seek to address this point and offer a 
situated conception of agency. In addition, the focus on collective responses to 
structural injustice risks over-emphasising the potential in intersubjectivity at the cost 
of the contribution of structure and agency to social transformation. It reduces 
responsibility to coordinated efforts to change an unjust world. Commentators tend 
to combine Young’s model with a discussion of the responsibility-in-complicity 
approach, to which I turn next. 
Responsibility-in-complicity is the main post-structuralist alternative to the dominant 
moral and legal framework on complicity. Founded on the work of philosophers such 
as Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Emmanuel Levinas, and Gayatri Spivak, the 
post-structuralist alternative conceives of complicity as the practice and theory of 
cultural engagement with others against the background of an unjust past 
(Applebaum, 2010; Farrell, 2014; Sanders, 2002; Sanyal, 2015; Spivak, 1999). The 
model builds on a general idea of affirming complicity as the basic togetherness, 
foldedness, and solidarity of human beings. Challenging the necessary link to legal 
culpability and its retrospective function, complicity ‘is viewed as a way of living and 
working in relations with others that could have positive as well as negative effects’ 
(Laidman, 2016: 69). Thus understood, the term complicity describes above all a 
practice of critical ethical engagement with the other (Morton, 2003: 41; Probyn-
Rapsey, 2007). This conceptual shift has significant implications for identifying 
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first, in the hope that these insights might ensure the effective implementation of collective 
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responsibility. In conceiving complicity primarily in these general terms rather than 
individual acts of aiding wrongdoing, theorists must think about responsibility-for-
complicity as part of our understanding of how humans live together. In contrast to 
Young’s collective approach, this responsibility is largely construed in terms of a 
self-other binary. 
Where the image of contributing to a heist is central to conventional conceptions of 
complicity, the poststructuralist approach works with the image of complicity in 
systemic injustice and violence such as genocide or colonialism. In these contexts, 
complicity can hardly be avoided, and even resistance is framed by the system of 
oppression (Sanyal, 2015: 10f.). Therefore, complicity is ill-defined in terms of 
singular acts of complicity in wrongdoing that could be prevented. It requires instead 
an acknowledgement of the many different, often unintentional ways in which human 
beings contribute to a system of injustice. This is apparent in the context Mark 
Sanders devotes himself to, South Africa’s apartheid regime. Drawing heavily on 
Derrida’s and Levinas’ ethics of deconstruction, he shows how the apartheid regime 
relied on a strategy of denying the togetherness or foldedness of the various South 
African ethnic groups. In response, Sanders (2002: 10) argues that anti-Apartheid 
intellectuals, in their resistance to the state, necessarily became contaminated by its 
workings and, indeed, that their resistance depended on acknowledging that 
complicity. 
This is not to deny that the term ‘complicity’ can serve an important function in 
society by condemning reproachable behaviour, but to turn attention to a general 
meaning of complicity, fruitfully deployable in response to systemic injustices 
(Sanders, 2002: x). Responsibility remains linked with a desire not to be complicit in 
socio-political evil, which is, crucially, embedded in an acceptance of a larger 
complicity, ‘etymologically, a folded-together-ness (com-plic-ity) – in human-being 
(or the being of being human)’ (2002: 5). Mark Sanders (2002: 11) calls this 
‘responsibility-in-complicity’.12 Responsibility-in-complicity has two dimensions. At a 
general level, acknowledging one’s connection to all human affairs becomes the 
pre-condition of taking up responsibility. Through this generalisation, Sanders seeks 
to foreclose any attempt to dis-embed oneself from the unjust system that left 
unchallenged apartheid’s segregation policies. Instead, he identifies the imperative 
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of recognising one’s complicity in and proximity to wrongdoing, including to victims 
and perpetrators. Responsibility-in-complicity also entails an acceptance that acting 
in complicity, in the narrow sense of contributing to an unjust system, cannot be 
eliminated. Resisting systemic injustice often merely amounts to avoiding the worst 
excesses of complicity. The purpose of the responsibility-in-complicity approach is 
therefore to separate out complicity in the general sense, which arises from the 
inevitable interrelationship with the other, from complicities in the narrow sense of 
contributing to wrongdoing. In affirming human foldedness, so the hope, one’s 
relation to wrongdoing are made visible to us and enable a person to acknowledge 
and problematise the ways in which they have helped sustain unjust practices. This 
is the pre-condition for the very possibility of responsibility: 
‘When opposition does not free one from complicity, but depends on it as its 
condition of possibility, responsibility is sharpened. No longer can the intellectual 
[…] simply proclaim his or her opposition. Complicity is to be acknowledged, and, 
when a strategy of demarcation is adopted, responsibility assumed for choosing 
“between … terrifying contaminations”’ (Sanders, 2002: 10). 
This brief outline of the post-structuralist position illustrates well that the main aim of 
this conception is not to provide a simple solution to systemic injustice. At best, as 
condition of the possibility of responsibility, it is hoped that a recognition of human 
foldedness is the first step towards taking appropriate action, by making visible the 
many ways in which the seemingly morally good are entangled in concrete 
instances of moral wrongdoing. The main concern is that this framework over-
emphasises the self-other binary and thus privileges an affirmation of the other over 
the multi-dimensional responses needed for positive social transformation. In 
addition, similar to Young’s model it presupposes responsiveness rather than 
conceptualising it. Scholars who take up this framework thus seek greater clarity on 
the potential for human receptivity to suffering. 
In this section, I have discussed two alternative accounts of responsibility that move 
beyond the dominant legal and moral philosophical liability model. The post-
structuralist responsibility-in-complicity approach turns to the sense of complicity 
inherent in sociability. Mark Sanders in particular examines how people can 
acknowledge the larger foldedness with the other, whether privileged or 
marginalised. Complicity becomes a pre-condition of ethics itself; assuming 
responsibility presupposes the recognition of humans’ proximity to injustices and 
violence. From a different perspective, Young’s social connection model builds on 




responsibility to transform injustice where there is no easily identifiable responsible 
agent. According to her, individuals can be criticised for failing to respond to injustice 
and that responsibility-for-complicity therefore entails acting together politically to 
combat structural injustice. Both avoid the shortcomings of conventional, moral-legal 
philosophical ways of judging complicity and explore different accounts of how 
relationally situated humans encounter and participate in pervasive injustice and 
violence. I therefore take their frameworks as the starting point for thinking through 
the problem of judging responsibility-for-complicity. However, both approaches do 
not fully unpack the difficulties of judging responsibility-for-complicity and do not 
elaborate sufficiently on the challenges of dualism and pluralism that I turn to in the 
last section of the chapter. This becomes clear in relation to an ethics of 




4.2 Duality and the Dispositional Ethics of Responsiveness 
I engage critically with the poststructuralist responsibility-in-complicity account and 
Young’s social connection model through a diverse range of exponents of an ethics 
of responsiveness13, who build on and extend these two theories. The insights will 
serve as a starting point in 4.3, for discussing the potential of a less reductive ethos 
of reality – my proposed solution – for judging complicity in injustice and violence. 
The ethics of responsiveness, framed also as a dispositional ethics of encounter and 
response-ability14, focuses on the challenges of cultivating responsiveness and 
receptivity, when faced with complicity in systemic injustice. Responsiveness is seen 
as a distinct and logically prior problem to taking responsibility that can be 
addressed by taking the concept of ‘responsibility’ back to its etymological Latin 
roots in the verb to ‘respond’, and by shifting our focus on responsibility towards a 
practice of relational, dynamic subjectivity in late modernity (Beausoleil, 2017: 293). 
Proponents of this ethics argue that this lens reveals how Young’s collective 
responsibility and the post-structuralist affirmation of human foldedness raise difficult 
questions about situated human agency and the limits and power of judging and 
acting, which these critical alternatives have not sufficiently addressed. 
More specifically, Schiff (2014) argues that conventional theories of responsibility 
are insufficiently attentive to the dispositional, structural constrains that bad faith (as 
defined by Jean-Paul Sartre), misrecognition (as theorised by Pierre Bourdieu), and 
thoughtlessness (as conceptualised by Hannah Arendt) pose for responses to social 
injustice.15 For, ‘no matter how well-intentioned we are, how conscious of our 
privilege, how attentive to our implication in suffering, we are all still subject to 
powerful temptations to disavow those things’ (2014: 3). Two other scholars, 
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Beausoleil’s (2014, 2017) recent work that emphasises how they can be seen as a 
dispositional ethics of encounter and responsiveness. 
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 Kelly Oliver describes response-ability alongside address-ability as the ‘ability to respond 
to others and oneself’ (2004: 83). 
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in it’ (Schiff, 2014: 54). Bad faith describes why we may choose to be thoughtless, as 
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85). And whereas ‘thoughtlessness entails an incapacity to think and bad faith entails 
choosing to lie to oneself, misrecognition denotes a forgetting of history through which the 




Barbara Applebaum and Clarissa Hayward, additionally foreground Charles Mills’ 
(2007) concept of ‘white ignorance’ as central to understanding the obstacles to 
responsiveness. White ignorance is unlike conventional ignorance, i.e. the absence 
of knowledge: it is ‘a non-knowing, that is not contingent, but in which race – white 
racism and/or white racial domination and their ramifications – plays a crucial causal 
role’ (Mills, 2007: 20).16 Thoughtlessness, bad faith, misrecognition, and ignorance 
are important dispositions that help humans navigate the complex world. They are 
highly problematic in that they engender a flight from reality – understood as hiding 
facts of reality that differ from our vision of the world – and thus from responsibility. 
These dispositions help naturalise structural oppression so that we forget its 
contingency and transformability. 
The ethics of responsiveness recognises that the problem of judging responsibility-
for-complicity is not a matter of insincerity or unwillingness on the part of some 
people. Complicity is not, as I discussed in relation to the dominant framework, an 
intentional, but marginal, contribution to wrongdoing that could be avoided. Instead, 
the ethics of responsiveness captures the complexity of complicity that becomes 
visible when we move away from the image of Enlightenment’s Modern Man, who is 
able to master the external world through rationality, towards a socially embedded, 
late modern person that continues to remain entangled in deeply entrenched forms 
of injustice following a sincere acknowledgement of one’s implication. This human 
confronts the fact that they may not be able to fully grasp their complicity and that 
their unavoidable participation in unjust practices inevitably engenders continued 
disavowal. To accept the situated, relational character of human agency is to 
accommodate that, in Schiff’s terms, it ‘is simply not enough to acknowledge our 
implication in others’ suffering […] For such acknowledgement can be followed, if it 
is not immediately accompanied by, deflections, avoidances, denials, and 
disavowals’ (2014: 39). This may even lead to the following troubling hypothesis: 
what if behaving as a morally good person could actually contribute to the 
oppressive system?17 
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23). 
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The central questions posed by the ethics of responsiveness are: how does the 
situatedness of the privileged constrain and enable their experience of and response 
to the effects of oppression on the disadvantaged, and their implication in that 
domination? How might we affirm situatedness as a starting point for thinking about 
how humans can nonetheless respond more appropriately to their complicity in 
systemic injustice? In response to this problem of responsiveness, Jade Schiff 
directs our attention to how narratives can help humans by revealing the 
contingency of the unjust social arrangements that they are embedded in. Faced by 
the superficiality of supposedly moral behaviour, Barbara Applebaum holds on to the 
critical potential of cultivating responsibility and points to the critical vigilance we 
must incorporate into white pedagogy on racism that might help avoid simplistic 
responses to deeply entrenched racialized structures. Clarissa Hayward, in contrast, 
indicates that the cultivation of responsiveness is more likely to arise out of the 
power of the dominated and seemingly powerless to disrupt habitual action and 
change the incentive structures that facilitate widespread ignorance. Finally, Ella 
Myers advocates a form of collective action as democratic caring for a world in 
common that moves further away from the concern with the self-other relationship. 
Each scholar is thus in different ways attentive to the distinct problem of facing one’s 
implication in the suffering of others. 
Sympathetic to their perspectives, I will go through their arguments separately, as 
each offers a different take on complicity and each comes with new insights. 
Ultimately, in my reading, they all suffer from the same problem: the critical 
alternatives seem to feature an irresolvable tension between the demands of 
transforming injustice and the constraints on human agency. The problem is 
heightened as this ethics paints an image of largely recursive unjust social 
processes, which are unconsciously reproduced by human agents, and the hopeful 
image of receptive agency as the improved engagement with suffering. This tension 
and accompanying image, I conclude, mean that these critical conceptions of 
responsibility-for-complicity bear within them an impulse to seek refuge in a break-
through crisis or other ways of circumventing, rather than accounting for, the 
imbrication of structure and agency and its complex influence on responsibility. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
communicate suffering, has led to the ironic spectatorship of suffering dedicated to 
increasing narcissistic self-expression. This warrants scepticism about the transformative 




4.2.1 Pluralist Narratives and Heightened Vigilance 
As indicated above, Schiff focuses on how bad faith, thoughtlessness and 
misrecognition undermine the link between the everyday life of the privileged and 
the suffering of the exploited. These structural dispositions raise the problem of how 
to affirm human situatedness as a starting point for responsiveness. In response, 
Schiff turns to disruptive moments, cataclysmic events that could potentially expose 
‘conditions of everyday life in which structural injustice and crises take root’ (Schiff, 
2014: 22). Such moments help by showing the contingency of socio-political 
practices, disturbing our sense of ourselves and revealing the often hidden ordinary, 
everyday injustices. Hurricane Katrina or the 2008 financial crisis do not simply 
make us aware of the systemic injustice – racism, poverty etc. – that we fail to 
respond to. They also ideally expose us fully to the circumstances of those 
disadvantaged and our burdens of responsibility for them (2014: 139). Ruptures of 
everyday certainties could help shatter the barriers to responsibility that arise out of 
the naturalisation of injustice and violence, which makes them seem objective facts 
of life, for which no one bears responsibility. The experience of the contingency of 
everyday exploitation, could serve as a stepping stone towards the transformation of 
injustice. 
How aware people are of their implication in suffering, depends, for Schiff, on the 
type of stories we tell about the disruption.18 Her work builds on Arendt scholarship 
on storytelling, and draws attention to the fact that narratives can both facilitate and 
hinder responsiveness: crisis can lead once more to a flight from reality. In order for 
cataclysmic events to facilitate responsiveness, they require first a suitable 
disposition towards recognising the potential of crisis for positive social 
transformation. Schiff directs attention to ironic improvisation in the hope that it 
might prove a suitable source for nurturing a responsive disposition towards 
acknowledging and experiencing our implication in other’s suffering. Improvisation 
links the past to an unfamiliar present and creates something new to face the future. 
It is ironic because it relies on the past in order to achieve novelty. Irony is ‘a critical 
feature of public life because it offers a tentative, improvisatory path forward in and 
after crises, one that entangles the old with the new – our shared histories with our 
collective and uncertain futures’ (2014: 188). A politics of responsiveness 
accordingly entails reflective judgement as improvised telling of stories that reveal 
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the contingency of current public culture (2014: 190). Stories provide a source for 
cultivating responsiveness insofar as they help critically rethink and tell the past, and 
present it in ways that acknowledge the burdens of living a life.19 
Schiff provides a nuanced account of how the privileged could potentially take up 
responsibility following critical moments, such as the 2008 financial crisis, through 
narratives that engage with the contingency of unjust processes and the burdens of 
being human. Yet, her account leaves us with a problematic emphasis on situated 
humans relying primarily on an unconsciously held late modern, capitalist habitus, 
only to be dis-embedded by crisis and an appropriate story, which will hopefully 
stimulate responsibility (cf. Schiff, 2014: 15). Critical realists (cf. Archer, 2010; 
Porpora, 2015) have continuously challenged this reliance on extraordinary crisis for 
reflective and reflexive responsibility to emerge. They suggest that it risks neglecting 
the potential of the continuous re-positioning that constitutes everyday life in a 
complex, partially open social system. Theorists like Schiff fruitfully explore the 
improvisatory capacities of habitus to bridge the gap between expected and actual 
effects of action. Their commitment to a largely unreflective engagement with a late 
modern, capitalist context leaves unanswered the question of where the responsive 
agency originates from. The lack of conscious agency in everyday life means that 
responsiveness scholars seem to presuppose a (fully formed) responsive agency 
that springs into action at the moment of structural incoherency.20 
This is not to reject the importance of crisis and our structurally constrained 
dispositions. It is also not simply a repositioning of the focus back to everyday life 
away from cataclysm. The criticism runs deeper as it challenges the 
conceptualisation of agency that comes with it: for it is by conceptualising 
responsive agency primarily in the vacuum created by structural crisis that Schiff’s 
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risk of failure – experience suffering and act upon it. To avoid this oscillation, they first need 
to provide an account of the emergence of responsive agency, which also includes a 




theory obscures the contribution that both structure and agency always (have to) 
make to social transformation and reproduction. This is the point I seek to advance 
in this chapter. The consequence of Schiff’s argument is a responsive agent who 
relies heavily on autonomous agential capacities, e.g. for receptivity and ironic 
storytelling. Such an account risks ignoring the potential of structures to both resist 
and produce structural injustice. It further risks over-estimating the potential of 
transformation agency provides in times of crisis and following the engagement with 
appropriate stories. Even in these critical moments that counter the reproduction of 
some aspects of society and reveal the contingency of their morphostasis, human 
agency does not act unencumbered. In short, my point is less to discredit the power 
of extraordinary acts and moments of resistance to systemic injustice, but to frame 
them in an appropriate description that accommodates the various dimensions to 
reality, of which humans are one, important, multi-layered source of social 
transformation. What is needed for responsiveness to become a suitable response 
to the problem of how to judge responsibility-for-complicity is a prior engagement 
with the dualism and pluralism of being human. As will become clear in what follows, 
this limitation is not peculiar to Schiff alone, but characteristic of other attempts to 
articulate an ethics of responsiveness. 
Moving on to another strand of this ethics, Applebaum (2010) explores the 
challenges of judging complicity and responsibility as part of white pedagogy. She 
highlights how education traditionally played a crucial role in reproducing white 
ignorance and considers her own experience of students struggling with moving 
beyond the individualist conception of responsibility-for-complicity, familiar from the 
dominant legal and moral framework. Applebaum, like Schiff, turns to Butler’s 
account of vulnerability; however, instead of a focus on ironic narratives about crisis, 
she encourages heightened vigilance. 
Applebaum suggests that, more often than not, being a good, moral agent actually 
prevents a white person from taking up responsibility. A focus on acknowledging 
one’s privilege proves counterproductive, insofar as an emphasis on cultivating 
personal awareness can risk displacing a need to understand and challenge 
systemic injustice. As a matter of fact, taking up responsibility-in-complicity in a 
confessional mode and declaring one’s complicity in general terms, actually helps 
avoid realising the deep, complex ways in which systemic injustice is embedded in 




(Applebaum, 2010: 31).21 In short, Applebaum argues that complicity in the context 
of systemic injustices and oppression, for example racism, is often characterised by 
an inability (and unwillingness) to identify any actual complicity, combined with 
supposedly moral behaviour that helps disavow the need to seriously engage with 
the question of complicity in the first place. 
How, then, can responsibility and complicity come together when faced with a 
morally good white person confessing (publicly) complicity and yet being incapable 
of acknowledging the constitution of whiteness through racism? The question seems 
to raise serious doubts about the responsibility-in-complicity approach, the 
normative potential identified in embracing complicity as human foldedness, on 
which Applebaum’s investigation rests.22 In response, she maintains that 
responsibility-in-complicity can move beyond a concern with a morally flawed self by 
improving our conception of receptivity towards others. Applebaum (2010: 196) 
expands Young’s social connection model through Judith Butler’s work to argue 
that, in the context of white complicity, we should be attentive to how normative 
violence becomes invisible and, in response, cultivate an ethics of non-violence 
through vigilance, critique, humility, and uncertainty. Contra the violence inherent in 
subject-formation, Butler emphasises that we have a responsibility to disrupt the 
closure of how norms are reproduced. Ethics becomes a risk we take upon 
ourselves at the edges of normative frameworks, in challenging even seemingly 
good action by, for example, becoming more willing to listen to the marginalised.23  
In Applebaum’s account, responsibility-in-complicity remains focused on targeting 
individuals and relies on their improvement as the source for broader transformation. 
While a practice of vigilance, critique, humility, and uncertainty could prove 
important in tackling system injustice, they seem to provide a very limited response 
to the depth to ignorance and denial. A focus on responsiveness, particularly along 
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diffuse notion of guilt, e.g. guilt for the terrible crimes committed during the Holocaust, 
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(2007) provocative adoption of Sanders – complicity as pre-condition of ethics itself – as 
leitmotif of her own argument. 
23
 Focus in democratic theory has traditionally been on diverse perspectives appearing or 
being heard, while there has been a recent turn towards also the importance of receptivity 




a cultural dimension, as visible in Sanders’ focus on the anti-Apartheid intellectual 
and in Applebaum’s on pedagogy, appears to be too one-dimensional a response. 
My criticism is here not directed against the refined conception of human capacities 
for critique, or the argument in favour of an openness to listen to the voices of the 
marginalised; nor do I suggest that post-structuralism ignores the need for structural 
transformation altogether. It remains nonetheless unclear how this approach can 
respond to the duality between the inherent incapacity to grasp complicity and the 
need to acknowledge this complicity. Even in its more reflective, continuous 
engagement, it remains unclear how the agent can resolve these omnipresent 
limitations to human agency themselves. Of course, theorists adhering to the 
responsibility-in-complicity account have acknowledged that it does not provide a 
sufficient condition for resolving injustice, only a pre-condition.24 Responsiveness 
may therefore indeed play an important role, but responsibility-in-complicity must 
also think about other sources of tackling structural transformation. I turn to two such 
sources in the following: disruptive politics and collective care for a world. 
 
4.2.2 Disruptive Politics and Democratic Caring  
The third representative of an ethics of responsiveness I focus on, Hayward, seems 
to share my reservations about the capacity of the privileged to experience suffering. 
Her recent article (Hayward, 2017) offers an important alternative: disruptive politics. 
She argues that epistemologies of racial ignorance are not simply a matter of a lack 
of knowledge. Instead, the ignorance of the privileged presents itself as knowledge 
and thus forecloses the possibility of seeing white ignorance for what it is. A wide 
variety of mechanisms and practices secure this false self-perception, including the 
information gate-keeping by powerful members of the dominant groups, internalised 
beliefs and assumptions, and the desire to seem ethical even when we benefit from 
asymmetric advantages (2017: 404). Hayward concludes that alongside a ‘desire to 
see the self as ethical’, on which Young’s model builds, the privileged hold ‘an 
equally powerful desire to avoid relinquishing systematic advantage’ (2017: 407). In 
response, she directs attention not to vulnerability or to improvisatory narratives 
about crisis, but to the potential of the powerless to cause political disruption. The 
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action of, for example, the Black Lives Matter movement provide an important 
means to challenge self-interested ignorance and bring forth positive transformation. 
Hayward’s account seems particularly attuned to the political dimension of injustice. 
She turns to subversive political acts of protest and moves beyond a narrow focus 
on cultivating responsive agency. She clarifies that the purpose cannot be to 
convince the systematically advantaged but to ‘make it all but impossible for the 
privileged to not hear the voices of, to not know the political claims of the oppressed’ 
(Hayward, 2017: 406). Hayward also stresses the partial and temporary effect on 
white ignorance that disruptive politics is likely to have by undermining racial gate-
keeping and disrupting the internalisation of racialized standards and beliefs. 
Ignorance remains an enduring feature of being human. Disruption must therefore, 
Hayward informs us, target directly the incentive structures for racialized ignorance, 
rather than rely on an appeal to judgements on responsibility-for-complicity. 
Disruptive politics must furthermore connect with various other sources of 
transformation that ensure more widespread changes to unjust processes. These 
potentials for change include for Hayward the influence that already motivated 
sympathetic people in positions of power can take, as well as the constraints that 
broader socio-political changes – for example in public opinion – might place on 
actors. 
Hayward’s rejection of privileged cultivation of responsiveness unfortunately leaves 
the commitment to a duality untouched. Disruptive politics remains the source of a 
‘tipping point’ (2017: 406) that helps move people from a disposition of ignorance 
and passive acceptance of the unjust status quo to motivated resistance. Hayward 
holds onto a zero-sum approach to responsive agency and the unjust system in 
which the privileged are either fully incapable or unwilling to respond to injustice or 
fully motivated to do so. Yet, Hayward’s approach does not only encounter the 
problems I identified with Schiff’s argument on pluralist narratives about crisis. The 
scepticism about human’s capacity to judge their responsibility-for-complicity leads 
Hayward to favour strategies that change the privileged masses’ unconscious 
dispositions that kept them passive supporters of the status quo. Hayward suggests 
a change ‘at the level of habit’ which ‘does not require regular conscious thought 
and decision on the part of the relevant agent’, but can be ‘formed and maintained 
by a favourable incentive structure’ (Hayward, 2017: 407). Her argument is therefore 




chapter 2 – who seek to exploit the visceral to manoeuvre politics in the appropriate 
direction. I followed commentators on the turn to ‘neuropolitics’, who embraced the 
importance of the affective and non-conscious dimensions to human agency, but 
who insisted that this move is hostile to the political practices that are irreducible to 
visceral reactions to a social context. Worldly judgement and action may not enable 
a person to realise their white ignorance, a point Hayward astutely makes. Yet, 
politics turns our focus on the well-being of the world that humans together make 
their home and thus avoids a narrow focus on the binary ‘privileged-exploited’ that 
engenders our disavowal and heightens ignorance. This conclusion arises out of the 
work of Ella Myers, the fourth and final contributor to the ethics I wish to evaluate. 
Myers’ turn to Arendt seems to avoid the pitfalls of the ethics of responsiveness that 
I have identified thus far. Myers rejects the narrow focus on a ‘privileged self – 
marginalised other’ and adds a different, Arendtian element to the relationship, a 
care for the worldly things between us. In what follows, however, I will argue that 
she too, fails to fully capture what this self/world/other conception entails – in terms 
of the interplay between structure and agency. 
Myers’ Worldly Ethics (2013, cf. 2008) does not engage directly with the theories on 
complicity central to this chapter, but she offers a sympathetic, critical evaluation of 
a poststructuralist ‘turn to ethics’ from which responsibility-in-complicity emerges. 
Myers juxtaposes her own Arendt-inspired democratic ethos to an ethics of self-care 
(which also relies on the late writings of Foucault) and charitable care as the infinite 
responsibility for an Other (associated with Levinas). She argues that the two 
prioritise the ‘subject question’25. This focus, while undoubtedly of merit, makes their 
frameworks ‘ill-equipped to nourish associative democratic politics. The dyadic 
relations […] narrow attention to the figures of self and Other and obscure the 
worldly contexts that are the actual sites and objects of democratic action’ (Myers, 
2013: 2).26 A focus on the self or Other cannot address the political implications of 
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 Zerilli (2005a: 10) describes the subject question as a concern with the formation of a 
subject and the internal and external forces hindering freedom. 
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 The poststructuralist scholars share with Arendt a rejection of modern strategies of power 
that separate humans from each other, as visible for example in Foucault’s disciplinary and 
biopower. They also share an emphasis on the relational character of human existence, 
even if they ultimately construe it differently. Arendt focuses on the common world between 
humans as, for her, politics is concerned with the shared objects and ideas and not the 
individual qua individual. In contrast, the poststructuralist conception of complicity through 
foldedness with the other is intersubjective in that it is primarily concerned with the people 




oppression, because there 'is little room in these accounts for anything other than 
human selves and others’ (Myers, 2013: 86). In short, they stand accused of failing 
to address the political dimension to being human and its ethical implications. 
The disadvantage of this thinner conception of plurality is that it under-theorises how 
systemic oppression does not simply isolate people, but undermines the possibility 
of collective action to create a meaningful, hospitable world. The problem with 
domination, in other words, is not only the denial of humans’ relational character, but 
the destruction of the possibility of their acting in concert. According to Myers, then, 
in its Foucauldian and Levinasian conception, foldedness cannot capture the 
‘dissociative’ strategies of systemic injustice. They fail to address the ‘associative’ 
response needed to make affirming foldedness a viable option. It is ‘not an adequate 
basis’ as injustices and domination have an affect ‘primarily upon collectivities’ 
(Myers, 2008: 140).27 
Myers’ own solution to this problem is the cultivation of a democratic ethos as a care 
for the world inspired by Arendt's underdeveloped concept of ‘amor mundi’ and care 
ethics. Democratic care for the world is a collaborative effort directed at the things of 
shared interest and concerns. It describes the cultivation of a mutual care for 
human's worldly conditions (Myers, 2013: 87). Democratic care does not amount to 
care for the self and other. Indeed, it might even prove antithetical, requiring 
immediate neglect of a person and their interests. Priority must instead be given to 
creating and protecting a common world that enables people to address their 
perspective on the world together. 
Myers thus adds to the debates on judging responsibility-for-complicity the Arendtian 
emphasis on world-building. She also astutely identifies that care for the world 
entails a recognition that the world is ‘a conditioned and conditioning habitat’ and 
that humans are ‘of the world and not just in it’ (2013: 91). Drawing on Bruno 
Labour's and Jane Bennett's assemblages, Myers emphasises that a worldly thing is 
always shorthand for the larger interplay of things and humans at various levels. 
Care for the world entails an interplay between human agency and other sources of 
power. This re-balancing of worldliness directs attention to the dualism of political 
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on the space of action. 
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judgement and action: both structure and agency play, in principle, equal roles in 
social transformation and reproduction. Myers’ account thus fits well with the critical 
realist tenets this thesis endorses, not least as her expansion of the term worldliness 
refrains from attributing agency to structures and networks, contra Latour and 
Bennett (Myers, 2013: 101f.). The expansion of a notion of agency, as I discussed in 
chapter 3, misconstrues the distinct properties and powers of both structures and 
agency. In shifting the weight away from receptivity and responsiveness, her work 
offers a way forward. 
Myers’ contribution is marred by a relatively short discussion of the interplay of 
structure and agency that frames the cultivation practices of responsibility over time. 
As a consequence, her account largely falls back on the image of a person, or a 
group of people, encountering an unjust world that should be responded to through 
collective action. ‘Care for the world’ remains too unidirectional a concept, reducible 
to ‘collaborative world-centred projects’ (Myers, 2013: 143) and the task of 
specifying ‘features of worldly conditions as the appropriate object’ (2013: 144) of 
our care. I conclude that Myers, too, falls back on the image of a duality and puts 
unwarranted weight on the potential in collective responsibility to tend to the world. 
In sum, section 4.2 highlights the extension of the two main critical alternatives 
through a broad ethics of responsiveness, which provides above all a sustained 
engagement with the structural dispositions that frame the way humans judge 
responsibility-for-complicity. Bad faith, misrecognition, ignorance, and 
thoughtlessness are inevitably part of being human and pose difficult questions 
about humans’ capacity to respond to and experience the suffering of those 
negatively affected by exploitation and domination. In focusing on four 
representatives of the ethics of responsiveness, I showed the multi-faceted 
character of the insights that have thus far come with a turn to responsiveness. 
These scholars turned to the potential of narratives about crisis, vigilant receptivity, 
disruptive politics and a care for the world between us, in order to tackle the 
structural constraints on and dispositional disavowal of responsiveness. Together 
they bring into dialogue key approaches in contemporary political theory to political 
problems that together provide a useful arsenal to tackle responsibility-for-
complicity. 
I argue that, notwithstanding these merits, the problem with the ethics of 




of structurally constrained, oppressive dispositions and responsive agency. Schiff 
relies on crisis to break up dispositional constraints and enable instructive, moral 
narratives including public storytelling. Applebaum puts her hope on a cultural 
transformation via vigilant receptivity. Hayward advocates the breakup of 
dispositions through disruption, and encourages to use the potential of resistance by 
the powerless to affect the non-reflective morally inappropriate habitual behaviour. 
Lastly, Myers focuses on a collective care for the world independently from a self-
other binary, which tends towards acting together upon an unjust world. The 
problem, then, is not that these theorists fail to account for the centrality of structure-
agency to conceptualising responsibility and complicity, but that, in conceiving of 
their relationship as a duality – as opposed to a dualism – they obscure their 
continuous interplay and separation. In order to achieve its potential, an ethics of 
responsiveness needs to move beyond the different ways in which each scholar 
remains wedded to the duality of structurally constrained, oppressive dispositions 





4.3 Judging Responsibility-for-Complicity through an Ethos of Reality 
It is time to go back to the questions I started this chapter with: How should we 
judge our complicity in complex patterns of injustice to enable positive social 
transformation? How can we address mechanisms of disavowal such as 
thoughtlessness, misrecognition, bad faith, and the ignorance that inevitably frame 
how humans respond to enduring injustice? The three positions I identified above as 
most suitably addressing these questions, Young’s social connection model, a post-
structuralist responsibility-in-complicity account, and an ethics of responsiveness, all 
warrant extension in relation to structure and agency. In different ways, they fail to 
address the continuous interplay between structure and agency, that enables 
responsibility to transform society to the better. 
In the following, I explore how the most recent contribution to debates on complicity 
and responsibility, an ethics of responsiveness, can leave behind the duality 
between structure and agency. My aim is to re-orientate the critical alternatives to 
the dominant framework without giving up on their claims of human foldedness and 
collective responsibility, or on the insights into the varied ways in which 
responsiveness could be cultivated. This, I argue, can be achieved by framing the 
ethics of responsiveness through the hybridisation of Arendt’s theorising on 
reflective judgement and Archer’s theoretical insights on the relationship between 
structure and agency. I will briefly outline their hybridisation as the foundation for 
what I term an ethos of reality, before showing the ethos’ potential contribution to 
debates on responsibility and complicity. 
 
4.3.1 Key Features of a less reductive Ethos of Reality 
My formulation of an ethos of reality draws on Arendt’s fragmentary ‘ethic of reality’, 
which I introduced in chapter 1. To reiterate, Patricia Owens has argued that we find 
in Arendt’s work ‘a form of “realism” in which attentiveness to reality itself and the 
cultivation of a character trait in which to face and enlarge one’s sense of reality are 
ends in themselves with serious ethical implications’ (Owens, 2008: 105). Another 
scholar of Arendt’s realism, Rei Terada (2008), challenges suggestions that Arendt 
lacked an ethics to frame her response to Eichmann’s trial, and totalitarianism more 
generally. Rather, Arendt suggests that, when they were most needed, morality and 




(Arendt, 2003: 50). They are therefore better captured using the Greek and Latin 
terms mores and ethos. From this I conclude that an ethos of reality is not a stable 
universal framework of principles but a moving, complex stance towards the world 
that is always prone to failure. 
The concept ‘ethos of reality’ is fundamentally normative, both in the sense that our 
capacity to face up to and come to terms with reality offers the foundation of ethical 
and political considerations and that our stance towards reality is unique to us and 
open to improvement. The thesis focuses on this normative potential, rather than 
seeking to provide a systematic approach to how each of us develops an ethos of 
reality from childhood onwards. Nonetheless, before I explore this normative 
dimension, here are some important markers that delineate my interpretation of 
what an ethos of reality necessarily entails. 
Each of us has a particular ethos of reality, a multi-faceted stance towards the world 
that is the by-product of our everyday engagement with reality. This prism on reality 
patterns the way we respond to demands put on us by our context, whether we 
react positively, negatively, hopefully, out of fear, pro-actively, cautiously, or even do 
not recognise the demand in the first place. We might best think of an ethos of 
reality as combining elements of Archer’s modus vivendi, which arises out of a 
person’s attempts to respond appropriately to all three orders of reality (the natural, 
practical, and social order), and Arendt’s community sense, which is connected to 
the shared meanings in a society. The ethos emerges out of the way we approach 
humans and their individual contributions to our society, the relationships between 
people and the need to act together, the social and cultural structures, and material 
objects that shape the way we make our way through the world and that remain 
outside of our full control. Judgements both provide a source of critical engagement 
with that ethos of reality and are fundamentally shaped by the ethos. 
All stances towards reality are to some extent reflexive, since past deliberations 
affect our position towards the future and humans always converse internally even if 
that conversation bears little on the acts pursued. Our ethos is therefore positional, 
an expression of our position in relation to the world; it is also relational, embodied, 
and emotional. The ethos is structured by a person’s context, but it is also distinctly 
individual, subjective and causally efficacious. It crystallises as we seek to complete 
the mundane tasks of our life, including eating or working, just as much as when we 




how society should tackle issues of common interest, e.g. social injustice. Some 
activities may, of course, be particularly relevant for the development of an ethos in 
that they directly concern someone’s engagement with a shared reality and what a 
political community has in common. Yet, it will ultimately depend on the particular 
person, their background, and the people around them, as to what has (had) the 
most influence on their individual way of engaging with the world. 
My conception of an ethos thus shares affinities with the dispositional ethics of 
responsiveness in that I reject conceptualising responsibility in terms of universal 
moral standards and focus our attention on the practice of situated human agency. 
Unlike the ethics’ orientation towards the suffering of others, however, the ethos 
concerns our ability to come to terms with reality – as an ethically distinct, prior 
problem. Returning to Owens’ quote, in what follows I seek to substantiate what 
‘attentiveness to reality itself’ and ‘the cultivation of a character trait in which to face 
and enlarge one’s sense of reality’ as ends in themselves mean. 
Throughout the previous chapters, I highlighted two facts of the human condition 
that are central to our establishment of a sense of reality: the vexatious fact of social 
conditioning and the fact of human plurality. My hybrid account follows Arendt and 
Archer in their concern with widespread modern and late-modern strategies, e.g. 
positivism and scientism, orientated towards the denial of these facts in society and 
social science. The first fact describes humans’ experience of reality through the 
interplay of structures with human agency, the coming together of objective and 
subjective dimensions to reality. Archer terms the first fact the ‘vexatious’ fact of 
social reality, as ‘it is part and parcel of daily experience to feel both free and 
enchained, capable of shaping our own future and yet confronted by towering, 
seemingly impersonal constraints’ (1995: 65). This fact is easily undermined by 
modern conflationist28 strategies to overemphasise either structure or agency, which 
we encountered in this chapter in the form of a duality and in methodological 
individualism. The challenge is therefore to accommodate and explain both: genuine 
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experiences of agential and structural possibilities and constraints to making our 
way through the world. A suitable response to the vexatious fact of social reality 
must promote a possible objectivism and subjectivism, literally a subject- and object-
focus. By this I mean, that theorists and judge alike must account for a multi-layered, 
mind-independent reality that is shaped by unobservable mechanisms and a 
stratified agent that is embodied, relational, emotional, with a sense of self and the 
capacity to mediate the internal and external world through an internal conversation. 
The second fact of the human condition is that humans – in plural – share a world 
which, as world in common, can give their lives meaning. Arendtian scholars term 
the normative implications that arise out of the second fact ‘worldliness’. Worldliness 
is at risk if we reduce human plurality to a focus on individual or aggregate 
concerns. Attentiveness to the plural fact of human existence, as I argued in chapter 
1, entails an awareness of both the distinctiveness and sameness of human agency, 
and the existence of a common world that needs to be continuously rebuilt and 
protected. The three features of Arendt’s thicker notion of plurality – sameness, 
distinction, and common world – are best thought in relation to her metaphor of the 
common world as a table (Arendt, 1998: 108). A table both provides a physical 
connection between people who are sat around it and keeps them at a distance by 
providing a separation between them. Without that table, or generally any object or 
material that divides and connects, people sitting at a distance from each other 
would seem to some extent disconnected. In choosing to sit closer together to 
bridge the empty space between them, they would lose their ability to both share 
views and remain at a sufficiently critical distance from each other. The common 
world as a table both holds humans together, ensuring that they remain connected 
through shared concerns and interests, and separates them sufficiently, to protect 
their distinct standpoints from forced convergence, as visible, for Arendt, in mass 
society. 
The metaphor of the table reveals the intimate relationship between the reduction of 
plurality and the conflation of the emergent properties and powers of structure and 
agency that I seek to highlight. To uphold plurality and the importance of a shared, 
common world requires that other elements of society, structures and other humans, 
are given equal weight in explanations alongside any one, judging individual. This is, 
of course, what individualism traditionally failed to do, due to its reduction of social 




plurality and the importance of a shared, common world requires a serious 
engagement with the simultaneous separation and interplay of structure and 
agency. Put provocatively, on the one hand to embrace Arendtian pluralism without 
a focus on the interplay of the distinct causal contributions of structure and agency 
risks conflationism. Conflationism obscures what pluralism entails, i.e. not just a 
plurality of perspectives but a common world that arises out of confronting similar 
objects and events that shape interrelated interests and concerns. On the other 
hand, a focus on the dualism of structure and agency, without analysis of what it 
means to have a world in common, risks reductionism. Reductionism obscures 
social conditioning, thus it fails to capture an important part of social reality. It is by 
pointing to the necessity of avoiding both these pitfalls for an ethos of reality that this 
dissertation contributes a fresh perspective to the literature. 
So how might one respond to these pitfalls through a less reductive ethos of reality? 
Central to both Arendt’s and Archer’s work is the recuperation of being human 
through anti-foundational approaches that propose analytical dualism and 
worldliness as key concepts. The two thinkers’ answer can however surely not lie in 
a maxim of incorporating as much complexity as possible along the two dimensions 
– dualism and pluralism – to human experience. An ethos of reality is not a 
requirement to incorporate as many different perspectives as possible, which so 
often comes with claims to increased objectivity and validity. Nor does it require a 
hunt for ever increasing knowledge of the numerous dimensions to being human – 
although complexity and such knowledge can be beneficial. Such a maxim could 
prove counterproductive, by paralysing judgement.29 
Judging politically, humans should instead ask themselves what the costs of 
reducing reality in its dualism and pluralism are and, indeed, whether we can even 
make claims about the costs in light of the unexpected consequences judgement 
and action inevitably hold. A less reductive ethos of reality does not propose 
‘attentiveness to a multi-layered reality’ as a general standard of judgement, but first 
and foremost as an awareness of the heavy price we incur as human beings when 
we fail to account for the vexatious – that society shapes us and we shape society – 
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and worldly – that humans come to terms with the world together – character of 
being human. 
To ask these questions is not to deny that humans continuously emphasise some 
aspects of reality over others in their everyday practices of judging. Indeed, the need 
to judge and reflect on the world arises in the first place, to articulate what is 
important and of interest to us, in the hope that this reduction of a reality that we can 
never fully understand, may make our lives sufficiently meaningful and enable us to 
make our way through the world. The cultivation of a (routinized) ethos of reality 
similarly helps us to simplify the world we encounter, in an effort to grasp complex 
developments without dedicating all of our time to them. To avoid judging altogether, 
and acting on these judgements, would therefore be dangerous. Yet, telling a lie, 
printing a polemic review, or ignoring the suffering of another, may not only (or 
primarily) be problematic because they disadvantage some and privilege others. 
Instead, in seeking to mould, and thus reduce, the world to our preferred vision of it, 
reductionism of reality has proven exceptionally dangerous to the possibility of 
meaningful human existence. Key to responding to ethico-political problems is 
therefore an effort to disentangle the necessary and inevitable ways in which we 
simplify our understanding (and the actual character) of reality, and the pernicious 
reductions of the interplay between structure, agency, and plurality, or dualism and 
pluralism, that endanger the common world. 
 
4.3.2 Implications for Responsibility-for-Complicity 
Up to this point I have sought to delineate in broad strokes what an ethos of reality 
ought to (or ought not to) entail. I am now in a position to sketch the role that a less 
reductive ethos of reality could play in judging responsibility-for-complicity. To get a 
sense of the shift in judgement on complicity this thesis is proposing, let me begin 
with an illustrative example – complicity in the use of plastic in the food and drink 
industry. At the most basic level, the problem is as follows: every year, large 
amounts of plastic, for example in the form of plastic bottles, are not recycled and 
end up in the ocean, causing the death of animals, which either get entangled in the 
plastic or digest it. In light of this problem, how should we, e.g. consumers, judge our 
responsibility-for-complicity? Here is a brief summary of the different possible 
responses discussed thus far. If we subscribe to the legal-moral philosophical way 




focus on those that are clearly identifiable as contributing to wrongdoing. We identify 
a clear-cut wrong – the long-lasting effects of plastic on the environment – and 
specific, powerful actors that sustain it, e.g. the wilful action of consumers who 
should know better than to buy products that require plastic packaging. If instead we 
turn to the social connection model, our focus lies less on identifying culpability and 
instead on how we can act collectively to reduce the use of plastic. As supporters of 
the responsibility-in-complicity approach, we focus on our embeddedness in a 
plastic-dependent economic system and affirm our connectedness with those 
directly affected by the plastic pollution, in order to find ways of reducing the use of 
plastic. Finally, if we have been influenced by the ethics of responsiveness, we are 
concerned with finding ways of cultivating human receptivity to the damage caused 
by plastic that are sensitive to the dispositions preventing us from identifying 
alternatives to heavy plastic use. 
These different responses will likely be familiar to readers of this thesis, based on 
their own discussions about the use of plastic bottles and other forms of injustice. 
Indeed, the critical approaches I examined in this chapter have an important role to 
play in addressing injustice and complicity – once they are freed from the reductive 
strategies identified throughout this chapter. The purpose of this thesis is not to deny 
the value of approaches that tackle complicity directly, for example by highlighting 
ways in which we can reuse plastic bags. I also accept that in judging responsibility-
for-complicity we are often confronted with information – the shocking images of 
animals dying because of plastic pollution brought to a global audience by the BBC 
documentary Blue Planet 2 – that makes us spring into action. In judging 
responsibility-for-complicity, we nonetheless have to be aware of the limitations to 
responses that are directed to whatever we feel passionate about or the specific 
injustices that catch our attention. 
Immediate responses to suffering can be counterproductive to assuming 
responsibility, because there is no necessary causal link between receptivity and 
positive social transformation. On the contrary, humans have finite resources, e.g. 
time and money, and the time we spent in trying to find products without plastic 
packaging is likely to affect our ability to care for other issues. Attentiveness to one 
problem is therefore likely to come at the detriment of tackling the numerous other 
injustices that we are implicated in. A concern with finding temporary solutions may 




injustice. Furthermore, the reactions are often a means by which the privileged 
maintain their ethical appearance of being good people, without showing any real 
willingness to make necessary changes to their life-style. These and many other 
concerns animate the ethics of responsiveness. However, in order to avoid its turn 
to a duality of structure-agency, we need to move away from an immediate concern 
with suffering and injustice towards a care for the common world on which our 
capacity to identify adequate responses to injustice rests. In doing so, I do not claim 
that we can fully overcome these tensions and problems, quite the opposite. 
However, we can hopefully contribute to creating a framework through which a 
community is better able to recognise the potentials and limitations available in a 
society for positive transformation. 
The thesis proposes that judgements on complicity in the food and drink industry’s 
plastic waste should be dedicated to establishing an improved ethos of reality. Any 
effort to take up responsibility is preceded by the questions ‘how do we engage with 
this and other problems?’ and ‘what exactly does this problem entail?’.30 These 
questions should not be confused with or reduced to the questions about how to 
formulate a positive relationship between receptivity and human situatedness, 
highlighted in relation to the ethics of responsiveness above. Instead, they direct our 
attention to the state of the common world through which we experience and come 
to judge reality. Common world is not the same as ‘reality’; it refers to the objects, 
structures, culture and interactions that become common by viewing and judging 
them in relation to the plurality of distinct perspectives in a community. Two points 
are important here that I have discussed throughout this thesis: firstly, that 
commonness is both an ontological fact and an achievement, arising out of realising 
the potential in human plurality; secondly, that the common world is multi-layered, 
constituted equally by objective, subjective, and intersubjective causal powers and 
mechanisms. 
The concept ‘ethos of reality’ captures the challenge of developing a sense of reality 
attentive to the dualism and pluralism that arises out of the vexatious and worldly 
character of human existence. In other words, it directs our attention to the need to 
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ontological and epistemological problem, which helps avoid that judging responsibility-for-
complicity falls back on an impossible subjectivism. The double focus is a consequence of 
the interrelationship between our sense of reality and the common world – one cannot be 




cultivate a stance that affirms a multi-layered, shared reality and cares for how this 
reality becomes a hospitable world-in-common. Judgement contributes to this 
project through its orientation towards how structure, agency, and plurality 
simultaneously and continuously shape the common world, as the prism through 
which to judge political problems. I therefore suggest that judgements should take 
complicity in injustice as a starting point to think about how structure, agency, and 
plurality together diminish and impoverish, and lead to a more hospitable, 
flourishing, common world.31 The following discussion goes through this theoretical 
framework in more detail. 
First, we need to understand what a care for the world orientated towards the 
potential in plurality, structure, and agency, could look like. My summary of Myers’ 
work has already given us a sense of how caring for the common world differs from 
other approaches to injustice and receptivity. However, Myers’ care for the world 
tends towards an emphasis on collective action upon the world. She therefore does 
not yet help us capture concretely how a person should respond to plastic waste as 
her account falls back on how we can act together to improve the world. To solve 
this problem, I turn to Archer’s (2014b) brief discussion of responses to complicity in 
market harms to distant others, which offers an important theoretical extension of 
the ethics of responsiveness approach by focusing on how structural and agential 
powers together could potentially contribute to taking responsibility. While she, too, 
embraces the potential of late modern receptivity and of collective responsibility, her 
analysis of responsibility-for-complicity addresses systematically the ‘who’, ‘what’, 
‘how’, ‘when’, and ‘where’ of social transformation. 
Archer asks that we consider how structures like the capitalist market condition 
action through restriction, enablement, and incentives, producing benefits, harms, 
and practices that frame – without determining – human’s care for distant others. 
Vested interests, opportunity costs, and the situational logic of action go far to 
explain the lack of help for the marginalised and oppressed, including distant others. 
Proximate privileging over the distant other may here beset those seeking to change 
systemic injustice, as well as those ignoring complicity. As a consequence, Archer 
initially attributes responsibility to those with the greatest freedom and potential for 
influencing a positive transformation, but also warns against reliance on powerful 
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good people. Such an approach ignores the multiple layers of social reality. It 
endorses the ‘very individualism that is at the heart of the crisis’ and rests ‘on the old 
fallacy that good people make for a good society, which denies emergent structures 
any role in shaping societal outcomes’ (Archer, 2014b: 34). An approach to 
responsibility and complicity must instead focus on both the context and actors, in 
short on dualism. 
To capture alternative ways of dealing with responsibility, Archer focuses on the late 
modern dynamic of different modes of reflexivity addressed in chapter 3. A person’s 
way of thinking is the outcome of the continuous interplay between personal 
concerns and social contexts. While we use different modes of reflexivity depending 
on the circumstances, humans for Archer hold a dominant mode – communicative, 
autonomous, meta-, and fractured reflexivity – which comes to bear on our ethical 
stances and moral outlook on society. In current Western late modern democracies, 
communicative reflexives’ moral communitarianism and autonomous reflexives’ 
libertarian stances provide opposing influences. The former hold on to collectivist 
values and seek to strengthen social integration, while the latter embrace economic 
productivity and adhere to individualism. Those judging responsibility-for-complicity 
might therefore focus on the decline in communicative reflexives, which comes with 
the erosion of traditional forms of solidarity in society. What a person draws from 
these shifts in late modernity is dependent on their own reflexivity, but the decline 
also highlights that we can no longer rely on traditional responses to suffering. 
Alternatively, we might turn in hope to the changes in the way young autonomous 
reflexives think about capitalism, e.g. ‘responsible enterprise’. The question remains 
to what extent ‘sandpapering away the rougher edges of the profit motive’ (Archer, 
2014b: 46) provides a key source of responding to complicity. Of particular interest 
for responses to complicity is instead the likely future dominance of meta-reflexives 
in society. 
Meta-reflexives reject the ethical stances of autonomous and communicative 
reflexives, but their contribution to social transformation has not yet reached its full 
potential (2014b: 38). Their reflexive stance towards society combines with the 
transformative potential that arises from an increased synergy between generative 
mechanisms in the cultural and structural sphere characterising the move towards 
morphogenic society. Heightened transformations of both structures and the 




opportunities available in a society. This variety means that the function of the 
internal conversation has to change, too. In the past, with adulthood, humans 
tended to develop a modus vivendi as a relatively stable formulation of one’s stance 
towards a social context. Current conditions demand a modus vivendi that is 
unstable, re-positioning and changing according to the developments in culture and 
of structures.32 
Late modernity’s globalisation and the increase in meta-reflexivity could thus be 
looked at as the hoped-for potential for social transformation. Young meta-reflexives 
have the potential to embrace new variations of social formations and break with the 
logic of competition and zero-sum market dynamics. They reveal that there are 
alternatives to the paradigm of profit-maximisation, even if this impetus expresses 
itself, as yet, primarily in the third sector and is easily co-opted by market and state. 
Archer also cautions that responsiveness to harm caused against distant others 
remain of little concern to the privileged. Moral responsibility for the poorest in the 
market seems ‘to be confined to the most proximate and most visible poor where 
offering a “better deal” can, with suitable media exposure, even become a new form 
of market competition’ (Archer, 2014b: 49f.).33 
Archer’s theoretical discussion of responses to complicity in market harms gives us 
a sense of how humans could respond to complicity to create a more suitable 
common world. She emphasises collective responsibility contra legal and moral 
philosophical accounts of culpability and highlights the need to take the contribution 
of both structure and agency into account when we judge responsibility-for-
complicity. Otherwise, Archer warns us, we risk falling for the individualism that is at 
the root of capitalism. Her account fruitfully substantiates and balances Myers’ 
worldly care ethics. We might turn to the combined potential in meta-reflexivity, late 
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 The move from large-scale ethical and moral frameworks to an ethics of responsiveness 
illustrates the changing circumstances; this modus most closely resembles the one 
developed by meta-reflexivity. 
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 Critics might suggest that this account relies similarly on an account of structural crisis that 
overemphasises, at times, the potential of reflexive agency. One might wonder: is it not the 
case that Archer is inattentive to the structural consistency with which capitalism maintains 
itself and the deep socio-political crises that continue to endanger meaningful human 
existence? Hartmut Rosa in particular argues that Archer’s emphasis on the morphogenesis 
of late modernity obscures the underlying morphostasis of capitalist societies, where the 
need for transformation becomes the precondition of modern morphostasis (Rosa, 2017). 
However, even if the potential may be more limited than Archer imagines, the crucial point is 
that she identifies a way of turning to break-through moments without relying on their ability 




modern morphogenesis and the potential in social movements to provide a different 
vision of what the common world could and should look like. I now turn back to the 
plastic example, mapping out how we judge the impoverishment and flourishing of a 
common world by identifying the simultaneous and continuous contributions of 
structure, agency, and plurality. 
As we seek to judge responsibility-for-complicity, we need to consider the aspects of 
our social context that impoverish the common world. A world in common is 
diminished when it no longer supports its members in addressing the vexatious and 
worldly character of reality through the combined contribution of structure, agency, 
and plurality. Recent political events prove illuminating, whether it is the 
Charlottesville riots in 2017, surrounding the planned removal of a statue 
commemorating the Confederates, the xenophobic attacks on migrants in Germany, 
or the Yellow Vests protests in France. They highlight the troubling consequences of 
living in a society in which sections of the population no longer seem able to rely on 
a common world through which to express their disagreements. The problem is not 
the lack of a shared framework of rational standards that could help adjudicate 
between different claims on reality, or an unwillingness of the ‘left’ and the ‘right’ to 
compromise. Instead, the sections of the population in conflict no longer seem to be 
able to think representatively from different viewpoints – a precondition of a shared 
world – which leads to an ‘us-versus-them’ mentality that facilitates injustice and 
oppression on a mass scale. This situation is reminiscent of what Arendt identified 
as the ‘irritating incompatibility between the actual power of modern man […] and 
the impotence of modern men to live in, and understand the sense of, a world which 
their strength has established’ (Arendt, 1973: viii). 
One of the ways through which this impoverishment occurs is through the reduction 
and distortion of one (or more) of the three components, structure, agency, and 
plurality. Arendt and Archer add invaluable insights on forms of reductionism, as 
they challenge modern phenomena including mass society, totalitarianism, 
scientism, positivism, capitalism and conflationism in social theory. The proponents 
of an ethics of responsiveness similarly make an important contribution to this 
project, by identifying ways in which humans disavow complicity through bad faith, 
misrecognition, thoughtlessness, and ignorance as part of capitalist and racist 
systems of domination and exploitation. In response, we need to cultivate an ethos 




and plurality negatively impact on a multi-layered reality and affect the capacity to 
share a world. We need to ask a number of questions as we confront plastic waste: 
how are we, as agents capable of emotionality, reflexivity and social innovation, 
contributing to and denying our complicity in this specific unjust practice? What are 
the distinctly agential contributions I make to the endurance of plastic waste 
production, e.g. how does my way of thinking affect my complicity and 
responsibility? What are the reductive stories that I tell to justify my complicity? What 
are the structures that we identify as forcing us to become complicit? To what extent 
are they beyond our reach for the purpose of transformation? How do we respond to 
them? And, what are the contributions of others – my friends and family, my 
employers, co-workers and various socio-economic and political organisations – and 
how have we together failed to create a world in which ‘the burdens of living 
together’ are ‘distributed more evenly’ (Schiff, 2014: 9)? 
How we respond to these questions is ultimately a matter of receptivity. However, 
only in learning to ask these kinds of questions can we avoid the reductionism that 
facilitates oppression and injustice.34 They help us attend to limited and distorted 
forms of interaction or collective action that engender our complicity in plastic waste. 
Thus, we might highlight how plastic pollution is accompanied by reductive 
strategies and narratives that undermine our capacity to act and judge politically. 
The use of plastic waste combines with various mechanisms that prevent discussion 
about how we as a (global) community can reduce plastic waste at a regional, 
national, or international level. Instead, the problem is largely left to political 
regulation at nation-state level, individual responses, or social movements – all of 
which have an important role to play but are only micro-cosmic expressions of the 
kind of potential a concerted effort could bring to tackling the multiple issues 
surrounding climate change (plurality). The questions also help us focus on the 
structures and culture that engender plastic waste, e.g. a consumerism that relies on 
one-time use of containers (structure). Finally, they make us sensitive to the ways 
our individual capacities as human beings facilitate this problem, e.g. the denial that 
our use of plastic bags can have a significant role to play in damaging the 
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 The emphasis on asking questions should not lead to the assumption that I am 
presupposing extensive moral deliberation. Instead, what I have in mind is a practice in 
which embodied and reflexive dimensions to human agency take part and through which we 
learn to position ourselves towards a stratified reality and attend to its vexatious and worldly 
character. This may at times require explicitly asking these kinds of questions, but often it is 




environment (agency). The point here is less to come up with a comprehensive 
analysis of the reductions and impoverishments of the common world along each 
dimension, but to learn to judge and experience the world along all three 
components. 
We also need to gain a greater awareness of the way that the reductionism along 
these three components affects the world in common. In the case chosen this 
seems fairly straightforward: plastic in the ocean creates a deeply hostile 
environment, not least by damaging the global food chain, with as yet unforeseeable 
negative consequences for humans. Yet, further questions can be raised, including: 
is plastic waste a key way in which the common world is impoverished? Are there 
other mechanisms and powers that we obscure by focusing on plastic? These kinds 
of questions can ultimately only be answered as part of a political community that 
judges what makes their lives meaningful and what endangers their continued 
common existence. Judgements can help by framing action in ways that are 
attentive to the importance of the common world and its multi-layered character. 
As the second objective of a less reductive ethos of reality, we need to learn to 
identify the specific aspects of our social context that (could) enable a flourishing, 
hospitable common world. What are the structures, the powers of agency, and the 
manifestations of human plurality that together shape a better world? How have we 
managed to keep in sight these three contributions, as a key way in which a 
common world can be improved? It entails a focus on plurality, visible in numerous 
collaborative efforts to counter injustice including attempts to build floating structures 
that remove plastic from the oceans (Ocean Clean Up). The objective is less to 
encourage people to invest more in these foundations, but to draw on and learn 
from positive examples of acting-in-concert. Each of us should ask ourselves, how 
do we interact with others, and what positive effect on the world as a common reality 
does this interaction have? 
We also need to find a more responsive approach to the way that the world shapes 
us, or risk falling back on individuals acting upon the world. Tracking the negative 
effect of human activities on nature, e.g. by calculating the cost of one ton of carbon 
emissions on the environment, is an important step towards a more appropriate 
engagement with the world. However, the approach ultimately remains entangled in 
an attitude towards nature that sees it primarily as an instrument and resource – to 




the role that materiality and social and cultural structures play in shaping our 
context. The various projects dedicated to identifying nature-based solutions to 
injustice, are an example of this: the fact that plastic floats on water is key to current 
efforts to clean up the ocean. An appropriate judgement accommodates this role of 
structures alongside the potential in human plurality and avoids reducing the positive 
examples of responding to climate change to solidarity and collective responses. 
The second objective of a less reductive ethos of reality furthermore requires more 
than the embrace of the potential in natural and social structures. It is about 
recognising a world that is stratified, in which relatively enduring relations and ideas 
shape humans and the social positions they inhabit in society. We need to develop 
an awareness of the history of emergence of different material and ideational 
conditions of how we act. This is again less about learning the history of particular 
generative mechanisms, although this may prove helpful, e.g. ‘where did the 
paradigm of profit-maximisation come from?’, ‘what kind of alternatives existed in 
the past?’, ‘why is it so pervasive and long-lasting?’. Instead, it is by learning how 
such mechanisms shape a world that we recognise as flourishing that we can 
respond to our complicity in injustice. There is undoubtedly an overlap between my 
approach and the concern with receptivity of the ethics of responsiveness, but to 
attend to structures means to clearly separate out our capacity for embodied 
receptivity towards the world and the potential for social transformation in the world. 
Finally, we also need to attend to how humans make their way through the world by 
relying on reflexivity, embodiment, a sense of oneself, and creativity/natality.35 My 
discussion of Archer’s insights on complicity in market harms helped capture how 
we can recognise potential subjective contributions to social transformation without 
falling for individualism or reducing these agential powers and mechanisms to 
broader narratives of ‘the social’. The reconstruction of a turn to the emotional and 
unconscious layers to judgement and to imagination in chapter 2 similarly added 
insights into how a different relationship with human agency can facilitate a more 
suitable way of living together. In relation to the clean-up project we might therefore 
ask what the researchers and supporters of the project bring in passion and 
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respond to the same objective circumstances’. This enables us ‘to explain the universal 




dedication to the realisation of the project, alongside the potential of structure and 
plurality. 
A suitable account of responsibility and practice of judging responsibility situates our 
response to plastic waste in a multi-layered context. Social injustice is not 
transformed by one decision alone, and the cultivation of an ethos of reality is an 
open-ended process that continues throughout our lives and cannot be completed 
easily or quickly. In some ways, therefore, I am being much more demanding than 
the responsiveness approach, which seemingly offers us a (conditional) ‘way out’ 
through increased receptivity and moments of rupture. We might therefore be 
worried that my approach encourages denial of responsibility. Any response to 
complicity may seem daunting or unlikely, particularly in light of the various 
mechanisms of human disavowal. Humans largely grapple with injustice in relation 
to everyday activities that already make (some of) us feel conflicted and which catch 
us between a desire to flee our responsibility, a shameful recognition of our 
complicity, and the seemingly insurmountable demands of late modern economies. 
But the broad scale of this project is also an opportunity: we are able to help create 
a better common world, because the vexatious and worldly character is something 
we grapple with every day, even when it seems so easy to ignore the suffering of 
others. Those seemingly most adapt at circumventing any responsibility for suffering 
still pursue some form of reflection on their engagement with reality, which is 
therefore always open to improvement. The weight of responsibility is also divided 
more evenly. The advantage of the framework is that it allows for both the 
transformation and the reproduction of oppression to come from various sources, 
often in unexpected ways; it strengthens the role of agency – the potential of a love 
of the world that actively faces up to the multi-layered, shared character of reality – 
without thereby neglecting structures. Structures and plurality contribute to invoking 
positive social transformation. States and non-governmental organisations have a 
role to play in tackling complicity, alongside self-improvement. Finally, the 
continuous process of cultivating an ethos also means that it is less about getting 
each and every situation right and more about developing a long-term stance that is 
more adept to a care for a multi-layered reality and supports a public sphere that 
enables such worldly caring. This care will look differently for each person and must 




In sum, central to our ability to judge responsibility-for-complicity is an ethos of 
reality. The ethos provides a prism on the world that ideally ensures that taking up 
collective responsibility, acknowledging human foldedness, and cultivating 
responsiveness towards suffering tackles the root causes of injustice and 
contributes to social transformation. To this end, judgements must be orientated 
towards the well-being of the common world, the space constituted by evaluating 
shared appearances, through which we can give life meaning. This thesis has 
highlighted that this necessarily entails an equal focus on the objective, subjective, 
and intersubjective mechanisms and powers that together constitute the common 
world. Of course, how concretely an ethos of reality actually looks like is fully 
dependent on the person, their modus vivendi, social position, context, and common 
sense. For this reason, I turn to two exemplary judgements that express this world-
disclosing capacity of judgement in important ways and help breathe life into the 
theoretical observations. 
 
4.3.3 Judging DAIA’s Distorted Ethos of Reality 
To illustrate the benefits of the theoretical considerations put forward in this chapter, 
I conclude by introducing the case of the main Jewish political organisation in 
Argentina, DAIA, juxtaposed to a Jewish resistance fighter, Marshall Meyer, during 
the Argentinean dictatorship (1976-1983). At first glance, this seems a very obvious 
and extreme case of responsibility and complicity. While not necessarily legally 
culpable, the DAIA could be considered morally responsible for actions that 
contributed to the violence committed by the dictatorship against parts of the Jewish 
community. Meyer, on the other hand, seems a good example of how to cultivate 
responsiveness in dire circumstances and at high personal cost. In my reading, the 
case offers a particularly difficult example of complicity that requires a careful 
consideration of individual, collective, and institutional forms of agency36 as well as 
of numerous structural layers over a long period of time. An integrated analysis of 
these agentic and structural forces prevents any simple judgement of complicity and 
responsibility. In other words, a suitable ethos of reality is needed, if we wish to 
make concrete judgements on complicity and responsibility that do not 
systematically conflate the interplay of structure, agency, and plurality. Using the 
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toolkit of an ethos of reality, I identify an organisation that developed an 
impoverished ethos of reality over time, which ultimately made it unlikely that they 
judge complicity appropriately. It also helps me to show that the movement towards 
this ethos entailed a complex interplay of structure, agency, and plurality that may 
not have been problematic of themselves, but further determined the failure to judge 
complicity when it mattered. 
The purpose of discussing the Argentinean case is not to provide clear-cut action-
guiding principles that the reader might seek to implement in their everyday lives. 
Instead, what I have in mind in putting forward practical examples here and in 
chapter 5, is to facilitate stories of political actors that acknowledged (or failed to 
acknowledge) complicity and responsibility, which could serve as vehicles for our 
own judgements on complicity.37 The choice of two extreme examples creates a 
sufficient gap between the reader of this thesis’ (likely) experience of complicity and 
responsibility and the actions and judgements of the protagonists, enabling a 
creative and critical engagement with the problem of judging responsibility-for-
complicit. In judging the DAIA, I rely on existing, sophisticated approaches to the 
case study, especially the in-depth analyses of archival material, interviews and 
documents collected in Paul Katz (2011), Marguerite Feitlowitz (2011), and Estelle 
Tarica (2012). Where not stated otherwise, my reconstruction follows their 
judgements closely, although I frame the discussion using the toolkit developed in 
this thesis, i.e. I identify an impoverished and distorted ethos of reality. The purpose 
of the reconstruction is thus less to shed new light on the DAIA’s role during the 
dictatorship, contrasted with that of Meyer, but to think about how we, removed from 
the difficult political circumstances, should judge responsibility-for-complicity to 
cultivate a suitable engagement with our reality and the challenges of complicity 
expressed in this case. The emphasis is therefore on illustrating the way such a 
case should ideally be approached in theory.38 
First, a brief summary of the key features of the case of the DAIA: The Delegation of 
Argentine Jewish Associations, DAIA, was formed in 1935 to protect the Jewish 
community from Nazi-inspired violence in Argentina. Successfully opposing anti-
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Semitism, the DAIA quickly became the proponent of a particular idea of the Jewish 
community, favouring Zionism and the exclusion of communists (Feitlowitz, 2011; 
Schenkolewski‐Kroll, 1991). It enjoyed unique success as the largest Jewish 
community in Latin America, but remained endangered by deeply entrenched 
Argentine anti-Semitism, which saw Jews excluded from all major positions in 
society (Elkin, 1986; Feldstein and Acosta-Alzuru, 2003).  
Between 1976 and 1983, Argentina was ruled by a military dictatorship that relied on 
a violent strategy of social exclusion. The military junta set in motion a National 
Reorganisation Process – today dubbed Argentine’s ‘dirty war’ – that involved the 
‘disappearance’, torture and murder, of tens of thousands of so-called subversives 
(Humphrey and Valverde, 2007, 2008). This programme also sought extensive 
transformation of civic society and politics towards a preferred conservative, 
Catholic, and nationalist culture (Osiel, 2001). To achieve such changes in an 
increasingly liberal, atheist society required the cooperation of a wide variety of 
Argentinean organisations, including by the media, corporations, and religious 
institutions. The dictatorship also relied on the use of spectacular public violence39. 
This proved a powerful means to co-opt a population struggling to uphold a façade 
of normalcy to shield themselves from being singled out as subversives. Citizens 
were encouraged to practice a self-blinding strategy of ‘percepticide’ (Taylor, 1997: 
119), to ‘look away’ and pretend that they had not observed the violence in the first 
place. As a consequence, everyday life became separated from the ongoing 
atrocities, and percepticide led to a blindness towards the plight of others and one’s 
involvement in that plight.  
This difficult situation eventually affected the official political representative of the 
Jewish community, DAIA. Indeed, although Jews were not the target of the regime, 
the junta did harbour and engender widespread anti-Semitic attitudes (Feitlowitz, 
2011: 123). They faced particularly extreme treatment in the clandestine prisons due 
to their identity, with victimizers drawing explicitly on Nazi ideology. Its complex 
effects on a Jewish community barely several decades removed from the tragedies 
of the Holocaust cannot be underestimated. At the end of the junta, many asked 
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what role institutions like the Jewish political organisation played in facilitating or 
inhibiting these crimes.40 
During the dictatorship, DAIA’s leadership focused on ensuring the well-being of the 
Jewish organisations. Key to prosperity was a narrow definition of Jewish identity 
and trade-offs with the regime; the two strategies helped DAIA to separate being 
Jewish from suspected subversion. The separation affirmed the status of some 
Jews as legitimate targets, and therefore came at considerable costs for the broad 
group of Argentines the organisation had been set up to represent. A policy aim was 
furthermore to move attention away from the Jewish community. Resistance to 
subversion by members of the Jewish community became highly undesirable and 
potentially counterproductive. It risked increasing the visibility of the Jewish minority 
and exposing Jews further to a hostile climate.41 
Through its close ties with the regime, the organisation was successful in 
negotiating some limits on anti-Semitic activities, as well as the liberation of high-
profile journalist Jacobo Timerman. However, this success came at a high price for 
the Jewish community. DAIA in return pursued a campaign to ensure its position as 
Jews’ sole representative, which included the discrediting of any national and 
international challenges to the military dictatorship that might have put significant 
pressure on the regime’s support for anti-Semitism. The Jewish political organisation 
was unable to hide the widespread disappearance of Jews altogether or evade 
relatives’ pleas for support. DAIA’s collusion with the military regime and its self-
understanding as sole representative of the Jewish community nonetheless appear 
to have had a devastating effect on the Jewish community.42 
Contrast their position with the judgements and actions of one of the Jewish heroes, 
Conservative rabbi Marshall T. Meyer. Originally from the US, but living in Buenos 
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 This problem gained in urgency, as the DAIA continued to maintain that it offered a 
protective, supportive role for the Jewish community and its disappeared. In contrast, Jews 
directly affected by the Dirty War, whose family members were kidnapped and never found, 
accused it of abandonment and complicity (Feitlowitz, 2011; Katz, 2011).  
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tortured son, Marcos. In response, the organisation was forced to cooperate even closer with 
the regime. 
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Aires since the 1950s, he became a human rights activist during the dictatorship 
(Feitlowitz, 2011; Tarica, 2012: 101). Working closely together with other resistance 
movements, notably the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, in 1983 he co-founded the 
Jewish Movement for Human Rights, before serving on the Argentine Truth 
Commission, CONADEP43 during the transition to democracy. Meyer made frequent 
visits to Jewish detainees and comforted the families of the disappeared, intervening 
on their behalf with the US, Israeli, and Argentine authorities. 
Meyer also maintained that the Jewish case did not differ from any other social 
group that was targeted by the dictatorship, i.e. that Jews were one among many 
groups targeted. However, his position served to connect them to the broader 
resistance to the junta rather than denying anti-Semitism altogether. As elaborated 
by Estelle Tarica (2012) a central memory trope for the various Jewish perspectives 
on the dirty war was the Holocaust, invoked by the military junta, DAIA, and resisting 
groups including journalist Timerman and rabbi Meyer.44 This prism proved pivotal to 
DAIA’s role, which became unreceptive to the grey continuum between complicity 
and resistance and thus could maintain that it, unlike the Judenräte, was protecting 
its community. The trope, in short, facilitated their failure to judge responsibility-for-
complicity. Meyer, while invoking the Holocaust, sought exactly to sidestep this 
narrow conception of resistance by aligning the position of Jewish Argentines with 
other minorities. 
What can my theoretical hybrid reveal about how we should judge DAIA’s position? 
What does it capture in comparison with the critical frameworks discussed? In the 
previous section, I indicated that judgements on responsibility-for-complicity must 
focus on the following objectives that enable the cultivation of a suitable ethos of 
reality. Judgements must attend to how structure, agency, and plurality together 
create a more or less flourishing, hospitable world, and thus contribute to an ethos 
of reality that affirms the multi-layered, shared reality and cares for a common world 
as the prism through which to respond to complicity. Even this brief discussion of the 
case, I hope, will give the reader a sense of how we can judge the organisation as 
complicit without losing sight of the world as being multi-layered and in common. 
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First, I wish to highlight the interweaving of structure, agency, and plurality over time 
that formed and informed the position taken up by DAIA’s leadership during the 
dictatorship. Our judgements must grasp the complex historical context DAIA’s 
leaders worked in, after nearly a century of Jewish migration to Argentina. 
Judgement requires attentiveness to the ebbs and flows of migration from various 
backgrounds that raised difficult questions about what it means to be a Jewish 
Argentine, the importance of Zionism and the formation of an Argentine identity, 
argentinidad. 
DAIA’s decision-making was framed by the perceived threat to the Jewish 
community through assimilation, together with the younger generations’ increasing 
secularisation and preference for communism. DAIA faced a choice between 
accepting assimilation and the dangerous path of remaining a separated enclave. 
Choosing the latter enabled a restrictive practice of Jewish identity, Zionism, but it 
meant also having to rely on a close relationship with Argentine’s power elite for its 
protection, long before 1976. The precarious situation was further worsened by the 
general institutional pressures during the military dictatorship, and the Jews’ 
particular political and economic isolation from the three main pillars of Argentina’s 
society – church, military, and trade unions (Liebman, 1981: 316). DAIA’s actions 
are, finally, framed by Israel’s and the United States’ close ties with the Argentine 
military regime, who at times similarly failed to respond to the pleas of the relatives 
of disappearing Jewish Argentines.45 
We should also acknowledge that Meyer, being an American Conservative rabbi, 
encountered structural conditions very different to those facing DAIA’s governing 
elite. To fail to address these distinct interplays of structure and agency, for example 
by emphasising that one acknowledged foldedness whereas the other did not, is to 
risk falling back on narrow, liability conceptions of responsibility and complicity. With 
Marguerite Feitlowitz we can conclude that the ‘DAIA behaved reprehensibly, it is 
true. But it was absurdly out of its league’ (2011: 125), dealing with pressures 
unknown to most organisations and deeply traumatised by the Holocaust. A suitable 
judgment must consider this challenging situation. 
Attentive to the structural context, we also need to think about the agency of the 
DAIA or, more specifically, of its key representatives. We can judge these to have 
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 Relatives in Israel consequently founded the Committee of Relatives of Desaparecidos in 




failed to develop an adequate ethos of reality. Central to this failure was reflexivity. 
The internal conversation functions as a socially patterned lens on the unfolding 
events – neither fully unconscious or socially determined, nor a detached intellectual 
exercise.46 From its very beginning, representatives of the organisation actively saw 
the world through a prism that denied the complexity of reality’s worldly and 
vexatious character (Feitlowitz, 2011: 113). Their percepticide, as the self-blinding 
strategy of upholding a sense of normalcy despite evidence to the contrary, 
functioned by routinely reducing the common world to a narrow conception of 
Jewish identity, substituting ‘the DAIA’ for ‘Argentine Jews’ as a whole. 
The desire for normalcy required detachment from the plight of the disappeared and 
this, in turn, meant denying one’s agential contribution to the crimes. DAIA actively 
sought to undermine alternative counts of Jewish disappearances, told pleading 
families they had done all they could by lodging official complaints with their military 
partners, blocked collective action and the potential connection between Jewish 
struggles and other groups, and, following the transition towards democracy, 
remained defiant of claims about their complicity (Katz, 2011). As indicated above, 
the trope of the Holocaust played here an important role. It is by attending to this 
reflexive prism, alongside other agential capacities through which actors engage 
with the world, that we can come to understand how and why an institution that 
explicitly sought to avoid repeating the complicit behaviour of Jewish organisations 
during the Holocaust (cf. Tarica, 2012), failed to cultivate responsibility-for-complicity 
towards Argentines tortured by the dictatorship. 
The DAIA thus serves as an extreme example of an impoverished ethos of reality, 
which is best understood by considering how structure, agency, and plurality came 
together over time to facilitate a problematic stance towards the common world. We 
may formulate this as a failure to acknowledge human foldedness, to take up 
collective responsibility, or to experience the suffering of others. Indeed, the 
acknowledgement of the different ways in which complicity was taken up by Meyer 
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 Of course, the DAIA is a collective agent and in talking about reflexivity here, I refer to the 
stances that key representatives of the DAIA exhibited in response to the dangers to the 
Jewish community. This raises questions about the use of people as a substitute for the 
analysis of an institution. I also make (problematic) assumptions about the relationship 
between external and internal conversation. It is possible, in principle, that the 
representatives’ internal conversation differed significantly from their externally exhibited 
stance towards the everyday challenges posed by the military dictatorship, recorded in Katz 




and DAIA’s representatives should play an important role in our judgements upon 
the case. However, I argue that such an approach falls short unless it is able to 
capture the distorted ethos that developed over time through the responses of the 
DAIA and the Argentinian society to the demands and potential in structure, agency, 
and plurality. Only then can we make concrete judgements on complicity and 
responsibility that affirm the complexity of reality. 
A second, more difficult, question is how DAIA could have developed this, more 
appropriate, ethos of reality, in light of undoubtedly challenging conditions and 
decades of carving out a particular identity and desire for normalcy. After all, their 
reductive stance over the years had proved successful in combating anti-Semitism. 
Aware of the briefness of my discussion of the case, I refrain from providing an 
answer which would have to look at the potentials of responsiveness and structure 
over time. Instead, it will be the purpose of the next chapter to explore further how 
judgements on complicity in injustice could look like, by drawing on a positive 




Chapter 5 – Resistance through Judgment framed by an Ethos of Reality 
‘let’s live, but they don’t let us live. So let’s live 
in the detail’ 
(Müller, 2016: 61, o.t.) 
My aim in this final chapter is to continue concretising the theoretical claims I 
advance in this thesis on judging responsibility-for-complicity informed by a less 
reductive ethos of reality. Whereas the previous chapter explored what political 
judgement should avoid – exemplified in relation to debates on complicity and the 
case of the DAIA – this chapter expands on what I understand under good political 
judgement.1 I focus on the Nobel laureate Herta Müller who tackled the difficult 
challenges posed by complicity during Romania’s national-communist dictatorship. 
Müller’s reflections on her resistance to systemic oppression reveal what a 
cultivation of a less reductive ethos of reality, as a distinct ethico-political project, 
may look like.2 Before I explain her work’s suitability for my purposes, let me briefly 
reiterate how my toolkit guides us in evaluating concrete political judgements. 
As we look at the suitability of someone’s judgement, we ought to consider how they 
respond to systemic forms of reductionism of reality that impoverish the common 
world. Furthermore, we ought to look at the particular weight a person puts on 
creating a hospitable world-in-common through which humans can meaningfully 
come to terms with a multi-layered, shared reality. While this process can take many 
forms, it should be attentive to three interrelated components to human existence 
that together enable the formation of a flourishing common world: i) the role of 
humans, as embodied, reflexive agents that produce causally irreducible 
contributions to society; ii) the relationships between people, based on humans' 
ability and need to act together; iii) the social and cultural structures that contribute 
to what it means to be human. The crux of my less reductive ethos of reality is that a 
judgement attentive to these components and their impact on the common world 
should ideally be able to affirm the complexity of social reality while, at the same 
time, telling ‘right from wrong, beautiful from ugly’ in relation to a specific event or 
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 Although this chapter moves beyond chapter 4’s concern with how the privileged might 
cultivate responsibility for complicity towards the flipside of complicity, resistance, the 
opposition of duality and dualism remains central. 
2
 While all people have in some form an ethos of reality – similarly as all people refer in 
some way in their actions and judgments to common sense – what I have in mind in this 





context. My response to complicity is embedded in the belief that affirming the 
stratified character of reality does not have to come at the cost of concreteness and 
a capacity for judgement, and vice versa. It is in making judgements informed by an 
ethos of reality, in general, capable of this balance, that we can take a significant 
step towards tackling responsibility-for-complicity. 
I will use Nobel laureate Herta Müller as an example of someone who successfully 
cultivated such a less reductive ethos of reality. The Romanian-German writer 
gained world-wide attention in 2009, following the publication of her novel 
Atemschaukel/ The Hunger Angel (2009a) about the deportations of Romanian-
Germans to Soviet labour camps, and the award of the Nobel Prize for Literature.3 
The writer offers a suitable case study, because i) she engages in a difficult context 
that brings to the fore the kind of de-humanising strategies political judgement 
should respond to; ii) Müller’s use of auto-fiction means that writing is both 
instrumental to her ethos of reality and a source for us to evaluate the ethos, i.e. her 
written self-reflection helps crystallise the elements of an ethos of reality;4 iii) Müller 
captures the central aspects of my ethos of reality schematically, while, at the same 
time, exercising political judgement in a way that is unique to her context. In my 
discussion of Müller, I therefore hope to find the right balance between particularity 
and abstraction for the sake of clarifying what a less reductive ethos of reality 
entails. 
My analysis focuses on Müller’s essays and interviews, especially Der König 
verbeugt sich und tötet/ The King bows and kills (2010) and Mein Vaterland ist ein 
Apfelkern/ My fatherland is an apple seed (2014), written following her flight to 
Germany and situated at the intersection between literary work and theoretical 
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 Müller had started gaining international acclaim in the 1980s with the publication of a series 
of collected short stories, Niederungen/ Nadirs (2015b). The series was followed by the 
novel Der Mensch ist ein großér Fasan auf der Welt/ The Passport (2015), dealing with her 
childhood in the Romanian countryside under dictatorship, and the novel Herztier/ The Land 
of Green Plums (2015a), which retells the effect of state terror on a circle of writers who 
shared a friendship. 
4
 Müller helpfully argues that we rely on writers not because they stand above society, but 
because their writing makes manifest their own agency (Müller and Liiceanu, 2011). In line 
with Arendt’s democratisation of the spectator, Müller’s writing therefore does not seek the 
detachment of the thoughtful intellectual. For both, the actor and spectator are innately 
connected – in Arendt’s terms, this ‘spectator sits in every actor’ (Arendt, 1981a: 262). 
Because I focus on the writer rather than solely on literature, my use of Müller does not 





reflection on repression. Drawing on this literature, I first trace the problem she 
responds to, her persecution under the dictatorship of Nicolae Ceauşescu in 
Romania. Müller’s work gives us ample insight into how the regime attempted to 
destroy meaningful human existence by targeting personhood and a common world. 
Once I have analysed this problematic context and how it informed Müller's actions, 
I turn to her response: political judgement orientated by the motto ‘to live in the 
detail’. This judgement spans the continuum from living in the moment to writing as 
‘invented perception’ meant to create, build, and protect a common world through 
autofiction and surrealism. In Arendtian terms, Müller’s political judgement creates 
‘the space in which the objects of political judgement, the actor and actions 
themselves, can appear, and thus alter our sense of what belongs in the common 
world’ (Zerilli, 2005b: 179). I will show how this political judgement is attentive to the 
three components I outlined above: agency, plurality, and structures. Fidelity to a 
combination of dualism and pluralism allows Müller to recreate the multiple layers to 
reality as the source for concrete judgements on responsibility and complicity that 





5.1 Herta Müller’s Life in Ceauşescu’s Romania 
Müller offers a sophisticated approach to an ethos of reality that can both serve as 
the starting point for thinking about our own ethos of reality and that is uniquely 
particular to her biography and the problems she faced. Müller’s life trajectory plays 
an important role in her writing, as its motivation, source material, and as a framing 
device. I therefore begin with a summary of key contexts and episodes.5 
Müller was born in 1953 in Nitzkydorf (Romanian: Nițchidorf), a Banat-Swabian 
village in south-western Romania. She belongs to an ethnic German minority that 
had moved to Eastern Europe over the last few centuries as part of the colonising 
efforts by the Habsburg empire (Drace Francis, 2013). During World War II, 
members of the minority fought, alongside the Romanian army, on the side of Nazi 
Germany. After the war, many Germans in the Banat region were deported to labour 
camps, as disproportionate punishment for the war damage caused to the Soviet 
Union. Romania, initially an ally of Germany, switched sides just before the end of 
the war and maintained accordingly a victorious, ‘innocent’ position. To this end, 
scapegoating the German minority became a powerful means to negate the 
country’s dark past. 
Müller’s own family captures many facets of the historic developments: Her father 
Iosif Müller had joined the Waffen-SS during the Second World War, aged 17; the 
impact of the national socialist sympathies on Iosif’s life would prove significant for 
his daughter’s later rejection of totalitarianism of any kind.6 Her grandfather, formerly 
a well-off grocer of colonial goods and corn, had his properties nationalised by the 
communist regime. He had also been a prisoner-of-war following World War One, 
and the shock of losing his status and livelihood only added to his already 
traumatised state. Finally, her mother, Katharina, had been deported at the age of 
19 to a labour camp in the Ukraine, where she was retained for five years only to 
return as a broken woman. 
This challenging context sets the scene for Müller’s resistance through a distinct 
form of political judgement in two ways. Firstly, her resistant agency is shaped by 
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 For alternative biographical summaries, see (Eke, 2017; Haines, 2011). 
6
 Her uncle served similarly as an SS-soldier during the war, but died in battle, leaving 
behind Müller’s grief-stricken grandmother. Müller’s father survived but succumbed to 
alcoholism, which would eventually lead to his death in 1978. The death marked the starting 




her experiences as a child living in a community with an unresolved, traumatic and 
shameful past; the inability and unwillingness to come to terms with the past 
expressed itself in various ways, including a general embrace of silence. This has 
significant implications for the role Müller attributes to communication through 
writing. The writer’s first major book, Niederungen (Müller, 2015b; English: Nadir), 
portrayed the oppressive community of her native village, caught by ethnocentrism 
and still harbouring National Socialist sentiments in the context of 20th century 
Romanian communism. Katharina’s experience, together with that of other villagers 
and Müller’s close friend Oskar Pastior7, resonate in Müller’s most recent book, 
Atemschaukel (Müller, 2009a; English: The Hunger Angel). The novel binds together 
various stories of the Soviet labour camps to a fictionalised recounting of the 
German minority’s camp experience. 
Müller’s work is, secondly, framed by her experiences as a German-Romanian 
persecuted by the communist secret police. To fully understand why she became a 
target, let me first add to the background context. Between 1965 and 1989, 
Romania was ruled by Nicolae Ceauşescu and the infamous secret police 
Securitate, which relied on a widespread network of collaborators and informants 
(Mihai, 2016a: 151ff.). Under Ceauşescu’s rule Romania proved unique in terms of 
the cult of personality, the repression of all opposition, and pervasive control of all 
aspects of everyday life (Haines, 2013: 94). Similar to the Argentinian context, 
explored in chapter 4 in relation to the DAIA, the general population responded to 
the difficult circumstance through the practice of percepticide in the form of social 
opportunism and political apathy (Müller and Liiceanu, 2011). Both entail an 
unwillingness or inability to respond to the plight of others and a desire to separate 
the supposed normalcy of everyday life from the implication in the suffering of others 
that one was encouraged to forget. Müller started to feel the full effects of the 
repressive state following her move to Temeswar (Romanian: Timișoara) at the age 
of 15, a city 30 kilometres from her native village.8 
Through the move to the city, Müller left behind an agricultural society with little 
interest in the life of the mind. In the city, she engaged with Romanian culture and 
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 Oskar Pastior was a Romanian-German poet and writer known for his sensibility to 
language and his play with words. As part of the previous generation, he fled to Germany in 
1968. 
8
 Müller attended the Gymnasium in Timișoara in 1968, where she stayed to study 




language, which she had previously been taught only as a foreign language. She 
also met and became friends with members of the Aktionsgruppe Banat, a group of 
ethnic German left-wing writers who had a significant literary influence on her 
(Haines and Marven, 2013: 2). First attempts in prose and poetry emerged in 1969. 
In 1982, a heavily censored Niederungen/Nadir was published.9 The secret police 
terrorised the Aktionsgruppe, weary of its political position, and approached Müller 
to convince her to become an informant on Timișoara’s artistic scene and the 
Aktionsgruppe’s activities. She rejected the offer.10 In retaliation, Müller was fired 
from her job as a translator in a machinery factory, where she had started working 
before she was approached by the secret police. 
Müller’s 1980s were marked by repression, including interrogation, death threats, 
and house searches, but also growing literary success in the West. The success 
came with resentment and harsh criticism by her ethnic group and the dictatorship, 
who were displeased by Müller’s bleak depictions of her childhood and life in the 
Banat-Swabian village. It also provided some initial protection and the opportunity to 
travel to Germany.11 Following her third departure, however, Müller’s privileges were 
revoked. The secret police acknowledged that they had underestimated her literary 
impact in the West and the terror increased once more. Finally, Müller gave up and 
requested an exit permit. In 1987, after one-and-a-half years of anguished waiting, 
and close to insanity, Müller fled to Berlin together with her then husband Richard 
Wagner.12 The dictatorship collapsed in 1989 and Müller became part of the struggle 
to deal with this violent past that continues to overshadow the country’s transition 
towards democracy. The increasing distance from the totalitarian experiences also 
seems to have marked a final shift in Müller’s writing, today focusing especially on 
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 Müller’s writing came at a considerable cost to her and her family. Yet, the Nobel laureate 
also profited from an unsystematic and inconsistent approach towards minority literature and 
culture during the dictatorship, which enabled her to kick-start her literary career in the first 
place (cf. Eke, 2017: 8). 
10
 Her refusal to collaborate did not prevent the group from eventually falling apart and Müller 
and other members of the Aktionsgruppe later joined the Temeswarer Adam-
MüllerGuttenbrunn-Literaturkreis. 
11
 As Müller discovered upon reading her Securitate file, this unusual freedom was used as a 
means to discredit Müller in the West as a Romanian spy: only someone collaborating with 
the government, so the thought, would be given such privileges to travel and criticise the 
dictatorship freely. 
12
 The move to Germany was made possible by a bilateral arrangement between the 
German and Romanian government to enable ethnic Germans to return to Germany. Müller 




producing collages, alongside a series of interviews that provide explanatory 
investigation into her writing style. 
 
5.1.1 The Impoverished Common World 
With the basic trajectory of Müller’s life in place, I now trace the problem that Müller 
responded to. My discussion gives us a first insight into Müller’s cultivation of a less 
reductive ethos of reality: her evaluation of the systematic reductionism of being 
human and a common world during the Romanian dictatorship that endangered 
humans’ capacity to come to terms with reality and engendered complicity in 
oppression. 
Key to Müller’s resistance informed by a distinct ethos of reality is her analysis of 
how dictatorships impact on personhood and lead to paralysing loneliness and fear. 
She emphasises that, above all, her native village and Romania more generally 
were ruled by the fear that the individual ‘I’ could succeed over the institutionalised 
‘We’ (Müller, 1998: 17, 22f.). The Romanian state, Müller claims, ‘defined itself 
solely through repression. It had no other programmatic content than the control of 
its population’ (Müller and Lentz, 2010: 15, own translation). The unpredictability of 
human beings was seen as a primary threat to this logic of control and the secret 
police targeted the individual qua individual.13 Under such extreme circumstances, 
the destruction of the person becomes inevitable and normal, a by-product of either 
the process of compliance with the regime’s vision of society or of the persecution 
experienced in response to acts of resistance (Müller and Klammer, 2014: 100, 
123f.).14 
The destruction of personhood brings with it the end of a meaningful political 
existence as it obliterates the in-between of plurality known as common world. 
Müller captures this destruction of worldliness through the metaphor of the island, 
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 Such a focus on individuality is of course ironic, as it means recognising the potential and 
possibility of individuality. As I highlight below, this tension between recognising and seeking 
to destroy individuality provides an important potential for Müller to maintain her defiant 
stance. 
14
 Müller encountered the extent of the compliance as kindergarten teacher. Her pupils, 
already fully ideologically conditioned, wished to stand like soldiers in a circle and sing an 
anthem that required no mental awareness (Müller, 2010: 187f.). Müller’s initial attempt to 
change these circumstances, by teaching a different song, especially to young ones who 




which the writer appropriates from the concept of ‘Inselglück’/ Island happiness 
(Müller, 2008: 195ff.). A notion of island happiness has been used particularly in 
Western countries’ tourism advertisements to represent finding peace and 
tranquillity on a faraway tropical island. In contrast, Romania became an island, 
because the regime brutally prevented any attempts at escaping the country.15 The 
Banat Germans, too, lived isolated as if on an island, branded by the Romanians as 
Nazis and kept apart by their own twisted sense of superiority. Further examples 
include the island of the ruling elite, afraid of the masses and of losing their 
privileges, and the islands of the collaborators and spies, at risk of being found out. 
Lastly, the metaphor island refers to the isolation in the heads of those separated by 
systematic terror and fear. As the country divided into myriads of islands, politics in 
Romania was reduced to shallow public engagement. 
In sum, as succinctly concluded by Norbert Otto Eke in relation to Müller’s novel 
Herztier, Ceauşescu’s dictatorship 
‘completely destroyed Eigensinn, individuality, and humanity: the dream of 
individual happiness within society, the dream of self-determination and self-
assertion in opposition to society, the dream of friendship and sincerity as an 
alternative to a society gripped by fear emotionally frozen and downright loveless’ 
(2013: 106). 
The consequence of living under regimes that seek to destroy the singularity and 
plurality of being human is loneliness. Its effects are of particular importance for 
Müller’s work.16 Müller experienced three contexts of (totalitarian) loneliness, first, 
the context of growing up in the Banat-Swabian village, then through the persecution 
by the Securitate, and, indirectly, the Soviet labour camps, the experience of which 
she understands vicariously, through her mother’s and her friend, Oscar Pastior’s, 
narratives. Each comes with different combinations of fear and loneliness that prove 
highly destructive to personhood. Below I focus on the two that Müller experienced 
directly. 
Loneliness became the defining characteristic of Müller’s early life (Müller, 2010: 
13). Her father’s SS-past, the trauma of the labour and prison camp weighing on her 
mother and grandfather, the confiscation of her grandfather’s livelihood and status, 
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 In the 1980s, increasingly common attempts to illegally cross the border often ended in 
death. 
16
 The importance of loneliness for Müller’s work is highlighted by her use of her Nobel 
laureate speech to emphasise the dangers of acute loneliness of humans during totalitarian 




combined with the Romanian communist narrative about ethnic Germans, prevented 
her family from reckoning with their past. In fear of punishment – Müller’s relatives, 
and the German minority more generally, turned highly opportunistic and politically 
blind (Müller and Klammer, 2014: 37). Keeping secrets and avoiding conversation 
became an acceptable way of life. An emphasis on solitude and a functional 
approach to thinking also linked well with the cyclical character of rural farm-life, 
while reading and independent thought, so central to Müller’s resistance, were seen 
sceptically.17 
At the centre of this loneliness in the village was what Müller describes as 
‘Dorfangst’ (Müller, 2010: 61) – village fear – as the built-in fear that arose from the 
various traumas which were not publicly addressed. Later, in the city, she 
encountered the planned fear created by the secret police in the fight against 
individuality (Müller and Klammer, 2014: 123). This fear arose from the penetration 
of the private sphere through repeated interrogations and the searching of her flat, 
but also the general ubiquity of threat: everyone who looked too closely, could 
become a target, almost anything was forbidden (Müller, 2010: 62). A second 
loneliness thus emerged following the failed attempts to recruit Müller and through 
the ensuing harassment by the secret police (Müller and Klammer, 2014: 62). 
The destruction of individuality and the production of fear and loneliness give rise to 
what Müller calls an ‘alien gaze’ (Müller, 2010: 163ff.).18 The alien gaze refers to 
someone’s inability to confidently and automatically engage with a surrounding that 
should be familiar to them. The gaze is an internal, personal deformation rather than 
a spatial shift in a person’s position towards the world (Müller and Klammer, 2014: 
178f.). One of the central strategies employed by the secret police to achieve this 
deterioration of familiarity – of trust in the objects and people around us – was house 
searches. This penetration of one’s privacy achieved its full effect by leaving the 
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 The village’s isolation reflected its existence on the outskirts of the Austrian empire, far 
away from any major capital. Uninterrupted until the two World Wars and the labour camps 
deportations, the villagers held tightly to their centuries-old traditions. Being stuck in a 
glorified and romanticised past enabled them to hold on to a belief in their superiority over 
the other ethnic groups, which was increasingly undermined by the political developments of 
the 20
th
 century (Müller and Lentz, 2010: 19, 23). 
18
 To possess the alien gaze, does not mean that one is foreign to a place. Nor does it refer 
to the detachment of an intellectual from the events occurring around them. Both these 
common conceptions of ‘alien’, in German ‘fremd’/foreign, gaze have been attributed to 
Müller’s writing, which she however vehemently rejects. For, such a reading misses the 
crucial point that the alien gaze arises out of a familiar environment and its trusted objects 




searched location seemingly untouched, while at the same time carefully changing 
small features, which, notwithstanding their unimportance, proved highly effective in 
destroying a person’s relation to the world: ‘nothing seemed certain any longer, 
whether it is this, or that, or something completely different. With time only inane 
things existed with important shadows’ (2010: 163; o. t.). The quote gives us some 
sense of how the alien gaze affected Müller as she struggled to maintain her way of 
being in the world, undermined by the doubt sown by the secret police. 
The annihilation of confidence in one’s perception of the world aggravates loneliness 
and fear. Together, they deny independent, critical thought, and leave behind a 
human being without the means to assure and confirm their perception on the world, 
in all its partiality. As a consequence, the person is continuously at risk of losing all 
confidence in adequately capturing and reacting to the world.19 Using the language 
of the hybrid established in chapter 4, the context potentially prevents any cultivation 
of a suitable ethos of reality. Müller therefore concludes that to come to terms with 
possessing the alien gaze and to find a way to live with it as one becomes weary of 
oneself is an art (Müller, 2010: 180, 183). 
In the rest of the chapter, I explore Müller’s reflections on how she responded to the 
destruction of personhood and the common world through loneliness, fear, and the 
increasing consumption by an alien gaze. The discussion traces her political 
judgement informed by an ethos of reality that seeks to enliven a narrative of a 
multi-layered, shared reality contra the reductionisms of the dictatorships. 
                                                          
19
 The situation triggers the need for constant self-assurance through heightened self-
vigilance. Müller for example put hairs at various strategic points in her apartment to monitor 
whether someone came into her rooms, but such a constant awareness necessarily took a 




5.2 Müller’s Ethos of Reality – Living in the Detail 
I now engage with Müller’s self-reflective essays to consider what her response to 
this reductionism looks like. The section reveals that Müller continued to make 
judgements on complicity, responsibility, and resistance that sustained her 
unwillingness to collaborate with the dictatorship. These judgements are embedded 
in a unique ethos encapsulated by the motto she borrows from Eugène Ionesco and 
repeats in Hunger und Seide: ‘let’s live, but they don’t let us live. So let’s live in the 
detail’ (Müller, 2016: 61, o.t.). This life in the detail has a twofold significance for 
Müller, both as a basic survival strategy and its extension through her aesthetic-
political resistance in her essays and novels. I first provide a discussion of how this 
motto frames her immediate response to loneliness, fear, and the alien gaze. In 
elaborating her initial survival strategy. I highlight how Müller focuses on the dualist 
and pluralist dimension to being human. I complete this picture of Müller’s political 
judgement in section 5.3, where I show how Müller extends her ethos of reality – to 
live in the detail – through writing as ‘invented perception’. 
By ‘living in the detail’, Müller acknowledges the necessity to live without the kind of 
plots and narratives that usually give someone’s life meaning. Overcome by fear, 
her full attention had to be on an adequate response to the immediate moment, and 
that moment alone (Müller and Lentz, 2010: 37f.). Living from day to day, in the 
present, was essential, without concrete plans for the future. Faced with the 
dictatorship’s distortion of social reality, Müller’s resistance depended on the 
accuracy of perception by focusing on the detail of specific objects and events.20 
Resistance thus expressed itself in the holding onto small things that ensured 
immediate survival. This accuracy sustains the basic survival strategy by providing 
the means to continuously monitor the aims and mechanisms of the apparatus of 
terror. 
The concern with the detail is also the starting point for the larger project of 
recuperating and protecting a common world that Müller seeks to juxtapose to the 
flight from reality that only empowered the dictatorship. As the writer puts it, to 
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 Bearing in mind that the Romanian dictatorship seemed capable of formulating regulations 
for any purpose it deemed necessary, Müller was initially puzzled by the secret police’s 
decision to come up with trumped up charges of prostitution and black market trading 
against her (Müller and Klammer, 2014: 193). This strategy, however, was not chosen 
arbitrarily. The invention of facts allowed the secret police complete control over what was to 
be considered as the legitimate narrative of reality, while retaining a thin connection to the 




defend herself she also opened her own surveillance office. The observance of 
simple things and objects, their precise monitoring, Müller discovered, could give her 
a sense of control and provide some immediate protection against the anti-human 
strategies of the totalising regime (Müller and Lentz, 2010: 24, 33). Of course, as 
stated in relation to the alien gaze, such hyper-vigilance comes with its own costs 
and dangers, constantly putting a person on edge, which leads Müller to writing as 
its necessary extension. Yet, life in the detail emerges for Müller also as a larger 
point about judging reality: ‘who cannot live with the detail, who prohibits and 
despises it, becomes blind. A thousand details provide something, but not a thread 
of life, not an overall agreement, no utopia. Details are not to be put in a chain, 
transformed into a clear-cut logic of the world’ (Müller, 2016: 61, o.t.). As the quote 
reveals, Müller holds on to the particular as juxtaposed to a superficial whole, which 
she often seems to associate with ideological oppression. Out of the immediate 
survival thus emerges a normative project – a less reductive ethos of reality. The 
rest of the chapter explores the different dimensions to her ethos of reality in more 
detail. 
 
5.2.1 Resistant Agency 
Of particular interest for this thesis is that Müller displays an acute awareness of the 
importance of highlighting how structure, agency, and plurality together constitute 
reality, and the tendency to distort their interplay. A ‘life in the detail’, or in my terms 
an ‘ethos of reality’, fails as a normative project that seeks to build and protect a 
common world, unless it is attentive to how the three components shape our 
capacity to judge and make our way through the world. For the sake of clarity, I 
address structure, agency, and plurality, separately, starting with human agency. In 
each step I show how Müller both reveals the deep ways in which the causal powers 
of a component are curtailed and distorted by the regime and how she nonetheless 
holds onto the continued importance and potential of structure, agency, and plurality 
for resisting the reductionism. 
Throughout this thesis I have highlighted the centrality of what it means to be human 
contra modern de-humanising tendencies in society and sciences. Chapter 4 
summarised that in order to cultivate a suitable stance towards reality, a less 
reductive ethos of reality, a person should be attentive to their distinct, emergent 




with the world, a sense of self which builds on an emotional, embodied, and 
relational existence, and a commitment to the unceasing potential in humans for 
social innovation. To fail to practice a stance towards reality informed by these 
characteristics may result in political judgements and actions that systematically 
aggravate de-humanisation. I referred to Diana Taylor’s concept of percepticide as 
illustrative of the consequences: political judgement that lacks orientation towards 
the components to human existence risks a blindness towards the plight of others 
and one’s involvement in their suffering. Müller’s response centres on what she 
terms her ‘individualism’ (Müller, 1998: 19), through which she captures central 
features of human agency. 
Attentive to the destructive force of totalitarianism on personhood, Müller holds on to 
the belief in people as a source of innovation: ‘I wanted to address the unpredictable 
that inhabits each person, whether in me or in the powerful’ (Müller, 2008: 57f., own 
translation). Elsewhere, she adds that ‘every person is a unique individual in the 
world and has a unique relationship with that world. And everything each one of us 
does we do differently, because we have no other option’ (Müller and Liiceanu, 
2011). Müller acknowledges that this individuality brought with it a failure to follow 
the implicit rules of the village, which would have made her life easier. As a child, 
Müller was unable to prevent the ‘Irrlauf im Kopf’/rush through the head (Müller, 
2010: 16), and to avoid looking too closely and to raise unwanted questions (Müller, 
2010: 101, 200), all manifestations of her unpredictability.21 She struggled with 
uniformity, enforced in a pre-dominantly Catholic region with the doctrine of an all-
knowing God (Müller and Klammer, 2014: 20). Müller sought normalcy and yet 
foreclosed the possibility of assimilation through her independent, critical thought. 
Individuality also finds its expression in Müller’s work through a sustained 
engagement with different ways of thinking.22 Through her move from a village to the 
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 Accordingly, in her interviews, Müller recounts that she was aware that no one could know 
that, as she spent considerable time alone in the fields herding her family’s cattle, she would 
eat flowers in order to become part of the surrounding nature or that she married flowers with 
each other – games that might indicate the child’s ‘abnormality’ (Müller and Klammer, 2014: 
14). Müller understood the drastic consequences of revealing her abnormality and the 
deviation of her behaviour and thoughts. 
22
 Müller’s writing, especially the novel The Appointment, can furthermore be read as a 
journey into the mind of the main protagonist that helps illustrate what happens to a mind 
under state persecution (cf. Boase-Beier, 2014). Her emphasis on reflexive agency must 
furthermore be read as part of a commitment to account for a situated, embodied human. 




city, Müller learned to appreciate the continuum between silence and speaking, 
thought and non-thinking. At one extreme of the continuum, the members of her 
village, especially her grandmother, shied away from expressing their thoughts 
freely. Their communication remained closely connected to silence. In its narrative 
and fragmented character, their conversations also resembled more internal 
conversations thought-out-aloud rather than external speech (Müller and Klammer, 
2014: 19). In the city, Müller encountered the other extreme, abundant speech that 
seemed to lack prior thought or that actively sought to prevent it (Müller, 2010: 
100f.). Finally, Müller herself couldn’t escape the rush in the head, a double-edged 
term that captures a capacity for unpredictability and a form of restless challenging 
of reality. 
Müller’s work highlights patterns of thought familiar from Archer’s theorising on 
modes of reflexivity. Müller’s rush in the head resembles a contrary-meta-reflexivity, 
characterised by a critical stance towards society and the natal background, in a 
context of pre-dominantly communicative, and even fractured, reflexive 
communities. Communicative reflexive practices played an important role in 
maintaining the coherence and homogenous character of the ‘ethnic island’ and its 
supposed superiority and separateness from the larger ethnic group. Müller’s meta-
reflexivity also stands in stark contrast to her depiction of the people representing 
the oppressive orders who, in their almost caricature portrayal, reveal typical 
autonomous reflexive concerns of instrumentality and social mobility. 
The unpredictability and critical thought that marked her early individualism, came 
primarily to the fore in her later life in opposition to the secret police. They enabled a 
form of integrity that culminated in the decisive moment of declining the offer of 
collaboration. Müller summarises her refusal to collaborate as her willingness to lose 
anything but herself (Müller and Klammer, 2014: 65). To sign the Securitate pledge 
would have meant to be a person ‘gegen mich selbst’ (Müller, 2010: 83), against 
one’s self.23 This moral resolution arose in part from her engagement with her 
                                                                                                                                                                    
and Klammer, 2014: 82, 141). Loneliness and fear were felt and thought even where she 
could not adequately express them. The thirst to capture these experiences in speech 
ultimately animated her writing (Müller, 2010: 19). 
23
 However, again Müller recognises the limits of self-awareness during a heightened state of 
fear. Müller’s vigilance during the period of intense persecution fostered a thirst for giving up 
the fight, not by assimilation but the oblivion promised by insanity (Müller, 2010: 180). The 
writer was also for some time plagued by thoughts of suicide, which she however claims to 
have overcome, because her suicide would have meant the ultimate triumph of the secret 




father’s dark past.24 The writer however rejects the idea that integrity is dependent 
on one’s parentage and origin, whether one had a happy childhood or not. Framed 
as her individuality undoubtedly is by the unique context she grew up in, Müller 
states that no one can be forced to become something against themselves (Müller 
and Klammer, 2014: 40). Her resistance may therefore also entail a certain naivety 
about the complex ways in which humans can become complicit, showing that an 
ethos of reality is always prone to failure and imperfect. 
As a positive example of resistant agency irrespective of the context and 
background, Müller relies routinely on her close friend Jenny, who was part of the 
socio-economic and political elite, which protected her from some of the dangers of 
living under a dictatorship. In her outspoken nature, however, Jenny revealed an 
uncompromising, robust approach to the anti-individualist strategies of the regime 
(2014: 147). Müller’s integrity was also informed by the costs of collaboration and 
spying. The seemingly easy life of the collaborators and spies is marred, claimed the 
Nobel laureate, by having to effectively live a double life. The situation is worsened 
further by the fear of being found out and the constant danger of being dropped by, 
and thus becoming the target of, the secret police (Müller and Klammer, 2014: 102). 
The attacks by the Securitate therefore created a reverse effect, emboldening Müller 
to stubbornly defend her individuality – her right to be a source of innovation and to 
keep the ‘rush in the head’ going. She even seems to relish the secret police’s 
frustrations and irritations that her strong inner moral commitments to truths and 
reality caused. Müller argues that to love life temporarily out of anger and out of 
spite may just give sufficient meaning to one’s existence (Müller, 2010: 65). 
In sum, the Nobel laureate paints a picture of a resistant agent, shaped by her 
unique autobiography and struggling with the demands of living under a dictatorship. 
She reveals an awareness of differences between humans, their unique modes of 
thinking and acting upon the world, and maintains the need for agency as source of 
innovation and integrity against oppression. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
2010: 29; o.t.). Müller suddenly ‘wanted to live, became addicted to life, exactly because she 
wasn’t deigned worthy of it’ (2010: 30; o.t.). 
24
 Müller was 17 at the time she was approached by the Securitate and her father had been 
enthusiastic about Hitler at a similar age. Müller therefore argued that she could not be 
critical of his acts and simultaneously collaborate with a different totalitarian system (Müller 




5.2.2 Objects and Structures 
The second dimension to ‘life in the detail’ entails Müller’s engagement with material 
objects and the structures of society, notably gender, sexuality, and language. This 
dimension does not simply provide a staging device that gives political judgement a 
particular tint. Nor are structures (and culture) and materiality merely an obstacle to 
being human, to be overcome. Ordinary objects are integral to human agency and 
structures.25 Social and cultural structures provide the relatively enduring relations 
and ideas that shape humans and the social positions they inhabit in society. Their 
generative mechanisms are unobservable and their effects often invisible due to the 
interplay of many structures and agents in a multi-layered social reality, in which 
structures and agency equally provide emergent causal contributions. Structures like 
language, gender, and sexuality, and objects play an active role in shaping 
resistance. Müller’s writing establishes this function, as she seeks to capture their 
positive and negative contributions to social formations.  
Müller emphasises the role material objects play in her encounter of reality. She 
provides a ‘surreal but deeply materialist aesthetic’ (Haines, 2013: 104). Objects are 
an extension of who we are, and provide separate influences on our behaviour. 
Sensitive to this fact, Müller observes that humans define themselves through 
specific objects, including their clothing, and that in doing so they also express and 
display their character (Müller and Lentz, 2010: 25f.; cf. Müller, 2010: 17). Body and 
objects are interlinked and the internal and external world of humans extend into 
each other. 
In her own writing, the multi-functional role of objects for human agency emerges in 
various ways. Mundane objects, a nut or nail scissors, and objects captured by 
using compound terms, such as wood melon26, are taken from their context and 
given multiple meanings to invoke in language a multi-layered reality. A nightgown 
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 The emphasis on material objects arises out of the objectivism introduced in chapter 3. 
Contra anthropocentric models that focus primarily on intentionality and language, the critical 
realist framework highlights how structures consist in the relations between human and non-
human material parts and their interaction and –relation. For a discussion of the relationship 
between social structures and ordinary objects in critical realism and its importance for 
debates on social ontology, see Dave Elder-Vass (2017). 
26
 Through the metaphor wood melon Müller captures a failed transformation of an 
agricultural society into an industrial economy, as envisaged by communist social engineers: 





which features on a German train advertisement, for example, links Müller back to a 
series of experiences during Romania’s dictatorship that she remembers as 
connected to similar nightgowns. Objects and locations thus gain an important 
narrative function and are attributed an independent causal role (Müller, 2010: 
121f.). They do not merely offer a passive backdrop, but play an essential part in the 
story.27 As illustrated painfully by the secret police moving and removing objects in a 
flat to suggest their presence and instil fear, this interplay between materiality and 
agency, subjectivity and objectivity can have positive and negative implications. 
Physical objects, together with agency and human interaction, constitute social 
structures – the network of relationships among social positions that frame human 
agency – which play a key role in how agency resists reductionism. To understand 
more fully Müller’s objectivism, I focus on how she deals with the social function of 
gender, sexuality, and language in Romania. Together, they reveal how structures 
both enable and constrain a person resisting a dictatorship. More specifically, as I 
focus on Müller’s interviews and essays, I consider the role she attributes to 
structures, which, in turn, gives us a sense of how they framed her own response to 
persecution. 
Müller challenges the totalitarian misuse of sexuality and gender that led to a highly 
poisonous system of gender relationships. She attributes the emphasis on gender 
and sexuality in her work to the fact that, during the dictatorship, all areas of the 
citizen’s life were colonised, including the sexual. The erotic is both a site of 
oppression and a useful, necessary release valve for all the fears and anxieties: 
under the dictatorship, relationships and desires gain a more intense, immediate 
and yet particularly vulnerable character (Müller and Klammer, 2014: 108). Müller is 
especially interested in how distorted structures of gender and sexuality impact on 
human relationships: ‘I see humans, how they seem to act freely and do not know 
that they do so under certain constraints, that they are part of a mechanism, that 
they act with the freedom of string puppets. I try to depict this mechanism‘ (cited in 
Eke, 1991: 12; o.t.). 
In her considerations of how structures such as gender and sexuality define and 
inform resistance to the totalitarian state, Müller describes various forms of 
oppression, from rape to sexual harassment as part of political interrogations. The 
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 Müller also breaks with the Euclidean notion of container space where space is merely the 




cases are framed by her critique of the regime’s inhumane reproductive health 
policies, part of a pro-nationalist population strategy banning contraceptives and 
abortions: ‘the state monitored the most private of humans, intimacy was owned by 
the state. Nasty methods were used to enforce check-ups on women, as they for 
example needed attestation by a gynaecologist to access treatment by a dentist’ 
(Müller and Klammer, 2014: 107; o.t.). 
Müller highlights the interpersonal reproduction of domination. Although she makes 
a point about depicting both men and women as victims and perpetrators, they differ 
in that women’s power remains derivative and secondary to men’s and Müller often 
describes their power as a response to male violence (Bauer, 2013).28 Women are 
caught in two hierarchical power relations, a patriarchal and a totalitarian. Both men 
and women are in a sense the victims and enactors of the asymmetrical 
interdependence, but it is men who are in a position to systematically exploit their 
dominance over women. Müller’s story is therefore also one of (distorted) patriarchal 
structures in the contexts of her village and Romania more generally. Rural and city 
life followed strict division of labour, men occupying positions said to require force or 
authority, a system only gradually transformed by the introduction of machines 
(Müller and Klammer, 2014: 58).29 
Attentive to the gender dynamics of her time, Müller’s ethos of reality seeks to open 
up a space in which resistance is possible – in full awareness that any resistance 
must successfully negotiate the system of gender domination as she herself tries to. 
Her female characters are deeply shaped by the sexual violence they experience 
every day. They also continuously find ways of taking control of their bodies and 
sexuality, often seeking to participate in the exchange economy in ways that enable 
them to protect themselves from the threats of living under a dictatorship. Yet, 
whatever strategy the protagonists involved in sexual domination employ, Müller 
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 Possibly the most prominent example of male sexual victimhood in connection to Müller is 
her friend Oskar Pastior, turned informant to evade reprisals for his homosexuality. 
29
 A farmer’s wife, Müller notes in an interview, seems to have little independence in such a 
patriarchal context and yet, her individuality and sense of self emerges out of practising a 
pragmatist self-confidence, out of always being seemingly able to respond appropriately to 
life (Müller, 1998: 19). Müller however remains sceptical of this pragmatism, and her 
scepticism is informed by the (political) blindness that came with it in her ethnic group, as 
captured by her mother: traumatised by the labour camp and struggling with her husband’s 
alcoholism, the writer’s mother practiced an obsession with cleaning as a means to escape 




always articulates the looming negative consequences and the heightened 
vulnerability that comes with it, defying any desire for a break-through moment.30 
Language provided another structure of central importance in the relationship 
between Romania’s citizens and between citizens and the totalitarian state. Müller’s 
considerations on language as a tool of oppression and resistance are framed by 
her distinct position to her mother tongue, German, and to Romanian. I will address 
the gap caused by her movement between the two languages as part of the 
discussion of her writing approach in section 5.3. For now, my analysis focuses on 
how Müller approaches the political character of language and resists a simplistic 
connection between one’s language and homeliness. Language, for Müller, means 
initially the German she learned in Nitzkydorf. An Austrian variation of German, the 
rural dialect is said to have ‘slowed down’ as if encapsulating an agricultural life at 
the periphery of the Habsburg empire (Müller and Lentz, 2010: 41). Later on, she 
encounters Romanian, as a more lyrical language rooted in its folkloric tradition. 
Both languages became political instruments, and Müller surmises that all 
dictatorships instrumentalise language (Müller, 2010: 37). The first oppressive 
regime she encountered consisted in the Banat village’s regime of conformity. Müller 
recreates the linguistic working of this dictatorship through the use of the proverb 
‘the devil is seated in the mirror’ for the title of one of her novels.31 This proverb, 
representative of numerous phrases taught to children by their family to curb 
individuality, characterises how language was used as a form of indoctrination: ‘one 
puts something into people’s heads through a harmless phrase, which later gets 
stuck and takes effect in various situations. That is how you control people’ (Müller, 
1998: 17; o.t.). 
Language is for Müller innately political as it is tied to the relationships and 
interactions between people. Because of the danger of political misuse, Müller is 
especially disconcerted by the fact that German writers confronted her with the 
notion that ‘language is homeland’ (Müller, 2010: 33). She notes the problematic 
origin of this term – its use by emigrants fleeing from a totalitarian Germany – and 
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 This is representatively visible in the case of Lola in The Land of the Green Plums, who 
defies the exchange system by engaging in numerous sexual activities before becoming 
pregnant and committing suicide.  
31
 The devil in the mirror is meant to warn against vices including vanity, but Müller reads it 





the xenophobic character of those nationalists in Germany and Romania who 
continue to rely on the term ‘homeland’. Her scepticism also links back to her 
general focus on a life in the detail as response to a context where 
home/homeliness has become foreign and a place of insecurity. Contra this naïve 
relationship with language, Müller encourages a critical engagement with language 
that considers in each case what meaning is conveyed and whether the action that 
language motivates is legitimate or unacceptable, good or bad (Müller, 2010: 46f.). 
And, while language, like gender dynamics, may at first seem to offer little in 
resistance, Müller finds new ways in which language moves from being a tool of 
interrogation and terror to providing a tool for resistance. These gain their full force 
in relation to her approach to writing. 
 
5.2.3 Plurality through Friendship 
The pluralist dimension to being human refers to the fact that humans share a world 
in common which they can only make hospitable together. Furthermore, pluralism 
captures the fact that, as each person has a partial perspective on the world, they 
have to rely on others to make suitable judgements and come to terms with reality. 
In Müller’s work plurality is framed by her insight that to retain moral integrity in the 
private sphere necessitated public failure (Müller and Klammer, 2014: 40). Put 
differently, to be successful under a totalitarian regime likely requires compromises 
and showing support for the regime, both of which leaves a person in a difficult 
moral situation. Plurality under Ceauşescu’s rule proved highly constrained and 
distorted, undermined by a state-produced ‘ugly’ equality in all areas, from 
architecture and fashion, to the party language (Müller and Klammer, 2014: 73, 76). 
In Müller’s childhood, plurality is primarily visible in the form of an acceptance of 
one’s common identity, which in the German minority was presupposed rather than 
being formed in the process of acting together. The oppressive silence of the village 
created a state of loneliness further heightened by Müller’s realisation that her own 
‘abnormality’ had to be hidden from others (Müller and Klammer, 2014: 17f.).32 The 
Aktionsgruppe Banat proved therefore crucial for Müller in discovering something 
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 Highly limited forms of solidarity emerged only between the deported who brought back 
from the labour camps a common, short hairstyle and teeth prostheses – external 
manifestations of the suffering caused by the terrible conditions in the camps, and the former 




akin to a pluralist public sphere, in which views could be shared and strategies 
developed against the secret police. 
While such forms of togetherness and friendship can be looked at as ersatz 
pluralism, it too is marred by encroachment of the alien gaze. Müller later discovered 
that the secret police had bugged their rooms and used the information gathered 
clandestinely against the group. Her writing and its increasing success in Germany 
opened up another public sphere to Müller, but again, the pluralist dimension to 
being human was undermined by the Securitate’s extensive strategy of publicly 
defaming her (Müller and Klammer, 2014: 168f.). If we accept, as Müller does, that 
to be human is to meaningfully share a world together, the question therefore 
remains: what could friendship offer under these extreme circumstances? 
Positively, friendship may have offered a means to cope with the planned fear 
produced by the secret police (Müller and Klammer, 2014: 114). Emblematic in this 
respect is fellow worker and friend Jenny who, despite being part of the Romanian 
political elite, remained supportive. Müller had been terrorised to force her to quit: 
she was removed from her office and rumours were spread about her being a 
collaborator. The friend nonetheless chose to sit with Müller during lunch and share 
a private friendship (2014: 150ff.). This support and confirmation by another person 
was of utmost importance to Müller during this difficult period. 
Jenny is, however, also a reminder that friendship is always potentially a source of 
fragility. Jenny became susceptible to the secret police’s manipulation strategies 
following a diagnosis of terminal cancer. Desperate to see her friend, she agreed to 
spy on Müller, who by then had emigrated and settled in Berlin. Because of the 
importance of their friendship, this betrayal hit Müller particularly hard. It proved a 
traumatic event that Müller has tried to come to terms with throughout her work, not 
least as Jenny offered her a friendship outside the targeted artistic circles and 
therefore some distance and ‘normalcy’ – Jenny and Müller enjoyed conversations 
about non-political topics (Müller and Klammer, 2014: 148). Thus, friendship for 
Müller can at best avoid facing the terror alone, and help cope with the planned fear 
of the secret police. For this function, the relationships are close and tight-knit, as 
visible in her relations with the Aktionsgruppe Banat. Friends help share and 
temporarily ignore the fear (Müller and Klammer, 2014: 113f.). They cannot prevent 
or hinder the destruction of the individual as each is targeted separately and 




Friendship thus cannot provide a suitable alternative to a public sphere. The 
Securitate acknowledged the friends from her literary and cultural circles as a ‘we’-
group of resistance and set out to exploit the weaknesses of a collective. 
Additionally, people sought to avoid engaging and being seen with potential targets 
of the secret police, in fear of becoming oneself a target. Jenny and other people 
who ignored this separation between those subversive and the nomenclature were 
at great risk. This meant that friendship was restricted to those who were already 
targets of the secret police (Müller and Klammer, 2014: 112). Given that the 
measure of worldliness, instantiated through friendship, offers only limited 
protection, the totalitarian devastation achieved its full potential. 
Friendship as source of plurality found its low point in Müller’s life with the death of 
two friends. She was forced to find a different medium to express her life in the 
detail: ‘I searched for words for the fear we had in common. I wanted to show what 
friendship looks like when it is no longer self-evident that one will survive’ (Müller, 
2008: 62; o.t.). Another world-building form of judgement was needed, and Müller 





5.3 Writing in Defence of an Ethos of Reality 
At stake for Müller and the regime under which she lived until 1987 was nothing less 
than control over the human ability to independently judge and come to terms with 
reality. Contra the de-humanising reductionisms of the Romanian dictatorship, 
Müller proposed ‘living in the detail’. It starts off with the basic survival strategy of 
maintaining one’s sense of self from one moment to another – to simply hold on and 
avoid giving up – and requires attentiveness to the three components that together 
constitute the common world: agency, structure, and plurality. Their function is 
curbed by the totalitarian experience and the encroachment of the ‘alien gaze’. 
Müller therefore mounts her strongest defence against the persecution: a form of 
writing that she terms ‘invented perception’. This writing seeks to strengthen a sense 
of reality, by insisting on the complexity of social processes. It opens up space in the 
description of the world for all three components of human existence to play their 
part. The success of writing in Müller’s case depends on whether it allows her to 
maintain, build and protect a common world denied by the state, as the source for 
concrete judgements that take the dualism and pluralism of human existence into 
account. It does not depend on the reproduction of the potential of structures, 
agency, and plurality by other means.33 
Müller’s political judgement through writing is dedicated to the production of what 
she terms ‘erfundene Wahrnehmung’ (Müller, 1991: 38), invented perception. This 
form of realisation is a variation of what I term affirming a multi-layered, shared 
reality, and entails the use of autofiction, surrealism, and the gap between 
Romanian and German. It is the inversion of percepticide, the motivated separation 
from reality, because invented perception seeks to rebuild our sense of reality. In 
order to understand what Müller means by this form of realisation, we first need to 
consider the particular role she attributes to everyday realities that motivate 
invention. From this consideration emerges once more the central motto of her 
response to the dictatorship, ‘life in the detail’. Building on these insights I analyse 
the three strategies autofiction, surrealism, and the valorisation of the gap between 
languages as her means to exploit the motto without falling for reductive narratives. 
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 The purpose of invented perception is not to replace the deformed interplay of structure, 
agency, and plurality with writing and its unique ability to re-create reality, but to both show 





The continuous harassment in the factory and the death of Müller’s father brought 
back the village experience and led her to search for some alternative hold in 
writing.34 The need to write was therefore instinctive, part of the immediate survival 
strategy by living in the detail. Müller was compelled to put forward something 
protected from the regime’s vigilant eyes by entering a quasi-fictional terrain (2010: 
18). Admittedly, writing may seem, at first, an unlikely solution when faced with the 
demands for a defence against fear and terror. To write is not to resolve the 
challenges to daily life under a dictatorship. If anything, writing ensures a more in-
depth immersion in an environment of terror, as it often comes with a cultivation of a 
particular sensibility for the way the world is. Müller is certainly no exception to this 
problem for writers.35 
Müller’s extension of ‘life in the detail’ through writing is further faced with the 
difficulty of how to depict life under the Romanian dictatorship without creating a 
pedagogic, ideological book ‘with reverse sign’ (Müller, 1998: 18). Müller seeks to 
avoid any connections between her writing and Socialist Realism, i.e. the 
compulsory style of glorified depiction of communist values cultivated by the 
communist regime, which provides a highly reductive narrative of reality.36 This form 
of realism contributed significantly to Müller’s desire for the fictional and literary, and 
its capacity to create a space for reality to be complicated (Müller, 1998: 18). 
Painfully aware of these tensions that arise from the connection between writing and 
a ‘life in the detail’, Müller nonetheless insists that writing, over time, provides some 
certainty, some internal stability that can be used to oppose the pervasive fear 
(Müller and Klammer, 2014: 42; Müller and Lentz, 2010: 7, 15). To write is to 
hopefully gain access to the many things that have been silenced, distorted and 
perverted, to reveal the truths about everyday reality by expressing them in the 
simplistic beauty, and precision, of a written sentence (Müller and Klammer, 2014: 
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 Haines reads Müller in connection with Arendt. She concludes that it is ‘gestures, objects, 
and the free life of words that, for Müller, lend some temporary stability to Arendt’s subject in 
crisis’ (Haines, 2013: 104). 
35
 The complicated relationship between writing and a need to resist by living in the detail is 
further heightened through Müller’s rejection of any means-ends-thinking about literature. 
She emphasises that writing would be unlikely to fulfil the demands put upon it (Müller and 
Lentz, 2010: 8). 
36
 What particularly concerned her about the potential corruption of her work by Socialist 
Realism is its connection to utopian thinking: ‘utopias implemented in reality have always 
turned into misfortune. They always created dictatorships. For me, this was self-evident. If an 





77). Her first attempts, including the novel Niederungen, enabled reflection on what 
had been silenced in her home-village (Müller and Klammer, 2014: 81). 
The different meanings – rather than functions – of writing interlink for Müller 
through her concern with individuality: the quality of a text is defined by its ability to 
create a ‘rush in the head’ that undermines silence and ideology, and produces new 
understanding and meaning both in Müller and her readers (Müller, 2010: 23f.). Its 
beauty depends on whether it reveals a multi-layered reality, and how it purposefully 
avoids protecting humans from the truth by provoking a wild, independent thought 
beyond dogmatic presuppositions. Invented perception lacks direct reality and yet, 
crucially, enables a new, different perspective on reality (Müller and Lentz, 2010: 
39). And, although writing remains an individual and silent activity, Müller further 
uses it as a platform for discussions with her audience, publishing essays and 
providing numerous interviews in German and Romanian. In seeking to strengthen 
the ‘it-seems-to-me’, to create a more hospitable common world, and in interacting 
with others to do so, Müller’s writing constitutes an exemplary political judgement 
that helps sustain a suitable ethos of reality. 
There are numerous literary devices that Müller deploys to achieve this invented 
perception in her writings, starting with the focus on autofiction. By autofiction Müller 
means that her work relies on a first-person narrator resembling Müller and that it 
constructs stories by relying on true occurrences.37 The choice of autofiction is a 
consequence of living under a state that forces the individual to engage with the 
question of how to live as a person under a totalitarian regime, and that turns the 
aesthetic into a space of political contestation. Müller uses her real experiences as a 
background, which is then extensively rewritten into fiction that shares similarities 
with reality, without directly reproducing any particular fact or event. Her fictionalised 
reality is hence juxtaposed to the contorted reality experienced, and achieves its 
credibility because of the latter – the experience of numerous actual interrogations 
enables the invention of a fictional situation of interrogation (Müller, 1998: 15, 18). 
Müller frames autofiction with what commentator Paola Bozzi identifies as surfiction 
– the critical encounter with the ‘fictional’ nature of reality (Bozzi, 2013). By this she 
means that surfiction rejects any clear-cut divide between reality and fiction, where 
the latter, fiction, is merely an ‘unreal’ abstraction of the former. Surficition combined 
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with autofiction thus becomes a form of realist surrealism or surreal realism. Indeed, 
Müller does not understand surrealism as an alternative to reality, but rather as a 
deeper version of reality, as she seeks to capture the surrealism inside reality. In her 
Leipzig poetry lecture following the award of the Nobel Prize in 2009, Müller 
accordingly stated that for her ‘reality is something far further reaching than others 
might suggest. How far does reality reach, and where and when does surrealism 
begin? It certainly does not start outside the real and not underneath it. The surreal 
is always inside reality’; many may ‘believe that the surrealism goes above or deep 
beneath reality. I simply go inside, to find the surreal’ (Müller and Lentz, 2010: 35f.). 
Autofiction thus offers the first means by which Müller recreates the multi-layered 
character of reality as the source of a hospitable common world that enables her to 
judge and come to terms with this difficult context. 
Müller’s invented perception, or surreal realism, gains in strength through her 
reliance on fragmented narratives. Discontinuity is for Müller not the opposite of 
reality: we might perceive reality as continuous and embedded in simple stories with 
clear directions and with a beginning and an end; in reality, as Müller emphasises, 
objects and events around us remain scattered and their connections complex 
(Müller, 1998: 18). Yet, the prevalence of fragmentation in her work38 does not mean 
that the Nobel laureate denies the narrative dimension to reality altogether. 
Continuity and discontinuity are part of a multi-layered reality in which some things 
are connected and numerous things happen at the same time. 
Other literary devices exploring the nexus between realism and surrealism include a 
particular attentiveness to the role of dreams and to how children, in taking things 
(too) literally, often reveal a surrealism that can make manifest something concrete, 
otherwise hidden (Müller, 1998: 18; Müller and Klammer, 2014: 21). Furthermore, 
Müller relies on repetitive use of numerous metaphors, including objects such as the 
nut in Herztier/heart animal (2015a) or a king in Der König verbeugt sich und tötet/ 
the king bows and kills (2010). These metaphors are increasingly estranged from 
their original context and given numerous levels of meaning that help reproduce a 
sense of complexity and ambiguity to reality.39 The estranged terms are however 
also returned to their original contexts and resolved, which helps Müller maintain the 
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connection between reality, especially materiality, and fiction in her political 
judgement (Müller, 1998: 18). All of these devices serve to create, build, and protect 
a common world as part of which Müller is able to make concrete judgements about 
her context that affirm the multi-layered character of reality, contra the state 
narratives. 
Lastly, Müller’s production of invented perception gains in strength through her use 
of the gap between her mother tongue German and the second language she 
learned in her youth, Romanian. As Haines argues, ‘Müller’s texts create an 
Arendtian newness out of a reconfiguration of the gaps between languages and 
words’ (2013: 102). Typical example is the pheasant, from her novel Der Mensch ist 
ein großer Fasan auf der Welt (Müller, 2006, english: The Passport), an animal that 
for Germans epitomises arrogance and for Romanians being a loser. The gap is in 
part a result of Müller’s lack of affection for her mother tongue, which she associates 
with her stifling community in the natal village. German, at best, provides her with a 
useful familiarity (Müller, 2010: 32). Romanian lacks this familiarity and Müller rarely 
writes in Romanian. However, by having to learn the language abruptly upon her 
arrival in the city aged 15, and struggling to do so, it is also a language Müller learnt 
much more consciously. This gave her time to appreciate the gap between German 
and Romanian, the way things have different meanings in the two languages 
(Müller, 2010: 31). 
Romanian takes part in all her German writings, and both languages encounter each 
other with every newly learned word (Müller, 2010: 32; Müller and Klammer, 2014: 
84, 86). The language offers a particularly potent contribution here because it 
diverges significantly from Germanic languages. Müller claims that Romanian has 
also remained closer to its folklore roots which offer the language protection from 
the totalitarian inversion of language (2014: 87f.). This Romanian, Müller argued ‘is 
in its sensuality and in its way of looking at the world, completely different, and I was 
always much closer to this different way of looking at the world. Structurally, this 
language’s images, the metaphors, the idioms, and the folklore have always suited 




poetic connections between words and extend her surreal realist conception (Müller 
and Klammer, 2014: 49).40 
At the same time, language is a structure deeply embedded in the oppressive 
mechanisms of the dictatorship and, as articulated in section 5.2, Müller exploits 
language as a tool for writing in order to simultaneously highlight the multi-faceted 
role of language. The gap helps create a situated position sufficiently distanced to 
help interrogate the structural underpinnings of her culture and to simultaneously 
impose one’s own individuality – as Müller exploits the gap to give new meaning to 
words. The gap also forces upon the reader a choice between meanings and thus 
creates, once more, a rush in the head. Dis-embedded from the familiarity of one’s 
own language, Müller’s play with words sustains multiple layers of meaning to a 
reality and also, crucially, an echo of the plurality of perspectives on shared objects 
that should be available to humans as they seek to come to terms with reality. 
In sum, the writer Herta Müller offers an insight into what political judgement framed 
by a less reductive ethos of reality in practice might look like by focusing our 
attention on the difficult context of Romania between 1965 and 1989. Her ethos is 
encapsulated by the motto ‘to live in the detail’ and centres around a strategy of 
upholding the complexity of reality. She attends to how the ethnic German minority 
and the Romanian dictatorship sought to destroy both personhood and a world in 
common. This I identified as the first objective of a less reductive ethos of reality: to 
explore the pernicious reductionisms of a multi-layered reality that impoverishes the 
common world. Müller also affirms the need to create and protect a common world 
independent from the distorting strategies deployed by the secret police. Writing 
offers an appropriate political judgement, and maintains the ethos of reality by 
combining an everyday survival strategy of ‘life in the detail’ with the abstraction and 
estrangement of surrealism. Deploying a number of different devices, including 
autofiction and the gap between languages, Müller’s work can thus be read as 
illustrative of the framework I develop in this thesis: the affirmation of a multi-
layered, shared reality through which critical evaluation of events is made possible 
without falling for a problematic strategy of reductionism. As I indicated above during 
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my discussion of a suitable toolkit for evaluating political judgement, such a less 
reductive ethos can only be achieved through an engagement with its three 
components: structure, agency, and plurality. My discussion of Müller’s reflection on 
gender, sexuality, language, materiality, reflexivity, and friendship has illustrated that 
Müller is sufficiently attentive to both the dualist and pluralist dimension of political 
judgement. This makes Müller exemplary of the kind of ethos of reality I wish to put 





My interrogation into political judgement started with the observation that recent 
public debate, informed by social movements including Black Lives Matter and 
#metoo, has seemingly made it impossible for the privileged to deny their complicity 
in systemic injustice and oppression. I also argued that the continued, widespread 
failure to affirm complicity and take responsibility should serve as a catalyst for a 
sustained engagement with how we judge responsibility-for-complicity. The thesis 
contributes to this project by providing a refined theoretical toolkit centred on 
debates about judgement, complicity, and social conditioning. 
An attempt to transform late modern injustices must address the issue of how 
humans disavow their complicity and responsibility in the suffering of others. Recent 
approaches to responsiveness have taken up the challenge of disavowal. They 
insist on theorising different ways of cultivating a greater receptivity towards 
domination and exploitation. I showed that they remain caught by a problematic 
duality of oppressive structures and responsive agency that relies too heavily on 
ruptures and heightened agency as the source of social transformation. The ethics 
of responsiveness approach fails to account for the role that structures and human 
agencies play, together, in resistance and oppression. To avoid these limitations, I 
propose a focus on a less reductive ethos of reality, by which I mean a stance 
towards reality attentive to the dualism and pluralism of the human condition. This 
ethos, as a distinct ethico-political project, should inform how we judge 
responsibility-for-complicity. By way of conclusion, I shall provide a brief summary of 
the contribution this thesis has sought to make, including a review of the key 
findings in each chapter, a discussion of lessons and limitations, and a postulation of 
potential trajectories for further research. 
Key Conclusions 
This thesis puts forward three key findings. First, in response to debates on how 
human beings can judge their responsibility-for-complicity in injustice and 
oppression, I showed that we must focus on our sense of and engagement with 
reality as a neglected, irreducible and paramount problem of political theory. 
Chapter 1 retraced Hannah Arendt’s thought and highlighted the relationship she 
identified between a person’s sense of reality, the potential of a pluralist public 
sphere, and reflective judgement. Their interdependence gains in importance 




century’s totalitarianism. The break in tradition also enables the re-positioning of 
human activities in the gap between past and future, for which politics plays a crucial 
role. 
Arendt connects politics and reality through a thick conception of plurality, by which I 
mean the implications she drew from the fact that humans can only make the world 
hospitable together. She identified three key elements to the human condition of 
plurality, the distinction and sameness of human beings, and the existence of a 
common world. This notion of plurality stands opposed to a dominant view in society 
and political philosophy that perceives politics as reducible to means-ends-thinking 
and focuses on issues of sovereignty, violence, and authority. In its place, Arendt 
highlighted that politics, in the form of acting together in the gap between past and 
future, enables people to appeal to others without reliance on exhaustive moral 
frameworks and, in so doing, produces meaning. 
Pluralist politics maintains the separation and interconnection between people, and 
enables objects to appear and become issues of common interest and contestation. 
Judgement contributes to this political manifestation of plurality and its capacity to 
facilitate an appropriate engagement with reality, by enabling people to take up a 
position towards public appearances. In particular, reflective judgement brings 
together a plurality of spectators and actors, incorporates plurality through 
representative thought, and is oriented by and informs a community sense through 
which people can refine their ‘it-seems-to-me’. Together these various mechanisms 
enable a judging person to enlarge their sense of reality by interacting with others, 
without ever reaching objectivity or losing sight of one’s partial, yet unique, 
perspective on the world. 
The second finding of this thesis concentrated on the connection between the 
conceptualisation of political judgement and the issue of social conditioning. Chapter 
2 summarised the debate that followed Arendt’s theorisation on political judgement, 
and identified two phases with a variety of different responses. The second phase 
directs attention particularly to the problem of how judgement can gain critical 
purchase – once freed from the clutches of rationalism and supposedly universal 
principles. I considered a number of theorists who respond through a discussion of 
the related concepts imagination, emotions, the unconscious, storytelling, and the 
pre-discursive structuring of judgement. Through their projects, the thesis gained 




increasingly seeking answers by looking at the interplay between structure and 
agency. 
The thesis extended the insights of judgement scholars by connecting Arendt’s 
political thought with Margaret Archer’s realist social theory. I propose a 
hybridisation of Arendt’s and Archer’s work as the suitable means to capture the 
inescapable dualism of structure-agency and pluralism that underpins judgement. 
Archer shares Arendt’s concern with attending to a multi-layered reality and with 
modern dehumanising tendencies. In response, Archer proposes a morphogenetic 
approach to structure and agency: we, social and political theorists alike, need to 
consider the analytically and temporally separate powers and mechanisms of 
agency and structure that shape society, to explain when social reproduction or 
transformation occurs. Chapter 3 took from Archer that the second dimension to 
political judgement requires attentiveness to the dualism of structure-agency or, in 
short, objectivism, subjectivism, and their mediation through reflexivity. A focus on 
the distinct properties and mechanisms of structure and agency amounts to a 
commitment to a mind-independent, stratified reality alongside a concern with 
personhood that is embodied, emotional, relational, capable of social innovation, 
and with a sense of self, emerging out of a varied engagement with a stratified 
world. The dualist approach enables judgement scholars to attend to the object and 
subject of judgement, without denying their interrelation or the crucial role that a 
public sphere plays for judgements. 
The third finding of this thesis is therefore that we should judge existing responses 
to complicity by their ability to account for the dualism and pluralism to judgement, 
i.e. their capacity to create, build, maintain, and protect a world that is multi-layered 
and held in common, through a suitable focus on the interplay of structure, agency, 
and plurality. This focus translates into a less reductive ethos of reality, by which I 
mean a normative project tied to a person’s stance towards reality with two 
objectives: i) to respond to the subjective, objective, and intersubjective powers and 
mechanisms that impoverish the common world, notably the systematic 
reductionism of a multi-layered reality; ii) to identify and engender contributions by 
structure, agency, and plurality that facilitate a more hospitable, flourishing common 
world as the prism through which we can make concrete judgements on 




Chapter 4 went back to the starting point of this project, complicity in systemic 
injustice and oppression, and showed the comparative merits of my approach over 
competing theorisation of this problem. The importance of adhering to dualism and 
pluralism in judging complicity became evident in my discussion of the 
methodological individualism that continues to frame the dominant legal and moral 
philosophical perspective on complicity, but also in the critical responses that 
opposed it, most recently through an ethics of responsiveness. The proponents of 
such an ethics build on post-structuralist thought and the work of Iris Young, which 
sought to articulate a broader conception of complicity as taking up collective 
responsibility and affirming human foldedness in contexts of systemic injustice and 
oppression. This ethics highlights that, although both poststructuralists and Young 
acknowledge socially embedded human agency, they nonetheless fail to account for 
the cultivation of responsiveness towards the marginalised, victimised, excluded, 
and suffering. This is something that authors who build on these perspectives do. 
While supportive of their attempts to expand the critical alternatives by engaging 
with the problem of receptivity, I criticised the ethics for the image of a duality that 
comes with their proposals for how humans can become more responsive to 
injustice. The duality opposes deeply rooted systemic injustice with receptive 
agency, which leads to a theorisation of responsiveness in separation from the 
structural contributions to transformation. 
Chapter 5 took up the challenge of mapping out how actual judgements of 
responsibility-for-complicity, embedded in an ethos of reality, could look like. I drew 
on the reflections of Romanian Nobel laureate Herta Müller in her interviews and 
essays. Müller responded to the everyday challenges of resistance and complicity 
during the Romanian communist dictatorship. The writer’s ethos of reality is 
captured by a resistant practice of ‘living in the detail’, which highlights the need to 
hold on to the complexity of reality and the concreteness of particulars contra a 
regime that distorted reality to oppress its citizens. The complex layers of reality are 
articulated in Müller’s work, which serves to protect an alternative reality, through 
attentiveness to variations in agency, the contributions of objects, places, and 
structures, and the friendships and exchanges that together create a hospitable 
common world. Literary devices including autofiction and surrealism serve to 
maintain the ambiguity and complexity of this reality, as they deny the closure and 




Put together, my thesis hybridised Archer’s and Arendt’s distinct contributions to 
social and political theory, to propose a less reductive ethos of reality that focuses 
on human’s engagement with structure, agency, and plurality as the source for 
facing and coming to terms with reality. Judgement should be orientated by our 
sense of and need to give meaning to reality. Taking up responsibility-for-complicity 
in injustice and oppression therefore depends on a person’s ability to cultivate such 
an ethos as one of the paramount demands of politics. 
Contribution 
The thesis contributes to debates on judgement, on structure-agency, and on 
complicity, and I combined their insights to engage with a variety of other scholars 
and schools of thought. The first debate centres on Arendt’s political thought and her 
theorisation of reflective judgement. The numerous companions and handbooks 
currently in production and recently published (Baehr and Walsh, 2017; Bernstein, 
2018; Gratton and Sari, 2020; Hayden, 2014; Krimstein, 2018) attest to the fact that 
Arendt’s thought remains highly relevant for contemporary political theory. The 
widespread use of her thought is also visible in the diversity of scholarship drawing 
on Arendt, some of which I reconstructed in the debate on judgement in chapter 2. 
Nonetheless, scholarship is still grappling with the tensions that emerged in Arendt’s 
thought, and, alongside social-political theory more generally, it remains caught 
between a desire for a priori principles and a socially attuned framework informed by 
post-colonial and feminist literature. Debates on Arendt also continue to shy away 
from social theorising, as they retain Arendt’s scepticism towards social sciences, 
which makes them ill-equipped to explore the kind of insights I drew from debates 
on structure and agency and in particular Archer. This lacuna leaves many 
questions unanswered – especially on the ‘realist’ dimensions to Arendt’s thought. 
The thesis offers an initial attempt to reveal the contribution that hybridising Arendt’s 
insights and a sympathetic social theoretical account of human agency can provide. 
Sharpening Arendt’s formulation of the different dimensions on which a common 
world – and with it judgement – builds, this thesis seeks to take forward the dialogue 
on judgement with major scholars to which it is indebted, notably Ferrara, 
Azmanova, and Zerilli, and with Arendt scholarship more generally. 
Feminist, post-structuralist, and Bourdieusian scholars have helped uncover and 
counter-balance problematic tendencies in Arendtian conceptions of the political and 




relationships of conflict and domination that they consider constitutive of it. The 
thesis seeks to take seriously both the normative insights of Arendt and the need to 
embed her insights in contemporary social and political theoretical debates. 
Substantiation through Archer’s realist social theory, I claim, achieves this, because 
she leaves space for the Arendtian normative commitments and adds concreteness 
on social conditioning. Put simply, Archer helps maintain a focus on human agency 
that avoids reverting to a conception of dis-embedded mastery of the world through 
a rational human, but also avoids the image of humans as embodied, largely 
unconscious, social vessels where reflexivity and receptivity come only into play in 
sporadic moments of crisis. The thesis thus seeks to help refine the critique of 
Arendt further. 
The second debate concerns Margaret Archer’s realist social theory and the critical 
realist insights into structure and agency. My main aim has been to show the 
complementarity of Arendt and Archer’s thought while highlighting their distinct 
contributions. Critical realists tackle a wide variety of key issue in social theory, from 
meta-theoretical considerations about scientific enquiry to renewed efforts to 
conceive of reflexivity, and the normative project of ensuring human flourishing in 
late modern societies. The school of thought nonetheless reproduces broader social 
theoretical tendencies to give preference to socio-economic concerns over the 
political dictum to give meaning to reality through a strong pluralist public sphere.1 
Following the lead of Arendtian social theorists Philip Walsh and Peter Baehr, I 
sought to highlight the contribution that Arendt and political theory can bring to social 
theory through their particular focus on politics. 
Thirdly, this thesis addresses debates on complicity and provides a critical 
evaluation of its key commitments together with a counterproposal of introducing a 
less reductive ethos of reality. The thesis aligns with critical positions that have done 
much to illustrate the varied ways in which power works on and through judgement. I 
therefore hope that this thesis offers an opportunity to engage in dialogue with a 
position that does not follow the dominant binary of methodological individualist, 
rational approaches and post-modern and critical theory perspectives, but instead 
provides a means to interrogate both in order to develop their sophisticated 
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accounts further. Accommodating concerns with identifying morally wrongful acts 
and culpable agents, as well as the need to cultivate greater receptivity towards 
those excluded and suffering, the cultivation of a less reductive ethos of reality 
provides the pre-condition that these demands could lead to positive social 
transformation. Rather than tackling the moral and legal philosophical challenges of 
injustice directly, the thesis contributes by adding precision to the ever-changing 
articulation of the potential in being human. In hybridising Arendt and Archer, the 
thesis seeks to provoke renewed efforts to account for agency in all its contingency, 
neither to immortalise, idealise, and glorify, nor to succumb to scepticism and denial 
when faced with the numerous challenges of late modernity.  
Potential Criticisms 
Leading on from this overview of the findings, argument, and contribution of the 
thesis, and prior to an articulation of the potential avenues for further research, I 
shall address some potential criticisms one might wish to raise against my 
argument. As a primarily theoretical project, the thesis would benefit from empirical 
research, for example into reflective judgement and its connection to the identified 
changes to reflexivity in late modernity. In awareness of this limitation, I have 
refrained from stretching the extensive empirical research done by Archer beyond its 
original purpose. The restriction undoubtedly leaves an important gap to be filled by 
research into the relationship between political judgement and reflexivity, as well as 
into politics as Arendt understood it and the conditions of late modernity. For such a 
project to get off the ground, however, significant under-labouring is necessary. To 
this end, I sought to provide an appropriate articulation of Arendt’s and Archer’s 
positions. For the purpose of an imminent critique of approaches to responsibility, 
complicity, and judgement, the theoretical insights prove crucial. Furthermore, in 
light of the continued dominance of an emphasis on ‘burdens to judgement’ in 
political theory and the social imperialism in contemporary social sciences, there is a 
particular value in revealing the combined force of the humanising project that 
emerges out of Arendt’s and Archer’s theoretical and normative, rather than 
necessarily empirical, insights. 
A second challenge may focus on the (over-)emphasis on three dimensions, 
structure, agency, and plurality, which risks obscuring other categories, e.g. time 
and space, that could potentially help evaluate the limitations of how people take 




separation of the three dimensions is insufficiently attentive to their interplay. 
Chapter 4 underlined the value of a focus on the separate categories of structure, 
agency, and plurality. It provides an important tool that lays bare the traditional 
failures of a conceptualisation and exercise of complicity. Theorists of complicity 
show an acute awareness of the challenge of structure-agency and the need to 
create a hospitable world amidst systemic violence and injustices; the failure of their 
sophisticated responses to account for the dualism and pluralism of judgement is 
therefore particularly problematic. It raises serious doubts about their ability to 
contribute to positive social transformation, which, after all, is the common normative 
project of complicity scholars. 
Lastly, readers might challenge a turn to critical realism without a prior consideration 
of the realist position available in contemporary political theory. Arendt had a 
strained relationship with major political realists, notably Isaiah Berlin (Dubnov, 
2017; Hiruta, 2014), and a comparison of their work may help delineate Arendt’s 
contribution to a less reductive ethos of reality further. While I agree that political 
realists provide a means to distinguish Arendt’s pluralist realism further, they lack a 
suitable approach to political judgement and recent realist criticisms of Rawls do not 
provide a sustained attempt at putting forward a comprehensive alternative to 
Arendt’s realism (Bourke and Geuss, 2009; Galston, 2010; cf. Vogler and Tillyris, 
2019). 
Further Research 
In response to the potential limitations, but also from within the various debates that 
I considered, arise a number of ways in which the insights in this thesis warrant 
extension. The changing interrelationship between structure, agency, and plurality in 
late modernity, for example, provides much potential for further investigation and re-
imagination.2 The following focuses on one avenue for further research that I take to 
be particularly important and most neglected in this thesis and in contemporary 
social and political theory: a systematic approach to the common world. Such a 
project gains in urgency, as the constitution of a hospitable and flourishing common 
world is crucial in articulating a positive response to systemic injustice and political 
oppression. My hybridisation of Arendt’s pluralism and Archer’s dualism goes some 
way in refining our understanding of the three components that constitute the 
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common world, structure, agency, and plurality. A failure to address adequately one 
of the three dimensions of being human risks falling back into an overly structuralist 
or individualist conception of reality. However, worldliness and common world 
remain opaque terms whose full meaning has not been sufficiently unpacked in 
terms of plurality. For this purpose, a cross-pollination of social and political theory 
may prove particularly fruitful. 
As a potential avenue for further research, I therefore suggest the combination of 
three concepts of social and political theory: Arendt’s common world, Archer’s 
relational goods and evils, and Rosa’s resonance. Each, I would argue, provides a 
different aspect to conceptualising plurality and goes beyond existing literature, 
including on recognition, solidarity, trust, and friendship, in important ways. Together 
with Pierpaolo Donati, Archer (2015) argues for a conception of relationality as ‘we-
ness’ where the relation itself has emergent properties irreducible to the 
intentionality of the participants. People offer reflexive orientations towards the 
emergent relational goods, e.g. trust, or evils (distrust). In his recent monograph 
Resonanz: Eine Soziologie der Weltbeziehung (Rosa, 2016; transl. Resonance: A 
sociology of the relationship to the world), social theorist Hartmut Rosa argues that 
in a sociology (and world) narrowly focused on the distribution of resources, critical 
theory must concern itself with the elementary issue of the state of human 
relationships with the world. His work looks at how people resonate with the world, 
as a suitable response to forms of alienation. A comparative analysis could help 
capture a refined understanding of the potential in human plurality as an irreducible, 
distinct socio-political phenomenon. 
With these three theorists, it is my intuition that it is our responsibility as academics 
to articulate new ways of recuperating a stronger theoretical notion of plurality and 
relationality in order to create a hospitable world as the starting point for tackling 
injustices and oppression. For now, the thesis has shown that judging responsibility-
for-complicity should come with the cultivation of an ethos of reality attentive to the 
three dimensions to being human, structures, agency, and plurality that, together, 
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